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In this issue, we feature twenty contributions from thinkers around the world on 
issues cutting across policy, law, and research in the field of forced migration studies. 
Continuing OxMo’s long-standing tradition of offering space for critical and oft-
neglected perspectives in the global discourse on displacement, several of this issue’s 
authors contribute their personal critiques, insights, and policy recommendations 
from their own experience of displacement. 
In the first hand section, two resettled refugees in the UK make the case for scaling up 
resettlement, while a resident of Kakuma refugee camp urges us to rethink self-reliance 
strategies in Kenya and beyond. Together, they reflect on the role and potential of 
policy in enabling displaced individuals to shape and reconstitute meaningful lives 
in and beyond displacement. Contributors to the Artistic and Field sections further 
explore themes of integration, bureaucracy, and discrimination from the perspective 
of researchers who have experienced asylum and integration first hand. While the 
photography taken by a Kyrgyz researcher during his personal journey through the 
British asylum system explores the materiality of bureaucracy and everyday life, 
another contribution reflects on the positionality, practice, and experiences of a 
refugee-researcher addressing bottom-up integration in Europe.
This issue’s contributions speak to varied geographical, as well as historical, contexts: 
from competing forms of colonialism in Mozambique to contesting power at the British-
French border zone; they offer broader theoretical insights into the displacement, 
contestation, and injustices to which coercive practices of colonialism and border 
enforcement have given rise. The issue further shines a new light on long-standing 
challenges, such as the statelessness of Syrians and the protracted suffering of refugees 
on Greek islands. Throughout the volume, our contributors continue to expose gaps 
and challenges in the current protection regimes for displaced individuals, whether it 
be the legal limbo of refugees in Hong Kong, protection challenges of North Koreans 
in China, limitations of the legal framework on indigenous migration, or the pending 
fate of the refugee regime in Central America. 
The issue also considers nascent themes in the study of forced migration, in 
particular focusing on climate-induced displacement. Encouraging an understanding 
of environmental displacement both from ‘below’ and ‘above’, our authors in turn 
explore the link between water scarcity and mobility in southern Iraq - urging for 
greater understandings of local perspectives on climate-displacement - and share their 
reflections on the use of satellite imagery to overcome methodological challenges 
in studying this form of displacement. These different perspectives contribute to a 
burgeoning conversation on environmental displacement and provide avenues for 
better understanding and responding to environmental distress.  
As in our previous issue, we are proud to feature artistic and creative expressions 
and to publish pieces in different languages. This time, we would like to draw your 
attention to poetry featured in both English and Tigrinya written by an Eritrean refugee 
in Ethiopia, as well as English-language poems drawing on themes of displacement, 
migration, and family.   
vFinally, we would like to thank everyone who has worked tirelessly over the past 
months to put together OxMo’s Volume 8.2, not least the editors and authors without 
whom this issue would not have been possible. We would also like to express our 
gratitude to the staff and faculty of the University of Oxford for their continued and 
strong support of OxMo.
We hope you will find joy, inspiration, as well as food for thought and action in 
engaging with the ideas, images, critical reflections, and personal stories of OxMo’s 
Volume 8.2.
Enjoy reading!
Chloe Marshall-Denton & Lena Kainz
Co-Editors-in-Chief
Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration
1Why Resettlement?
heba anD nour1 
1 The authors prefer only using their first names.
We are Nour and Heba, Syrian 
refugees who resettled from Jordan to 
Wales in August 2018. We have been 
refugees for seven years. The war 
destroyed everything in our lives, our 
houses, our jobs, and our dreams. We 
lost some of our relatives. The war has 
scattered our siblings across the world 
and we lost the simplest right to live 
together as a family. Two of our brothers 
are in Saudi Arabia and we have not seen 
them for nine years. Our other brother is 
in Germany. We still feel the impact of 
war, especially during Ramadan, which 
we cannot celebrate as before because 
it should be celebrated with family. 
Nonetheless, we are fortunate for the 
UNHCR resettlement programme, which 
transfers refugees to a country that has 
agreed to admit them and provide 
permanent protection, and to relocate 
to the United Kingdom (UK). 
We are involved in the VOICES 
Network, which is a network of refugees 
and asylum seekers in the UK. As 
VOICES Ambassadors we are happy 
to share our experience with the hope 
that our stories will inform policies 
and services, influence news stories to 
portray the realities of refugees and 
counteract negative and politicized 
sentiments about refugees in countries 
of resettlement. We want to share our 
experience of resettlement which is 
very important for the international 
protection of refugees. 
Life in a host country
In 2013, we moved to Egypt to seek 
safety. But after a few months, a political 
coup in Egypt meant that we had to 
move again, this time to Jordan. We 
thought that if we worked hard in our 
host country, we could rebuild our life 
there. However, it was difficult to support 
our living costs since our legal status did 
not permit us to work. 
Nour: In Jordan, I was lucky to 
continue my university education 
in accounting. Most Syrians without 
any identity documents were not 
allowed to go to school. It took 
three years to get my ID and enroll 
in school, which is a huge amount 
of time in a person’s life. I was lucky 
because my brother was able to 
financially support my university 
attendance since I had to pay for 
the university each term. 
Heba: Even though I already have 
experience and certificates in 
accounting from Syria, it was illegal 
for me to work as a refugee in Jordan. 
I was frustrated and felt that this rule 
is unfair. Most refugees who tried 
to work illegally were exploited by 
really low salaries and long working 
hours. If the government caught 
them working, they would be sent 
back to their home country. 
We joined a volunteering group 
which provided services and aid for 
refugee families at the Jordanian 
border. We thought that we were in 
bad circumstances until we met refugee 
families in those poor camps. The camps 
didn’t even have the basic necessities for 
life. There was no electricity and not 
enough space to sleep inside the tents. 
The worst time was the winter when 
it rained and snowed. People had no 
choice but to stay in tents or risk their 
lives. How could they have a normal life 
while finding themselves in this horrible 
situation?
Later, we volunteered in a psychological 
support centre. The children we worked 
with were not only suffering from the war 
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and their resulting trauma, but they were 
also negatively affected by their parents’ 
own war trauma. They could not treat 
their children the way they should. 
Heba: An eight-year-old girl’s 
experience was particularly heart-
breaking to me. She did not speak 
to anyone except her mother. The 
mother would record a video of 
her child asking questions about 
homework and then send the video 
to her teacher. Since I met that girl, I 
have twice had dreams in which she 
spoke to me.
Deciding to resettle to the UK
In Jordan, we were told that we would 
be safer if we applied for UNHCR refugee 
status and no one could send us back to 
Syria. Three years after applying, UNHCR 
told us that we would be resettled to 
the UK. The resettlement process was 
not easy. We had many questions about 
the implications of moving to another 
country. If we left Jordan, we would 
not be allowed to come back. We had 
mixed feelings about going to the UK. 
We were not sure if life in the UK would 
be good or bad. There would definitely 
be challenges because each time we 
moved from one country to another, it 
took us a lot of time and effort to get 
used to the new place. 
The resettlement process started with 
a short course provided by UNHCR about 
the life in the UK including culture, laws, 
education, work, and rights. It helped us 
imagine possibilities for our future. We 
became happier and were persuaded 
that resettlement would turn out very 
well. We knew that Jordan was not the 
right country for us to rebuild our lives; 
we felt like prisoners since Syrians were 
neither permitted to work nor leave the 
country. The uncertainty and lack of 
opportunities in Jordan helped us make 
our decision to resettle to the UK. The 
resettlement option appeared to be a 
great one for us, even though we heard 
that many refugees drop out due to the 
unknown and the fear of starting again.
FIRST HAND
Children in one of the camps at the Jordanian-Syrian border.
Omair Tabekh
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Life as a resettled refugee
We were anxious when we first arrived 
in the UK because we did not know much 
about the society or how British citizens 
would treat refugees. It did not take 
long after we arrived for us to see that 
the UK respects human rights, equality 
and diversity. For us, seeing both a 
church and a mosque in the same area 
illustrated the coexistence of religions. 
The Welsh government assigned us 
a support worker who helped us from 
our very first day in the UK. Before we 
arrived, they had furnished and cleaned 
our house. They also provided a short 
course on living in the UK. More than 
one year after our arrival, they are still 
helping us settle in Wales. 
Nour: For me, resettlement means 
starting over. I had attended three 
years of university in Jordan studying 
accounting. I had excellent grades 
during my studies, and I expected 
that I would only need to take one 
more year of university in the UK 
and then I could graduate. But this 
was not the case. I had to start from 
the beginning. Resettlement is not 
an easy decision because every 
time we move to another country, 
we start over. I have been improving 
my English for the past year, and am 
now enrolled at a local university in 
accounting and finance. I still have 
to pay tuition fees in the UK, but 
unlike in Jordan, at least I can get a 
loan to continue my education.
Heba: As a resettled refugee, I have 
a right to work. I can choose what I 
want to do, and train myself in that 
sector. We are treated as citizens 
in the UK with the same rights as 
British people. We are not treated 
as foreigners which is crucial in 
helping me to move on with my 
life. I am eager to learn new skills 
and I am interested in volunteer 
work to help people and give 
back to the community. I tutor a 
secondary school student in Arabic 
and recently started volunteering to 
befriend elderly people. 
We have been spending our time here 
by attending regular classes to improve 
our English skills. We both engage in 
community activities like the VOICES 
Network to portray positive images of 
refugees. Starting over and building a 
new life is not an easy task, but we are full 
of hope that the best opportunities are 
out there, and that they are yet to come.  
Resettlement matters
Regardless of their country of 
origin, most people want to advance 
and create meaningful lives for 
themselves. Becoming a refugee does 
not make these aspirations go away. 
Refugees are often seen as exploiting the 
benefits of western governments even 
though many who come to the UK and 
Europe contribute to the economy and 
help others in their new communities. 
People who want to rebuild their lives 
are not the problem. The problems are 
the terrible circumstances which cause 
them to flee and the difficult life of a 
refugee.
There are many people who risked 
their lives crossing the Mediterranean 
Sea who deserve the same chance that 
we have in the UK. That little girl who 
cannot speak to anyone but her mother, 
whose smile we cannot forget, deserves 
to live a good life. Those families left 
to live in tents deserve enough space 
to sleep and warm winter clothes. Our 
family should be together to share 
good and bad times. Refugees are no 
different from any other people and we 
want to have a meaningful life as much 
as anybody else. We hope that new 
initiatives like the Global Compact on 
Refugees will encourage the UK and 
other countries to continue or start to 
resettle many more refugees so that 
they can have a safe and good life like us.
FIRST HAND
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According to the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
there are more than 70.8 million people 
who are displaced.1 This figure, out of 
which 25.9 million persons are refugees, 
accounts for more than the total 
population of France. As prolonged 
temporary humanitarian aid has created 
dependency and hopelessness among 
large parts of this population, the 
international community has shifted its 
focus toward strengthening the ability 
of refugees to live independently 
from humanitarian assistance (i.e. self-
reliance).2 The current self-reliance 
programming, however, has its own 
risk as it mainly focuses on creating 
jobs that don’t go beyond temporary 
lifesaving economic gains; it also 
neither fully considers specific contexts 
nor addresses it strictly at an individual 
level. Understanding the challenges 
of achieving self-reliance in view of 
individual rights and capabilities is vital 
to successfully facilitate the process. This 
essay discusses self-reliance through the 
lens of a refugee, seeing her or him as 
an independent and dignified human 
being. As such, I critically explore the 
existence of ‘group-reliance’ or ‘group 
dignity’ in a situation where individual 
self-reliance and identity is in question. 
The intended goal of self-reliance 
programming to me, as a refugee, is to 
1 Out of this 70.8 million displaced people, 41.3 are internally 
displaced people, and 3.5 million are asylum seekers. 
UNHCR, ‘Figures at a Glance’, accessed 27 October 2019, 
https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html.
2 The UNHCR handbook defines self-reliance as ‘the social 
and economic ability of an individual, a household or a 
community to meet essential needs (including protection, 
food, water, shelter, personal safety, health, and education) 
in a sustainable manner and with dignity. Self-reliance, 
as a programme approach, refers to developing and 
strengthening livelihoods of persons of concern, and 
reducing their vulnerability and long-term reliance on 
humanitarian/external assistance.’ UNHCR, Handbook for 
Self-reliance’ (Geneva: UNHCR, Reintegration and Local 
Settlement Section, August 2005), https://www.unhcr.
org/44bf7b012.pdf.
make sure we refugees stand for ourselves 
and continue to thrive and meet our 
own needs so that we are not reduced 
to a mere burden of humanitarian aid 
agencies and host nations. If one tries to 
define ‘self’ in self-reliance focusing on 
the fundamental conditions of a human 
being, this definition might comprise 
only ones’ physical nature and basic 
physiological needs. Consequently, 
this leads to common attributes (e.g. 
a physical needs like food, health, and 
water) being considered over individual 
differences (e.g. being a farmer, a 
social worker, an artist, mother, etc), or 
metaphorically speaking, on the forest 
rather than the trees. As a result, the 
scope of self-reliance mainly captures 
the essential needs of an individual and 
overlooks their specific life experiences, 
talents, and capabilities. If a person 
is only able to satisfy those essential 
needs (food, water, etc.), it does not 
mean that the self truly exists and can be 
relied upon, even if that person appears 
physically well. Instead, facilitating self-
reliance must start with recognising that 
self, whose potential can then be utilised 
and strengthened in order to proactively 
start being relied upon. A development 
intervention should, therefore, focus 
on channeling individual capabilities 
to where they are most productive; 
just like a diligent teacher focuses on 
teaching or a farmer on farming. In 
short, strengthening self-reliance should 
ideally involve creating space to freely 
utilise already existing capabilities – 
and ultimately ensure that a refugee 
maintains his or her agency and dignity.
As stated in the UNHCR Handbook, 
when an individual case has been taken 
into account, livelihood interventions can 
be better tailored around the individual 
initiatives of refugees, and better focus 
on alleviating barriers, such as rights 
related to free movement, property, 
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getting permits, etc.3 On the contrary, 
if livelihood interventions focus on, for 
example, the availability of resources 
or ease at which they can be deployed 
(supply-driven approach),4 achieving 
self-reliance becomes more unlikely. A 
good example of associated challenges 
of this supply-driven approach is the 
short training that various organisations 
have been aggressively offering here 
in Kakuma refugee camp – so far it has 
provided us with a bunch of certificates. 
Such training helps to keep hope 
alive but so far doesn’t go far beyond 
that. There are a good number of 
entrepreneurs who have been trying 
to do businesses but failed because of 
obstacles related to restrictions on free 
movement, permits, equipment, access 
to market, etc. There are also many high 
school and post-secondary graduates 
who are competent enough to be 
employed in different organisations, but 
they lack such paid opportunities and 
are only offered volunteer positions. 
Instead of creating a fashion of 
‘volunteerism’ or group support, 
organisations should focus on individual 
support that considers what each 
person requires to overcome barriers 
even within similar group contexts. For 
example, the barrier of one refugee 
farmer may take shape in the form of a 
deep-water well that he relies upon to 
develop his farmyard throughout the 
year; but for the other farmer it may be 
the lack of good quality seeds instead. 
Similarly, for one trader the barrier may 
be related to movement restrictions 
3 UNHCR, Handbook for Self-reliance’ (Geneva: UNHCR, 
Reintegration and Local Settlement Section, August 2005), 
https://www.unhcr.org/44bf7b012.pdf. 
4 This describes an approach whereby an organisation 
brings support that is available and easily implementable 
without necessarily considering the context, background 
and interest of individuals. From personal experience, those 
at the receiving end of this type of assistance often see a 
mismatch between our needs and interests and the support 
that is provided through an intervention. The underlying 
belief appears to be ‘something is better than nothing’. 
Still, we often make use of this support because of the same 
belief; however, it does not bring any significant change and 
often makes us more dependent on support (rather than 
self-reliant).
whereas the other may require support 
with strengthening the supply chain to 
get better products and reach more 
customers.  
In order to follow such an individualised 
approach, humanitarian actors must 
look beyond the patronising ‘refugee’ 
label: a refugee is also a teacher, farmer, 
barber, translator, etc., and developing 
these identities further catalyses their 
progress towards self-reliance. If such 
actors ignore this fact and pursue a 
supply-driven support model instead, 
it forces those at the receiving end of 
the intervention to give up part of their 
identity (e.g. everything beyond what 
the term refugee can capture), or even 
to create and adjust to a new, pseudo 
identity. In terms of self-reliance, the 
question then is ‘how can you rely on 
yourself without being yourself?’
Humanitarian aid workers should also 
program a relevant intervention with due 
consideration (and use) of the specific 
context of the intervention and the 
individual at the receiving end. In short, 
when organisations try to understand 
the context and individual needs, they 
themselves rely on the active involvement 
and information provided by refugees; a 
starting point where refugees become 
their own agents. Such approach, for 
instance, reduces ‘recycling’ projects 
and programmes in a situation where 
needs are continuously changing. 
Maintaining those considerations can 
help transform an intervention from 
a ‘top-down’ (supply-driven) process 
easily to a ‘bottom-up’ (self-reliance) one. 
The UNHCR self-reliance framework 
also indicates that the successful design 
and implementation of an intervention 
is a continuous long-term process that 
incorporates refugees’ self-reliance in 
the overall development planning and 
implementation process.5 Starting this 
process by recognising the existence of 
a self (beyond the refugee term) in turn 
helps humanitarian workers to capture 
5 UNHCR, Handbook for Self-reliance’ (Geneva: UNHCR, 
Reintegration and Local Settlement Section, August 2005), 
https://www.unhcr.org/44bf7b012.pdf.
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and support the short- and long-term 
goals of individual refugees. To adjust 
or scale up such programmes, it requires 
monitoring and evaluation standards, 
tools, and indicators that seek and 
value refugees’ participation. Excluding 
refugees and other beneficiaries from 
the evaluation process does not only 
conceal the full picture of the intervention 
but also discredits their struggle towards 
self-reliance, takes away their agency, 
and denies their dignity. 
To conclude, as a refugee—but 
also as a teacher, a development 
worker, and a dignified individual in 
the broader sense—I think that one 
can only be self-reliant if his or her 
‘self’ is recognised legally and socially 
within the development terminology; 
but not only as a person of concern. 
Moreover, concealing individuals’ self 
under the guise of ‘group self-reliance’ 
is counterproductive and only leads to 
underutilising the nuanced capabilities 
that individuals could otherwise rely 
upon; such groups are always the 
product of self-reliant individuals who 
seek collaboration and synergy.  
A woman preparing vegetables for sale in the 
Kalobeyie integrated refugee settlement area. 
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The author
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Why I Leave Home
Yohana teKeste
ብ    ዮሃና ተከስተ
ተወሊደ ኣብ ምድረ በዳ
ዓብየ ብናይ ሓሶት ተስፋ





ራኢኦም ጸልሚቱ መለሳ ዘይብሉ
ኣእምርኦም ሰፊሕ ቅንጥብጣብ ዝሓስቡ
ኣየር ብብዝሑ ትንፋሶም ተዓፊኑ
ምንባር ሓርቢትዎም ተስፋ ዝሰኣኑ
ተልእኾ ኣድኪሙኒ ዕላማ ዘይብሉ
ቃልሲ ደኣ ናይ ኣቦይ እንድኣሉ
እግሩ ዝወሰደ መጻእየይ መንጢሉ
ጓሂ’ዶ ደኣ ክቀትለኒ እንታይ ኣለኒ ዕዳ
ንሕልመይ ምብካየይ ገበን ኮይኑ ግዳ
ስሙ’ኳ ዘይፈለጦ እንትርፎ ክርእዮ
ስደት ዓዲ ጓና መኣስ ተመንየዮ
ዝብላዕ ስኢነ’ዶ ዑቅባ ሓቲተዮም
ሕልናይ’ዩ ጠምዩ ናጽነት ምስ ሰላም
ዓደይ ብምግዳፈይ ኮይነ ድየ ጠላም፧
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I was born in a desert
In which I grew up with false hope
Eyes red, heart always aching
Free classes opportunities zero
I tried to look to those who were before
No change I could see
Mind so big, thinking so small
Too much air, couldn’t breathe any more
Tired of missions without aim
The struggle took my father’s leg and my future, too
My illness can kill if I don’t leave!
Can this be crime to save my prime?
Seeking for a place which I cannot even name
Asking for asylum, it was not for food
More a hunger for freedom leading to peace
Was it my fault for leaving home?
POETRY
The author
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poems, in which she finds a way to expresses her 
real feelings. If you are interested in following 
her work, she also has a Telegram channel 





My sister lost herself,
Crossing the Sahara
She was a soldier
Practically enslaved by the state
who pushed her
 Situps, pressups
  at the barrel of a gun
  Practice, accuracy 
  at the trigger of a gun
   Five-hundred times a day
A soldier
Practically enslaved by the state
who pushed her
encouraged her and the rest of her nation to hate
  the bodies at the other side of the border
  who looked the same
   felt the same
    even had the same names
   but whose fate was drawn with the shape of a line
   a national border of political worthiness, criminality,
          life-time
A soldier
Enslaved by the state




A soldier enslaved by the state
she could not leave
where national borders were barbed wire barrier
     compounds that screamed
‘You belong here!
Thou shall not pass
to the other side.
Not without a document
that tells us
      why:
that tells us
 that we say
 that you belong
  outside.
You belong here!
 Isn’t that nice.
 A soldier for your state
 A soldier to the president
 of the only party there will ever be.
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You cannot leave! Because then everyone will see…’
My sister lost herself,
Crossing the Sahara
Uncle at her side
  she passed over the border
in the back of a truck
crammed tight between others
each with one well-packed little bag 
grasped in one hand
as the other holds on
  for dear life
   for the bumps in the Saharan sand
  for the border controls
   for the breath that they held
  for their dear life
   and for the dear life of those they have left behind
My sister lost herself, when, 
crossing the Sahara,
the driver
     with hands already grasped around a fat stash of grubby cash
had a change of heart
and my sister was abandoned
to the sand
the tightly-packed little bag still in one hand
while the other flails
  with nothing to grasp
but sand
and air
and her uncle’s words 
    of despair
  for the lack of direction
 the lack of control
My sister lost herself
She was a soldier
trained 
      like her uncle
and the five other abandonees 
who stood
 beside her
    lost
       in the Sahara
where all the training and press-ups 
at the barrel of a gun
came to 
   none
POETRY
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But by some…
      not ‘miracle’
  nor ‘good fortune’
     but simply being human
 Another one
    another rickety van
 across the sands
  steering wheel in the hands of another trafficking man
They dropped their
  one
     bag
        each
 and ran
My sister was an engineer
She was an unwilling slave, a soldier to the state
who after enforced training
would stay up late




so that the citizens could be
  - maybe one day - free
POETRY
Fences in Calais. 
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But my sister was a soldier
a slave too
and when the opportunity came
she knew
We met over Elsa Kidane
singing at the top of her voice
on the outskirts of… Calais
My sister - and I - lost
in yet more sand
between the dunes
in a barren, town dump, wasteland
A tiny fenced-off area
where permitted women used to hang
to avoid unknown men
and police officers’ hard hands
While many more
along with lone children and fathers and granddads
remained outside:
‘Désolé; we only have beds for a certain number of women whom we have already 
identified.’
We found each other across the music
streaming out between a borrowed phone
held in the same fingers
that held some months before
a little, well-packed bag
now lost to Saharan desert sands
My sister lost herself,
Crossing the Sahara
that never ended
African land became European sand
tiny bits of grit 
  that get stuck under your fingernails
   and never leave the sole of your shoe
   or the soul of you
     a sol-dier 
Practically enslaved by the state
Sit-ups and press-ups
  at the barrel of a gun
turned into scaling spiked fences
  an endless need to run
to dodge racist abuse, state-fed dogs
the eyes of authority, the thud of police batons
the cruelty of traffickers
    and the cruelty of loss
POETRY
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    doubled each time something goes wrong
    each time another friend is suddenly gone
My sister was an engineer
who transformed her study of structural integrity
into late-night plots to skip the country
to scale national borders
overcome emergencies
Because my sister was a soldier
Practically enslaved by the state
by the state to which she’d come
in order to be safe
where most of those around her were soldiers too
and all the new friends, all those that she now knew,
were also trying to do what she was trying to do,
and were trapped there for weeks, months, or years,
or simply disappeared
I lost my sister,
Somewhere beyond the Sahara
We met in Calais,
but I don’t know where she went after
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1950s, one way ticket to cross the Atlantic
Promises and dreams, hopes and fears
Leaving behind all that he thought was his
Warm ocean waters, new food and scents 
Endless summers in that tropical land
Working long hours, his new life began
Friends with different accents
People from other shores
Some had never seen money before
And then the radio announced the rain
Where some of his friends were from
After a drought so painfully long
Immediately they headed home
Rushing to celebrate the new rain 
And that they could live there once again
They left my father, still by the ocean
Waiting patiently for good news to come
From the place he always called home
And Then It Rained...
Carla sofia ferreira fernanDes
Talhadas, the home village of 
the poem’s main character 
which he left in the 1950s to 
return to only twenty years later.
17
OxMo Vol. 8, No. 2POETRY
The author
Carla Sofia Ferreira Fernandes is a former 
humanitarian worker who currently conducts 
research on climate-induced migration in 
Morocco, as part of the PhD programme in Social 
Sustainability and Development of Universidade 
Aberta, Portugal, and in collaboration with the 
research group Societies and Environmental 
Sustainability of the Centre for Functional 
Ecology, Coimbra, Portugal.
18
More Rights, Less Justice: Tribal 
Communities and the Indian Republic
prashant sinGh anD MeGhna sharMa
The recent judgment of the Indian Supreme Court announcing the eviction of over one million forest 
dwelling and tribal communities from their ancestral lands sent shockwaves across the world. The 
order was directed at individuals and groups whose claims for property rights over inhabited lands 
were rejected under the contested Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers Act (2006), 
commonly referred to as the Forest Rights Act (FRA). As per Section 3 of the FRA, forest rights are 
guaranteed to ‘forest dwelling Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest dwellers.’ While the Court 
has stayed the judgment, over one million persons from forest dwelling Scheduled Tribes continue to 
face a legal protection black hole in India. This article explores the marginalising effects of the claim 
adjudication process under the FRA and the ensuing displacement crisis affecting tribal communities 
in India. This article also brings to the foreground an oft-ignored kind of displacement: forced 
displacement resulting from denial of tenure security and land access rights of forest communities. 
Introduction 
Approximately 45.6% of tribal 
communities in rural India suffer 
from absolute poverty and with 
tribal communities constituting 47% 
of the entire displaced population, 
displacement - often resulting from 
infrastructure development projects - 
is accepted as one of the reasons for 
the poor socio-economic indicators 
(Ministry of Statistics and Information 
2011; Mander 2018). 
While development projects are 
known to induce widespread internal 
displacement of the tribal population 
in India, other lesser-known factors also 
contribute to displacement, but have 
not been subject to the same scrutiny 
as development-induced displacement. 
Eviction of tribal communities from 
forest areas has continued since the 
colonial regime, when the British 
government enacted the Indian Forest 
Act in 1927 to capitalise on timber 
production. The legislation empowered 
the British government to rescind the 
land rights of these communities and 
has been an important cause of internal 
displacement since then. In essence, 
the legislation allowed the government 
to declare forests as ‘state property’ 
and consequently excluded the tribal 
communities from their homeland. By 
virtue of this law, the tribal communities 
were turned into encroachers and 
were left at the mercy of the colonial 
government (Prabhu 2010). This law 
continued to serve as the legislative basis 
for forest management even after India 
gained independence.  The later Forest 
Conservation Act of 1980, for example, 
did not break away from this regime, 
but rather maintained the Central 
government’s supremacy in controlling 
forest resources (Goyal 2005). 
In 2006, this legal regime changed 
with the introduction of the Forest 
Rights Act (FRA). The FRA aimed to 
restore the rights of the forest dwelling 
communities in India by empowering 
Gram Sabhas1 to decide the nature and 
extent of the claim of land rights. While 
this law was hailed for its normative 
articulations, the implementation on the 
ground left much to be desired as tribal 
communities have continued to be at 
the risk of being displaced on account 
of being denied their title claims under 
the FRA. This article first considers the 
1 Section 2(g) of the The Forest Rights Act, 2006 provides 
that ‘Gram Sabha’ means a village assembly which shall 
consist of all adult members of a village and in case of States 
having no Panchayats, Padas, Tola and other traditional 
village institutions and elected village committees, with full 
and unrestricted participation of women.
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level. Any person aggrieved the 
decision of Gram Sabha may 
petition to the Sub-Divisional 
Committee and then finally to the 
District Level Committee.  These 
committees are thus constituted 
to decide on the claims denied 
by the subordinate authority. The 
State Level Committee has also 
been constituted to monitor the 
progress of these claims.
• Lastly, the FRA ensures that at 
every step the claimant is given 
a reasonable opportunity to 
present his case and that no claim 
be adjudicated upon without his 
presence.
The failure of the FRA in achieving its 
aim lies in the fact that the due process 
requirements as discussed above are 
seldom followed.  The lack of procedural 
fairness is a result of several institutional 
and structural challenges, such as a lack 
of political will of state governments in 
standing up for rights of forest citizens, 
a lack of coordination between the 
committees set under the Act, and the 
constant undermining of Gram Sabha 
by politicians. In 2010, a committee 
appointed by the Ministry of Tribal 
Affairs found that due to an unnecessary 
rush to clear cases, a large number of 
claims were being rejected without even 
measuring the land. Further, the report 
also stated that the claimants were not 
given adequate grounds for rejection 
of their claims. Moreover, the report 
highlighted the lack of representation of 
some sections of the communities in the 
Forest Rights Committees which was a 
clear violation of FRA (Joint Committee 
2010). Due to budgetary constraints, 
the government has been ineffective in 
spreading awareness about the FRA. In 
the worst cases, the claimants were 
uninformed of the rejection of their 
claims, leaving them with no option to 
exercise their appellate rights under 
the FRA (Socio Legal Information 
Centre 2016). A report also found that 
a majority of the claims were rejected 
implementation shortcomings of the 
FRA before analysing its adjudication 
before the Supreme Court in the recent 
Wildlife First v. Ministry of Forest and 
Environment, Government of India 
case. The article ultimately finds that the 
implementation and adjudication of the 
FRA has resulted in more rights and less 
justice for tribal communities in India.
Lack of procedural fairness under the 
new regime
The FRA was enacted to correct 
the historic injustice done to forest 
dwellers through the Indian Forest Act 
of 1927 and the Forest Conservation 
Act of 1980 by securing their right 
over forest land. Section 3 of the FRA 
entitles them to forest rights, which 
effectively includes the right to own, 
hold, protect, and settle on forest lands 
in addition to recognising their right 
to forest resources and biodiversity. 
In essence, the FRA is a rights-based 
legislation which recognises the rights of 
communities over their forests and lays 
down a procedure by which these rights 
can be secured. The procedure has 
been provided under Section 6 of FRA, 
which appears to have accommodated 
due process requirements.
• Firstly, it recognises Gram Sabha, 
i.e. the village body itself, as the 
primary authority which decides 
the claims under the FRA. The Act 
provides a very clear verification 
procedure that considers 
statements by elders, physical 
evidence of houses and other 
residential structures, and even 
traditional structures, like wells to 
ascertain land claims. 
• Secondly, it lays down a clear 
appellate structure to ensure a 
reasonable opportunity to the 
person aggrieved by the decision 
of Gram Sabha. A committee has 
been formed at the Sub-Divisional 
level, District level, and the State 
LAW MONITOR
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Forest conservation v. Forest Rights: 
A false debate
The internal displacement caused by 
the poor implementation of the FRA had 
not received significant scrutiny until it 
finally took centre-stage on 13 February 
2019, with the judgment of the Supreme 
Court in Wildlife First v. Ministry of Forest 
and Environment, Government of India 
(hereinafter referred as ‘judgment’). The 
petitioner, an NGO focused on wildlife 
protection, brought forward the issue of 
rejection of over two million claims for 
exercising forest rights, as recognised 
under Section 3 of the FRA. The petition 
highlighted that no eviction had yet 
taken place even after the rejection of 
the claims. Accepting the arguments of 
the petitioner, the court in first instance 
ordered the eviction, by July 2019, of 
those with rejected forest rights claims. 
This eviction order was later upheld by 
the Supreme Court. 
The premise of the petitioners’ 
argument was that the forest rights 
as a result of forest officials’2 insistence 
on documentary evidence, which is not 
mandatory as per the FRA (Socio Legal 
Information Centre 2017).  
The FRA implementation has been 
particularly poor with respect to community 
rights. While it is estimated that the FRA has 
the potential to secure the rights of over 
200 million forest dwelling communities in 
over 170,000 villages, it has reached only 
4% of its potential  (Samarthan 2012). The 
poor implementation of the FRA, coupled 
with the low awareness of its provisions 
among marginalised tribal communities 
and difficulties in understanding the 
procedural technicalities, has enabled 
the creation of a regime where the tribal 
population has more rights but less justice. 
2 The term ‘forest officials’ here is used generically to refer to 
the officers of the department of Revenue, Forest and Tribal 
Affairs of the State Government and three members of the 
Panchayati Raj Institutions, who form the composition of Sub 
Divisional Committee, District Level Committee and State 
Level Committee. They are appointed to these committees 
by the respective State Government.
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The ‘tyranny of distance’ between 
India’s forest dwelling communities 
and the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has played a 
proactive role in introducing dynamism 
to the Indian Constitution with respect 
to human rights by expanding the scope 
of the right to life under Article 21 (Basu 
2008). The judgment presented a similar 
opportunity before the Court to advance 
the cause of forest rights and review 
the arbitrary administrative actions that 
undermine the rights granted under 
the FRA. Indeed, in considering how 
the eviction order risks resulting in 
the displacement of millions of tribal 
persons, the Court could have found 
a violation of the fundamental right of 
livelihood guaranteed under Article 21. 
Yet, while hearing the case, the 
Supreme Court was not made aware 
of the lack of procedural fairness that 
caused the rejection of most claims in the 
first place, as discussed in the previous 
section. This is because the government 
did not present the case of the tribal 
communities at the Supreme Court and 
tribal communities were left without 
legal representation. Hence, the court 
ruled only on the basis of the account 
presented by the forest conservationist 
organisation petitioner.  
Furthermore, the judiciary erred in 
inferring that the statutory consequence 
of upholding the rejection of claims 
under the FRA is necessarily the 
eviction of forest dwelling communities. 
However, the provisions of the FRA are 
silent on the required course of action in 
cases of rejection of claims. This created 
a situation of legal ambiguity in which 
the Court should have, according to 
the rules of interpretation, inferred a 
meaning that upholds the rights of forest 
dwelling communities and not vice-
versa. The case of the communities was 
further weakened by the apathy of the 
state, which did not defend the law or 
challenge this eviction before the court. 
The court’s failure to recognise the lack 
of representation of the forest dwelling 
regime is antithetical to forest 
conservation, protection of wildlife, and 
biodiversity. It is interesting to point 
out here that the petitioners specifically 
pleaded for eviction of communities. 
However, the legislative scheme of 
the FRA provides that even in case of 
rejection of claims, the communities can 
only be disallowed from exercising the 
right of self-cultivation.3 As such, the 
concern for forest conservation could 
have been effectively addressed by 
taking the legal recourse under the FRA, 
which provides for denial of cultivation 
rights but not for eviction. Eviction 
and displacement of millions of forest 
dwellers is not a proportionate response 
to address the issue of conservation. 
In view of the above, it is clear that 
the regulatory discourse around the FRA 
is marred by a false dilemma between 
forest conservation and forest rights, 
leading a section of conservationists to 
connect the FRA implementation with 
environmental harm, as was raised by the 
petitioners in this case. Contrary to this 
notion, however, the tribal areas in India 
have seen a recorded increase in forest 
cover. The forest cover report credits the 
increase to the conservation measures 
undertaken by forest communities 
themselves (MoEFCC 2017). In 2016, 40 
international conservation organisations 
and experts wrote to the government 
calling for effective implementation 
of the FRA, noting that ‘disregarding 
the Forest Rights Act or undermining 
it will greatly damage environmental 
protection in the country’ (Group 
of Indian Conservationists 2016). 
Researchers also claimed that the FRA 
‘has the potential to recognize the 
diversity of use, access, and conservation 
practices and traditional knowledge of 
forest communities’ (Dash 2010). 
3 Forest Rules Clause 12 A (8) defines self-cultivation as 
including activities ancillary to cultivation such as keeping 
cattle, winnowing and other post-harvest activities, rotational 
fallows, tree crops, and storage of produce.
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‘Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in the 
Context of Borders, Migration and 
Displacement’: A UN Study on 
Indigenous Migration
anne-Céline leYvraz
In July 2019, the UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (EMRIP) issued a study 
on Indigenous Peoples’ rights in the context of borders, migration, and displacement. This study 
addresses important contemporary challenges that Indigenous Peoples face throughout the world, 
such as forced displacement, discrimination, non-recognition, and restricted transnational mobilities, 
and contests the presumption of Indigenous Peoples as static and embedded groups. The content 
of the study and its analysis of the applicable legal framework deserves scholarly attention and could 
lead to increasing policy awareness on this underexplored area in migration research. Their mobilities 
raises conceptual and practical questions for forced — as well as voluntary — migration. As indigenous 
migration challenges the very dichotomy between international/national migration, it questions current 
legal categorisation and calls for different approaches to apprehend the existing legal framework. The 
present contribution discusses the legal framework applicable to indigenous migration, as developed 
in the EMRIP study, and pinpoints areas that still require further investigation. 
Introduction 
‘It is important to note that many of these 
children speak indigenous languages 
(…) We are caging indigenous people’, 
tweeted a congresswoman from the 
United States of America after visiting 
detention centres for immigrants 
during the summer 2019.1 A few weeks 
later, the murder of Emyra Waiãpi, an 
indigenous leader from Brazil, and the 
subsequent flight of the community 
from their ancestral land due to a 
lack of security sparked international 
indignation (IWGIA 2019). These two 
examples describe different contexts 
but portray the topicality, diversity, and 
challenges surrounding recognition 
of indigenous migration. Despite this 
topicality, only limited research has been 
undertaken since Yesca’s (2008) report 
for the International Organization for 
Migration, which tackled the causes and 
modalities of indigenous migration, and, 
importantly, challenged the portrayal 
of Indigenous Peoples as immobile 
1 Twitter account of Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (consulted in 
July 2019).
communities. More recently, however, 
the United Nations Expert Mechanism 
on the Right of Indigenous Peoples (the 
EMRIP) undertook a study on migration 
and Indigenous Peoples (‘the study’ or 
‘the EMRIP study’), titled ‘Indigenous 
peoples’ rights in the context of borders, 
migration and displacement’. While 
indigenous migration assumes different 
forms and precedes both colonisation 
and the creation of states, contemporary 
indigenous migration is relevant to 
forced migration studies.
In this contribution, I first address 
how the EMRIP and its work fit within 
the UN human rights system and then 
present different forms of indigenous 
forced migration. Following this 
contextualisation, I discuss the content 
of the study and underline that the legal 
framework addresses the specificity and 
commonness of indigenous migration.2 
2 This contribution stems from an ongoing research project 
titled, ‘Asylum and Indigeneity in the Context of Ongoing 
Displacement on the Ecuadorian and Colombian Border: a 
Legal and Anthropological Analysis’. The project is conducted by 
Anne Lavanchy (HES-SO HETS Geneva), Johannes Waldmüller 
(UDLA Quito), Camilo Eduardo Umaña Hernández (UExternado, 
Bogotá) and Anne-Cécile Leyvraz (HES-SO HETSL Lausanne). 
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.
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indigenous individuals in vulnerable 
situations (Expert Mechanism on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples 2018). 
Involuntary mobility presents itself as 
a frequent feature in the context of 
indigenous migration.
The multiple root causes of forced 
indigenous migration
 
Poverty,3 structural discrimination, 
inequalities, and human rights violations 
are powerful factors for forced 
indigenous migration (Berger 2019). An 
underlying cause lies in the difficulty 
for Indigenous Peoples to secure legal, 
social and/or political recognition, 
and territorial sovereignty at the state 
level (Bellier and Préaud 2011). They 
endure threats, violence, and murder 
that may lead to the displacement of 
the entire community from their land 
(Berger 2019). This may result from 
predatory behaviour on indigenous 
land by private companies working 
with or without government approval, 
and is also related to criminality of 
private groups (Watts 2017). While 
development is responsible for mass 
forced displacement, eco-tourism also 
leads to expulsions and forced removal 
in different parts of the world, such as 
Brazil, Mexico, Tanzania, and Mexico 
(Human Rights Council 2019). Conflicts, 
forced evictions and criminalisation of 
indigenous human rights defenders 
add to the list of causes. The forced 
displacement of indigenous populations 
creates an additional layer of vulnerability 
and difficulty to secure human rights. 
Yet, the study by the Expert Mechanism 
does not provide sufficient legal analysis 
on the parameters of indigenous rights 
and protection mechanisms in situations 
of forced displacement.
 
3 As stated under paragraph 20 of the EMRIP study, ‘they 
make up 5 per cent of the world’s population but account for 
15 per cent of the poorest’.
However, I contend firstly that it merely 
lists applicable rights and does not 
sufficiently describe how they would 
apply in the context of indigenous 
migration; secondly that it does not 
explicitly differentiate binding from non-
binding international norms; and finally, 
that it should have considered legal 
developments arising from outside the 
UN system. Alongside existing initiatives 
to ensure respect for the UN Declaration 
for the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, my 
article seeks to contribute to discussions 
of the legal framework on indigenous 
migration by identifying features that 
need further improvement and proposes 
possible measures to that end. 
Flagging the migration - Indigenous 
Peoples nexus
Created in 2007 following the 
adoption of the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the EMRIP 
provides expertise and advice to the 
Human Rights Council on matters related 
to Indigenous Peoples’ rights. The study 
was issued during the 2019 summer 
session and was developed initially 
as part of the Mechanism’s amended 
mandate, which requires the subsidiary 
body to ‘[p]repare an annual study on 
the status of the rights of indigenous 
peoples worldwide in the achievement 
of the ends of the Declaration’ (Human 
Rights Council 2016: para. 2 (a)). The 
decision to address migration and 
displacement in the context of border 
control was made at the 2018 session, 
held in July in Geneva. The Mechanism 
then organised a two-day seminar in 
November 2018 in Thailand for member 
States, Indigenous Peoples, national 
human rights institutions, and scholars. 
The study emphasises the causes of 
migration, legal considerations of 
trans-border movement of Indigenous 
Peoples, internal migration, and calls 
for specific attention to be paid to 
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Rights Council 2019: para. 6). Yet, the 
call for a human rights-based approach 
resonates beyond indigenous migration 
to encompass all forms of migration 
among all peoples.
Additionally, States have an 
obligation to uphold collective rights, 
such as self-determination, enshrined 
in the 2007 Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples, as well as in 
the 1966 International Covenants. Self-
determination is a ‘foundational right 
upon which all other rights of Indigenous 
Peoples are dependent’, an affirmation 
valid beyond a migratory context 
(Human Rights Council 2019: para. 10; 
Weller 2018).
Shortcomings and oversights of the 
study 
The legal framework presented in 
the EMRIP study suffers three major 
weaknesses. In a way or another, they 
each hinder the significance, legal 
clarity, and practicality of the study. First, 
while accurate and conforming with the 
definition provided by the International 
Organization for Migration,4 , the 
working definition of ‘migration’ 
referred to in the study is broad and 
encompasses various manifestations of 
this phenomenon.5 Keeping up with this 
breadth, the study tackles situations of 
voluntary return, forced displacement—
which can be induced by events such 
as climate-change or armed conflict—
eviction from home, and labour 
migration. Attempts to encompass 
the diversity of indigenous migration 
should be welcomed, however, it comes 
4 The definition provided on the website of the IOM reads 
as follow: ‘Migration - The movement of persons away from 
their place of usual residence, either across an international 
border or within a State’. International Organization for 
Migration, Key Migration Terms. Available from: https://
www.iom.int/key-migration-terms (consulted on November 
8th 2019)
5 The definition reads as follow: ‘In the context of the 
present study: the term “migration” refers to all movements 
of indigenous peoples, internal and across international 
borders’ (Human Rights Council 2019, n. 2).
The legal framework: a mixed result
International migration law “is 
sometimes described as […] a ‘giant 
unassembled juridical jigsaw puzzle, [in 
which] the number of pieces is uncertain 
and the grand design is still emerging’” 
(Lillich 1984, cited in Chetail 2017). 
The metaphor refers to scattered and 
disseminated norms and principles. The 
legal framework on indigenous migration 
presented in the EMRIP study also is a 
puzzle of sorts. While ambitious in scope, 
it refers to a range of relevant human 
rights treaties, soft-law instruments, and 
documents adopted by UN agencies, 
and only provides for an unsystematised 
fragment of the ‘grand design’. 
The commonness and distinctiveness of 
indigenous migration
The study accurately recalls that 
the existence of collective rights does 
not preclude the validity of traditional 
individualised human rights, as 
enshrined in international and regional 
treaties. Just as is the case for non–
indigenous migrants, indigenous 
migrants have the right to seek asylum 
and receive refugee status. They should 
be protected from forced arbitrary 
displacement, should not be subjected 
to torture or inhuman treatment, 
and children should not be detained 
for reasons related to their parents’ 
migratory status. These examples shed 
light on shared experiences of violence 
against indigenous and non-indigenous 
migrants during the migratory process, 
and recalls that the 2007 Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
should be interpreted in the light of 
international human rights standards. 
As for the distinctiveness, the study 
highlights the ‘particularly vulnerable 
situation’ indigenous migrants face due 
to the ‘current context of migration 
involving a global pushback against 
human rights, political instability, weak 
democracies and military use’ (Human 
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alongside Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement and Comments from UN 
Special Rapporteurs. These instruments 
are not all legally binding, as the last 
two are soft in their form. Customary 
norms can be enshrined in non-binding 
instruments, and soft-law instruments 
can restate existing rights. It is the case 
of some articles of the 2007 Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
such as norms preventing discrimination 
or securing land rights (Åhrén 2014; 
Rodríguez-Piñero Royo 2014). This 
should not, however, have prevented 
an explicit distinction between binding 
and non-binding instruments in order 
to systematize which instruments are 
mandatory and which instruments have 
a different function in the international 
legal order. It is not to say that soft 
law instruments should be discarded. 
On the contrary, as is the case with 
other human rights related topics, they 
cannot be disregarded as they provide 
practical guidance, for example through 
interpretative work (Chetail 2014; 
Saroléa 2006; Blake 2008).
Finally, the legal framework presented 
in the study fails to pay sufficient 
consideration to the rich case law of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
with a drawback: the legal analysis is 
vague and superficial. For example, 
the study mentions the International 
Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers when 
addressing labour migration, but fails 
to explain how it applies in the context 
of indigenous migration, nor does it 
explicitly state that other instruments, 
such as the Convention n°169, are 
equally relevant for labour migration of 
indigenous individuals (Human Rights 
Council 2019: para. 15). Adopted in 
1989 under the ambit of the International 
Labour Organization, the ‘Indigenous 
and Tribal Convention’ enshrines labour 
rights applicable to Indigenous Peoples, 
whether migrants or nationals. Instead, 
the study mentions Convention n°169 
to address cross-border migration and 
relocation (Human Rights Council 2019: 
para. 16). 
Secondly, the legal framework 
depicted in the EMRIP study emerges as 
a kind of patchwork, that refers to both 
binding and non–binding instruments. 
Treaties, such as the Indigenous and Tribal 
Convention n°169 or the International 
Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families, are presented 
LAW MONITOR
EMRIP forum held once a year in Geneva. 
emriP (2019)
28
OxMo Vol. 8, No. 2
a Court which has been deciding on 
cases related to forced displacements 
of Indigenous Peoples on the continent 
for years. It has decided on disputes 
involving forcibly displaced indigenous 
communities and also had the opportunity 
to tackle the presence of non-community 
members transiting and settling on 
indigenous territory. The same criticism 
can be made with respect to decisions 
adopted by the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights. While case-
law is only mandatory for the parties 
to the dispute, it nevertheless gives 
meaning to international norms (Daillier 
and Pellet 2002).
Conclusion
This contribution has discussed a recent 
study on indigenous migration from a legal 
perspective and underlined strengths 
and weaknesses of the legal framework 
presented in the study. Indigenous 
migration should not be conceptually and 
analytically disconnected from commonly 
understood definitions of migration, but 
the specificities of Indigenous Peoples 
cannot be disregarded. Additional legal 
research is still necessary to further 
contribute to the understanding and 
implementation of the UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 
the context of migration. Future research 
should also pay due consideration to 
existing decisions adopted by regional 
judicial bodies. And as research moves 
forward, it should also consider how 
indigenous migration challenges current 
approach to migration and mobilities and 
build on a legal framework that complies 
with their own ontologies. 
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When ‘Qualifying’ as a Refugee Gets You 
Permanent ‘Illegal’ Status in Hong Kong
annie li
Debates around the categorical difference between refugees and migrants are often underpinned by 
the idea that refugees enjoy better protection than other migrants. However, this is not necessarily 
the case in Hong Kong. Advocacy for both the application of the Refugee Convention in Hong Kong 
alongside non-Refugee Convention forms of admission and stay needs to be stepped up to ensure 
individuals are offered the protection they need.
The debate about whether refugees are 
categorically different to migrants and so 
should be treated as non-migrants is often 
informed by the idea that refugees enjoy 
better protection than other migrants. 
However, this is not true everywhere. 
In some jurisdictions, refugee status 
severely limits access to rights.
In Hong Kong, the 1951 Refugee 
Convention does not apply, as China 
has not extended its application to the 
territory.1 However, the Government of 
Hong Kong has a policy of giving non-
refoulement protection to those that 
meet an adapted definition of ‘refugee’ 
under the Refugee Convention, as well as 
those that face risks of torture or violation 
of certain rights enshrined in the Hong 
Kong Bill of Rights (Hong Kong Bill of 
Rights Ordinance 2017). Generally, only 
persons subject to removal can apply 
for this protection, and their ‘illegal 
immigrant’ status remains even when 
non-refoulement protection is granted. 
Their children, even if born in Hong 
Kong, also inherit this irregular status. 
This classification severely limits 
refugees’ ability to access rights. Most 
significantly, refugees in Hong Kong 
have no right to take up paid or non-
paid work and have limited freedom 
of movement. Furthermore, once a 
refugee leaves Hong Kong, there is 
1 The United Kingdom did not extend the application of 
the 1951 Refugee Convention to Hong Kong before the 
handover of Hong Kong to China in 1997, and China did 
not extend it to Hong Kong either thereafter (See United 
Nations Treaty Collections, at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/
showDetails.aspx?objid=080000028003002e&clang=_en).
no guarantee they can re-enter the 
city. While UNHCR may help refugees 
resettle to another place, as of March 
2018, only four people out of 75 whose 
claims have been substantiated under 
the Refugee Convention grounds since 
Hong Kong began assessing claims 
in 2014 have been resettled (Hong 
Kong Immigration Department 2018). 
Others risk potentially being stuck in 
permanent illegality. 
This means that, contrary to a 
common understanding and the 
principle of non-discrimination, the 
process of seeking refugee status can 
result in an irreversible situation and a 
significantly worse one than for those 
who come to Hong Kong as migrants 
in pursuit of employment, family 
reunification or studies. This differential 
treatment is based on the legal pathway 
taken for migration, which may have no 
correlation with whether the person is 
in need of protection. There are indeed 
people who have moved as labour 
migrants but who also face risks in their 
home countries which relate to one of 
the three grounds for non-refoulement 
recognised in Hong Kong: persecution, 
torture, and violation of rights. Justice 
Centre Hong Kong (2017), for example, 
found two individuals who came to 
Hong Kong on a work visa because 
they faced risks of violence inflicted by 
State officials or domestic violence and 
forced labour. 
In order to enrich discussions on non-
Refugee Convention forms of protection 
in light of the adoption of the Global 
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Although Rose worked for more than 
seven years in Hong Kong, her situation 
was compounded by a lack of access 
to permanent residence. Due to the 
government regulations on migrant 
domestic workers, she could not access 
a permanent residence no matter 
how long she had worked in Hong 
Kong.5 Her visa expired when her last 
employment contract ended and she 
could not prepare the paperwork for 
another contract in time. She was then 
subject to removal. While overstaying, 
she gave birth to a child out of wedlock 
and therefore felt even more unsafe to 
return to her country of origin. The birth 
of her child also made it difficult for 
Rose to continue to work as a migrant 
domestic worker in Hong Kong. Even 
if the Immigration Department were 
to issue her an employment visa after 
overstaying, Rose, like all migrant 
domestic workers in Hong Kong, would 
be required to live together with their 
employers. However, there are few 
employers who would host a worker 
accompanied by an infant. With no 
employment contract, Rose made a 
claim for non-refoulement protection, 
even though this claim will not lead to 
regular status in Hong Kong either.
As Rose’s case shows, further research 
is needed to explore the accessibility 
of various migration paths and the 
possibility to change between different 
legal statuses, including in the case 
of labour migrants, such as domestic 
workers like Rose, and non-refoulement 
5 According to section 2(4), Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 
115, a person shall not be treated as ordinarily resident in 
Hong Kong during any period in which he or she remains in 
Hong Kong as a “foreign domestic helper”. This excludes 
migrant domestic workers from access to the right of 
abode under Article 24(4) of the Basic Law, which states 
that persons not of Chinese nationality who have entered 
Hong Kong with valid travel documents, have ordinarily 
resided in Hong Kong for a continuous period of not less 
than seven years and have taken Hong Kong as their place of 
permanent residence before or after the establishment of the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region are permanent 
residents of Hong Kong. Other subsections of Article 24 are 
applicable to Chinese nationals and citizens, persons born in 
Hong Kong or persons who had the right of abode in Hong 
Kong only before the handover in 1997, and are therefore 
generally not applicable to migrant domestic workers.
Compact for Migration in December 
2018, the United Nations Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) and the law firm DLA PIPER 
(DLA PIPER and OHCHR 2018) released 
a mapping of national practices of 
admission and stay based on human 
rights and humanitarian grounds. 
Among the ten jurisdictions studied in 
the mapping, Hong Kong was the only 
one where protection does not and will 
never lead to regular status.2 While it is 
possible to apply for family unification, 
an employment or student visa in 
Hong Kong, the likelihood of success is 
uncertain as applicants are regarded as 
irregular migrants.3 
The case of Rose4 (Anderson & Li 2018) 
illustrates the dilemma those working 
in Hong Kong while being in need of 
protection can face. As a child from a 
very poor rural area in a country in Asia, 
Rose was forced by her father to marry 
his creditor as repayment of his debts. 
She had to work for her husband’s family 
for sixteen hours a day and was often 
slapped, hit, kicked and raped by her 
husband. Her parents were too poor to 
get proper medical treatment for her so, 
in desperation, they borrowed money 
to pay an agent to arrange work for her 
as a domestic worker in Hong Kong. 
Becoming a domestic worker in Hong 
Kong was both a means to flee and to 
support her family financially. She did 
not know about the non-refoulement 
protection mechanism in Hong Kong. 
The fact that she came to Hong Kong on 
a work visa but not as an asylum seeker 
had no correlation with whether or not 
she needed protection.
2 Other than while acting as a prosecution witness for human 
trafficking cases. (DLA PIPER and OHCHR, 2018, p.13).
3 Grounds for stay as regular migrants in other jurisdictions 
studied in the mapping include being a victim of domestic 
violence, coming from a country with an environmental 
disaster or having serious illnesses. (DLA PIPER and OHCHR, 
2018, p.10, 14 and 16).
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claimants. This knowledge can help us 
to better assess the protection needs 
and differential treatment of individuals 
who reside in Hong Kong under such 
different legal statuses. The recent 
study published by OHCHR and DLA 
Piper (2018) was a first step towards 
informing discussions in Hong Kong on 
this subject and highlighted the need to 
provide people, including refugees and 
other migrants, a regular status and the 
protection they need.
Crucially, instead of debating whether 
refugees are or are not migrants, it 
is integral that policymakers, United 
Nations agencies and civil society spend 
more time on advocating for better 
protection for all persons outside their 
country of origin in vulnerable situations. 
In addition, advocacy for both the 
application of the Refugee Convention 
in Hong Kong alongside non-Refugee 
Convention forms of admission and 
stay needs to be stepped up to ensure 




in certain countries such as the United 
Kingdom. 
In the specific case of the United 
Kingdom, its juxtaposed border 
arrangements with France (Home Office 
2017) mean that safe and legal routes to 
seek asylum in Britain are next to non-
existent,1 and have led to the emergence 
of a ‘border zone’ stretching from Calais 
and Grande-Synthe in northern France 
to the capitals of Brussels and Paris if 
not further afield. Within this border 
zone, a violence producing Politics of 
Exhaustion2 plays out, with the objective 
of ‘exhausting [prospective] asylum 
seekers, mentally and physically, with 
the ultimate goal of deterring them 
from approaching Britain for asylum, or 
indeed other European asylum system.’ 
1 This article refers to safe and legal routes to reach the UK 
from other European countries (specifically, via France) in 
order to seek asylum, whilst not referring to resettlement 
schemes of prospective asylum-seekers of individuals with 
refugee status from other parts of the world.
2 The concept is being further developed as part of the 
author’s ongoing doctoral research project at the University 
of Westminster, UK. Situated within critical border and 
migration studies, the project draws explicit attention to 
the ethical and moral implications of European immigration 
control in the British-French border zone. It is one of the 
very few in-depth academic research efforts that have taken 
place amongst displaced people seeking to cross the British-
French border to-date. 
The Politics of Exhaustion: Immigration 
Control in the British-French Border Zone
Marta welanDer
Within a climate of growing anti-immigration and populist forces gaining traction across Europe, and in 
response to the increased number of prospective asylum seekers arriving in Europe, recent years have 
seen the continued hardening of borders and a disconcerting evolution of new forms of immigration 
control measures utilised by states. Based on extensive field research carried out amongst displaced 
people in Europe in 2016-2019, this article highlights the way in which individuals in northern France 
are finding themselves trapped in a violent border zone, unable to move forward whilst having no 
obvious alternative way out of their predicament. The article seeks to illustrate the violent dynamics 
inherent in the immigration control measures in this border zone, characterised by both direct physical 
violence as well as banalised and structural forms of violence, including state neglect through the 
denial of services and care. The author suggests that the raft of violent measures and micro practices 
authorities resort to in the French-British border zone could be understood as constituting one of the 
latest tools for European border control and obstruction of the access to asylum procedures; a politics 
of exhaustion. 
Introduction
Across Europe, individuals arriving 
with the hope of seeking international 
protection often face severe forms of 
obstruction of access to the European 
asylum system and procedures. Arguably 
a reflection of European states’ attempts 
to appease the growing ‘populist 
right’ and anxious populations, and 
potentially as a reaction to the deadlock 
surrounding the reform negotiations 
surrounding the Common European 
Asylum System, an often unforgiving 
implementation of deterrence policies 
signals states’ eroding willingness 
and ability to uphold their obligations 
under international human rights law, 
including the right to seek asylum. The 
ways in which European states achieve 
this obstruction of access to asylum are 
wide-ranging, but could be broadly 
grouped into three main approaches: the 
externalisation of asylum and migration 
management to non-European countries 
such as Turkey, Libya and Morocco; 
push-backs conducted without proper 
legal formalities and deprivation of 
liberty through restrictions of people’s 
freedom of movement as well as in the 
context of detentions; and the denial 
of safe and legal routes to seek asylum 
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and structural violence3 (Galtung 1969), 
including what could be referred to 
as ‘active neglect’ (Loughnan 2019) 
whereby state actors withdraw services 
and care to produce suffering. Loughnan 
(2019) introduced the term ‘active 
neglect’ in the context of asylum seekers 
at Australia’s doorstep, which she defines 
as the removal of government support 
services combined with the erosion of 
hope and wellbeing amongst refugees 
and asylum seekers through unfulfilled 
promises and refusals. Such ‘active 
neglect’, a form of indirect violence 
perpetrated against prospective asylum 
seekers, is an inherent part of the Politics 
of Exhaustion, and its harmful effects 
are testament to the violent nature of 
such policies. As such, the Politics of 
Exhaustion is a strategic and conscious 
approach to mobility governance, rooted 
in the exhaustion of human efforts to 
cross certain borders. In the case of the 
UK, it takes shape as an extension of the 
British domestic ‘hostile environment’, 
exported to French territory through 
bilateral agreements (Prime Minister’s 
Office 2018) and juxtaposed border 
controls in France (Home Office 2017) as 
well as vast amounts of British funding 
(Full Fact 2018).   
While northern France has been 
a migratory nodal point for many 
decades, the Politics of Exhaustion in 
this border zone arguably reached its 
first notable peak during the existence 
of the so-called Calais ‘Jungle’ camp in 
2015-2016; an informal camp built by 
volunteers and displaced individuals 
themselves, which at its height hosted 
up to 10,000 individuals. During this 
period, the politics of exhaustion mainly 
took the shape of large-scale evictions 
and a successively shrinking living space 
3 Galtung (1969: 170) suggests that undercurrents of violence 
may be equally harmful: ‘…there may not be violence in the 
sense that anyone is hit or hurt, but there is nevertheless 
the threat of physical violence and indirect threat of mental 
violence that may even be characterized as some type of 
psychological violence since it constrains human action.’ 
Written 50 years ago, Galtung’s notion of structural and 
indirect violence is highly relevant to these contemporary 
forms of immigration control. 
(Welander 2019). The article draws both 
on research and policy engagement 
carried out by Refugee Rights Europe 
under the author’s leadership, as well 
as qualitative field research interviews 
and participant observations which 
the author carried out in her capacity 
of PhD researcher at the University of 
Westminster. The latter included 75 
formal and informal interviews with 
displaced individuals and volunteer aid 
workers and volunteers in Calais, Paris 
and Brussels throughout 2018-2019, 
and allow for further exploration of the 
dynamics of the Politics of Exhaustion in 
the subsequent sections of this article.   
The emergence of politics of 
exhaustion in the British-French 
border zone
As part of the Politics of Exhaustion, 
displaced individuals in the French-
British border zone face a high 
intensity of regular evictions of living 
spaces, random detention, removals, 
deportations and dispersals, untreated 
health problems, below-standard living 
conditions, and the continuous threat or 
reality of violence. However, rather than 
seen as isolated and reactive instances of 
violence, uprooting and intimidation, the 
micro practices and measures resorted 
to here are best understood as forming 
a high-level strategic state approach 
aimed at preventing individuals from 
crossing the British border and enter 
the asylum system there. This has very 
serious impacts on the lived realities 
of individuals in the border zone. The 
concept ‘Politics of Exhaustion’ was 
first introduced by the author alongside 
Dr Leonie Ansems De Vries of King’s 
College London, in the context of the 
Calais camp in 2016 (Welander and 
Ansems De Vries 2016).
The Politics of Exhaustion is made up 
of both overt forms of physical violence 
perpetrated against displaced people 
by police officers, as well as banalised 
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crossing from other nearby locations, 
while others were taken on coaches 
to French asylum reception centres 
across the country. A scandalous failure 
to ensure the safeguarding of children 
in the camp meant that hundreds of 
children were unaccounted for and were 
lost in the process (BBC News 2016; 
Welander and Ansems De Vries 2016b; 
Taylor 2016). 
The aftermath of the ‘jungle’ and the 
continuation of exhaustion
The period that followed, from October 
2016 onwards, was characterised 
by a sustained period of complete 
destitution and systematic police 
intimidation, which included seemingly 
nonsensical if not outright bizarre 
practices, where the absence of a camp 
forced individuals into hiding in small 
forests and woodlands in and around 
Calais. Repeated evictions of makeshift 
for an ever-growing population, as well 
as detention, indiscriminate use of tear 
gas, police violence and the obstruction 
of aid (Welander and Ansems De 
Vries 2016a; Refugee Rights Europe 
2016a). In March 2016, a court ruling 
permitted the French state authorities 
to proceed and demolish the southern 
part of the camp, which was home to 
several hundred individuals, including 
many family units. This inevitably led to 
the containment of all camp residents 
within a much more confined space, 
which sparked heightened tensions and 
allowed for fires to spread more quickly, 
and generally created an increasingly 
difficult daily existence in the camp. 
Some seven months later, in October 
2016, the camp was eventually 
demolished in its entirety, partly 
flattened to the ground by bulldozers 
and partly going up in flame through 
explosive fires. Several thousand former 
camp residents fled the war-like scene 
and continued to attempt the border 
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aid supplies and donations directed at 
human security saw a steady depletion 
due to the systematic confiscation 
and destruction of tents and personal 
belongings by police which required 
constant renewal of supplies at a rate 
that was often more rapid than incoming 
public donations in the warehouse run 
by the aid groups on the ground. 
The impediment of aid work, 
exhaustion of supplies, and widespread 
sense of hopelessness in the face of 
destructive and unforgiving state policies 
would start to induce an increasing burn-
out and depression amongst volunteers 
and aid groups (The Guardian 2017). 
Sustained over time, the same policies 
and practices have contributed to an 
increasingly deteriorating mental health 
situation amongst sleep-deprived and 
abused displaced people. In October 
2018, a team of mental health experts 
on the ground noted ‘clear signs of 
depression, anxiety and hopelessness 
as people get trapped in a cycle of 
rejection from countries across Europe 
and in the case of northern France, at 
the border, with no obvious way out of 
their predicament’ (Lloyd et al, 2018). A 
few months later, in April 2019, a trauma 
expert stated with concern: 
‘There’s a lack of sleep, degradation 
of humanity, people not feeling 
human. All of this has significant 
impact on mental health. […] I 
think it’s got worse, increasingly, 
worryingly.’ (Anonymous interview 
in Calais, 24 April 2019).
Politics of exhaustion, a subtle 
yet inherently violent approach to 
immigration control 
Politics of Exhaustion is a relatively 
subtle approach to mobility governance, 
compared to the more drastic and overtly 
illegal alternatives of mass-detention, 
blanket returns and refoulement. This 
makes this particular approach to 
immigration control more difficult to 
living spaces, coupled with dispersals, 
uprooting and sleep deprivation made 
people’s existence in the border zone 
riddled with exhaustion and mental 
health concerns. Many of those 
individuals who had been dispersed 
across France to asylum reception and 
orientation centres (Centres d’accueil et 
d’orientation, CAO) to have their asylum 
or family reunion claims processed at 
the time of the Jungle camp clearance, 
would start to make their way back 
to the Calais area in order to ‘take 
matters into own hands’ (Refugee 
Rights Europe 2017). During the same 
period, an investigation by the French 
administration and security forces’ 
internal investigations departments 
found evidence that police has used 
‘excessive force and committed other 
abuses against child and adult migrants 
in Calais’ (Human Rights Watch, 2017). 
In the same period, Human Rights 
Watch found that police in Calais, in 
particular the so-called Compagnies 
républicaines de sécurité (CRS), would 
use pepper spray on both children and 
adults alike, including whilst sleeping 
and in other contexts where they posed 
no threat. The same report highlighted 
how police officers would also “regularly 
spray or confiscate sleeping bags, 
blankets, and clothing; and sometimes 
use pepper spray on migrants’ food and 
water. Police also disrupt the delivery 
of humanitarian assistance.” (Human 
Rights Watch, 2017).   
In January 2018, France and 
Britain signed the Sandhurst Treaty, 
which involved an additional funding 
commitment of £44.5 million towards 
fencing, CCTV and detection technology 
in Calais and other Channel ports. The 
amount complemented the previous 
British investment of approximately 
£100 million. On the occasion, then-
Prime Minister Theresa May stated: 
‘The further investment we have agreed 
today will make the UK’s borders even 
more secure’ (France 24 2018). In stark 
juxtaposition to this large-scale infusion 
of additional funding for ‘border security’, 
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challenge from a legal perspective. As 
such, the Politics of Exhaustion could be 
understood as a manner in which liberal 
democracies continue to both counter-
act and seemingly uphold their status 
as law abiding nations at the same time, 
operating functioning asylum systems 
and paying lip service to international and 
human rights law. Equally, from a moral 
stand-point, the Politics of Exhaustion 
is propped up by the prevalent British 
policy and media narrative of so called 
‘illegal migrants’, providing a moral 
alibi for the violent maintenance of a 
sealed border obstructing the access 
to asylum, unfolding before the eyes 
of their national constituencies and 
international watch dogs. 
In sum, the concept of Politics of 
Exhaustion helps to make sense not 
only of direct physical violence in 
border zones, but also more banalised 
violence and micro practices, aiding 
to our understanding of the inherent 
role which violence plays in European 
countries’ immigration control. Taking 
the French-British border zone as an 
example, this article has explored a 
range of measures and micro practices 
which, taken together as a whole, could 
be understood as constituting a harmful 
and violent system of contemporary 
European immigration control. This 
approach, which may succeed in 
appeasing the growing populist right 
and anxious European populations, 
stands in tension with states’ ability to 
uphold international human rights law, 
whilst arguably adding further fuel to 
the now widespread toxic rightist and 
xenophobic discourses witnessed across 
Europe. 
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largely due to a lack of understanding and 
identification of the issue. Understanding 
who is affected by the problem can inform 
strategies to combat the discrimination 
they face and advocate for an end to 
situations perpetuating statelessness 
in the first place.  This article seeks to 
highlight the current gaps in identification 
of statelessness and suggest good 
practices to overcome them. 




As the two main affected groups in 
Syria, statelessness for Syrian Kurds and 
Palestinians has been the result of specific 
historic events – the 1962 discriminatory 
census in Syria’s north-eastern Hassaka 
governorate and the 1948 Nakba (mass 
expulsion of Palestinians) respectively.2 
Both groups have faced conflict-induced 
vulnerabilities and new experiences in 
displacement contexts since 2011 (NRC 
and ISI 2016). 
While Syria’s political unrest in 2011 
led the government to concede to 
the naturalisation of one sub-group 
of stateless Kurds (the ajanib), this 
action excluded another category (the 
2 It should be noted that most Palestinians residing in 
UNRWA mandated countries, as well as other ‘stateless 
refugees’, are not included in UNHCR’s global statistics of 
stateless persons.
Eight Years of Displacement: Syria’s 
Statelessness Still Unidentified
thoMas MCGee anD zahra albarazi
While statelessness is not a new problem for Syria, the civil war has brought about additional risks 
and instances of becoming stateless. It has also transformed situations and vulnerabilities for those 
who already lacked Syrian citizenship. Greater efforts are urgently needed to understand the impacts 
of statelessness within post-conflict and forced displacement contexts, and as a platform for change 
there needs to be heightened understanding and identification of the issue.  This article will outline the 
characteristics of the main stateless profiles, and then will go on to focus on the challenges and need 
for identification of stateless persons and risks of statelessness. 
Introduction 
In over eight years, the Syrian conflict has 
brought new and unforeseen challenges 
to the country, region and the world - 
as well as reshaping old problems.  One 
such challenge is addressing the issue 
of statelessness.1 Statelessness is not 
a new phenomenon in Syria, since the 
country was already home to one of the 
largest populations of stateless persons 
in the world prior to the war (Van Waas 
2010; ISI 2014), with discrimination 
embedded in its nationality law and 
practice (Global Campaign for Equal 
Nationality Rights and ISI 2016: 5-7). 
However, the protracted conflict has 
significantly shaped the issue in two key 
ways: changing the nature of existing 
statelessness problems and producing 
new instances of statelessness.  Looking 
forward, there is an urgent need to 
address challenges facing stateless 
communities and prevent new cases of 
statelessness. 
Relevant stakeholders in the Syrian 
refugee context - including states - must 
proactively work on how best to prevent 
new cases of statelessness and to protect 
the rights of those already stateless. 
Unfortunately, strategic responses to 
address statelessness have been limited; 
1 The 1954 Statelessness Convention defines a stateless 
person as someone ‘who is not considered as a national 
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and displacement are generating 
new cases of individuals at risk of 
statelessness.  Women whose children 
are born with no legally established 
paternity continue to face problems 
in passing their Syrian nationality to 
the next generation. This is especially 
problematic in displacement or asylum 
contexts, since a Syrian woman cannot 
pass on her own nationality when the 
child is born outside the country.3
An additional challenge is the lack of 
access to civil registration procedures 
in neighbouring countries and in Syria, 
particularly for birth registration. Birth 
certificates record where an individual 
was born and who the parents are, so 
without proof of this information it may 
become difficult for an individual to 
access their nationality. In neighbouring 
countries, problems of access include 
complex procedures, lack of awareness 
of their workings, the need for 
documents that are unobtainable and 
government employees taking large 
fees for authenticating documents. 
This often leaves sub-groups within the 
Syrian refugee community at particular 
risk of statelessness, such as children 
born within female-headed households 
or child marriages, undocumented 
refugees and refugees not registered 
with UNHCR (NRC and ISI 2016).4 In Syria, 
civil registration becomes complicated 
for individuals who have lived in areas 
outside government control.  There were 
no NGOs or humanitarian actors working 
on facilitating documentation in these 
areas to compensate for the breakdown 
of governmental systems. Alternative 
systems were not well established (IRC 
2016). This means that those who lived 
in these areas, and ultimately end up 
elsewhere in second or third waves 
3 According to Syrian Nationality Law Legislative Decree 276, 
Article 3: https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4d81e7b12.pdf
4 For good practice examples on how some of these 
challenges were overcome, see UNHCR (2016) In Search of 
Solutions: Addressing Statelessness in the Middle East and 
North Africa: http://www.refworld.org/docid/57dbdaba4.
html.  This research was generated as part of UNHCRs 
#IBELONG campaign to end statelessness in 10 years: 
https://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/
maktumeen). The latter, and ajanib unable 
to benefit from the concessions (Albarazi 
2013), generally faced increasingly 
restricted freedom of movement and 
heightened risk of detention in the early 
years of the conflict due to an inability to 
present recognised identity documents 
at checkpoints that were proliferating 
the country. When fleeing Syria, 
maktumeen and non-naturalised ajanib 
have also found themselves excluded 
from some formal resettlement solutions 
available to other vulnerable refugees 
in neighbouring countries (ENS and ISI 
2019). Of those reaching Europe, there 
is a common narrative of complex legal 
limbo due to their statelessness.
With regards to Palestinians, their 
statelessness vulnerabilities are also 
significant.  Firstly, both Jordan and 
Lebanon had restrictions on allowing 
Palestinians to cross their borders when 
fleeing Syria (UNHCR 2017), with only 
Syrians admitted, which meant that 
stateless Palestinians were often left 
stranded at the border and unable to 
flee (HRW 2014). Families were split 
as to who could and who could not 
enter a neighbouring country (Amnesty 
International 2014). Additionally, some 
have also found themselves without 
protection from any UN agency. The 
UN mandated organisation to provide 
assistance for Palestinian refugees is 
UNRWA. Many Palestinians who had not 
registered with the agency in Syria found 
themselves in need of this assistance 
once displaced, but registering with 
UNRWA in secondary displacement 
contexts is challenging if not impossible. 
Additionally, as Palestinians it was not 
possible to register with UNHCR, and 
therefore in practice many fell into a 
protection gap where they were served 





provisions within Syrian legislation, 
as well as the present context of conflict 
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statelessness or risks thereof. The 
majority of these countries have not 
ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention 
and therefore do not carry out their 
own refugee determination procedure 
or have any legal ‘refugee’ status 
(Akram 2018).  None of these states 
has a Statelessness Determination 
Procedure either. This means that the 
identification of these individuals is 
left to UNHCR, where statelessness 
is not always recorded. Additionally, 
there is sometimes a tendency, like in 
the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, for the 
authorities and refugee protection 
actors to opt not to distinguish between 
stateless and citizen Syrian refugees 
(McGee 2016). 
While it may be argued that such 
an approach avoids discriminating 
against certain refugees on the basis 
of nationality status (including lack of 
nationality), this may simultaneously 
conceal the vulnerabilities of those 
who are stateless. These ‘hidden’ 
vulnerabilities can be activated when 
refugees leave that country, such as 
being unable to access assistance 
available for Syrian nationals, or if they 
seek to travel to other destinations (ENS 
and ISI 2019). To resolve this, people 
without nationality may seek to return 
illegally to Syria in the hope of acquiring 
documentation (possibly through 
bribes) or may resort to acquisition of 
fraudulent documents. Such negative 
coping strategies are known to put 
stateless refugees at risk. 
Also, a lack of awareness and 
understanding of statelessness among 
other stakeholders means that the 
statelessness of many stateless refugees 
is ignored in response projects. For 
instance, many lawyers providing free 
legal assistance to Syrian refugees 
across the region have little familiarity 
with the main statelessness risk factors 
and what statelessness means in the 
context. Perhaps one solution here 
would be to have integrated teams of 
staff or volunteers from the host and 
Syrian communities (the latter being 
of displacement, may be completely 
undocumented or have documents not 
considered legitimate.
The challenges of being both stateless 
and a refugee
 
‘Isn’t it better to say I am a Syrian 
national but I lost my papers?’ 
(Stateless Syrian, Greece)
 The displacement of Syrians to 
neighbouring countries and to Europe 
means that the stateless population is 
dispersed across wide geographical 
areas, and under various foreign legal 
systems, many of which have no formal 
statelessness determination procedure 
in place. Identification of cases will help 
stakeholders develop strategies on 
how to prevent new cases and how to 
protect existing cases; however, this is 
yet to be done effectively.  Obtaining 
reliable statistics and information about 
the number and profiles of stateless 
Syrians and those at risk of statelessness, 
remains notoriously difficult for a number 
of reasons – but primarily due to the 
lack of awareness and identification by 
those who work with them.  Additionally, 
stateless Syrians are often reluctant 
to disclose their lack of nationality as 
a result of perceptions that this might 
expose them to further vulnerabilities 
and challenges with bureaucratic and 
security structures, both in Syria and 
when abroad.
 
Displacement to neighbouring countries
 
‘We have always been maktoumeen, 
but now we are maktoumeen and 
living in another country.  That means 
we really, really don’t belong.  I 
don’t know what the future will bring 
for my girls.’ (Khalid, Sulaimaniya, 
Kurdistan Region of Iraq)
 
In neighbouring countries to Syria 
there is very little attempt at identifying 
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but instead use other labels such as 
‘persons of undetermined nationality’ - 
further complicating identification.  This 
means that a stateless refugee will in 
most cases only be viewed as a refugee, 
with the stateless vulnerability ignored 
and not addressed. Also, the idea that 
refugees in Europe are automatically 
on a path to become nationals is not 
always true. In Sweden and Denmark, 
for example, the current situation is that 
many Syrians only receive ‘temporary 
protection’ - with no automatic route to 
naturalisation (Tucker 2017).  
 What is needed is more expertise 
in identifying those who are genuinely 
stateless or undocumented and at risk 
of statelessness and it is important that 
protection and outreach teams are able 
to identify those who are stateless. Given 
this new reality, it is imperative that 
staff working with Syrian refugees and 
‘asylum seekers’ (be they government 
case workers, legal assistance providers 
or from asylum support charities) in a 
wide range of different countries are well 
acquainted with the particular profiles 
at risk of statelessness.6 Unlike other 
stakeholders, the affected population 
themselves are usually very much aware 
of their stateless status, and therefore a 
role for many of the refugee focal points 
in Europe and the many refugee social 
networking groups is to encourage the 
community to inform authorities of their 
statelessness - or worries about the risk 
of statelessness - once they are settled. 
If this begins to be done effectively, it 
could put growing pressure on states to 
take this vulnerability more seriously. 
Conclusion
 
Syria’s statelessness problem is no 
longer a localised and static problem, 
6 The European Network on Statelessness’s recently published 
Syria Country Position Paper (2019) seeks to address the lack 
of awareness on this issue: https://statelessjourneys.org/wp-
content/uploads/StatelessJourneys-Syria-August-2019.pdf; 
See also the toolkit developed by NRC and ISI: http://www.
syrianationality.org 
expected to have more awareness of the 
statelessness problem). One of the few 
Syrian lawyers qualified to practise in the 
Kurdistan Region of Iraq explained that, 
‘I receive many cases from those who 
are stateless, and usually they feel they 
have been misunderstood. While I am 
not always able to completely resolve 
their legal problems, I can advise them 
on any available solutions within Syrian 
law.’ Such advice must complement 
legal information specific to the host 
country in which Syrians find themselves. 
 
Experiences in Europe5
One of the major concerns for stateless 
Syrians has been whether their status 
will be well understood in humanitarian 
and asylum systems. A number of 
stateless Syrians encountered during 
transit through Greece in early 2016 
mentioned a fear that acknowledging 
their statelessness to the authorities 
might complicate their situation 
and reduce their chances of finally 
reaching refuge in northern Europe. 
Some stateless persons have acquired 
forged documents in order to travel to 
asylum countries (both European and 
neighbouring Syria) or have had them 
produced as they believe that their claim 
to be Syrian would otherwise not be 
considered credible. Within immigration 
systems, there is understandably a 
challenge to determine who is really 
stateless -  so their fears are at times 
legitimate.  Stateless Syrians have been 
at risk of exclusion from resettlement 
procedures - this for example was true in 
the UK’s Vulnerable Person Resettlement 
(VPR) scheme (which later in 2017 
expanded its selection criteria), and for 
selection from embassies as proving 
their legal link to their children was not 
possible. 
Some states in Europe do not have a 
statistical category for ‘stateless persons’, 
5 A good source of information on Europe’s response to 
stateless refugees is: www.statelessjourneys.org.
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but rather a mobile issue affecting many 
disparate sites. From stateless persons 
‘stuck’ in ‘protective custody’ on Greek 
islands to those seeking to prove their 
status within asylum appeals in Western 
Europe and stateless refugees in Syria’s 
neighbouring countries, it is essential 
that those working with Syrians have 
an awareness of the multiple new 
risk groups of statelessness as well as 
the historically stateless populations 
from Syria. A major challenge for 
actors working on statelessness and 
assistance to stateless Syrians is the 
need to develop a multi-sited response, 
and to mainstream understanding of 
statelessness across actors engaging 
with Syrian displacement in a broad 
geographical scope. Identification 
needs to be done effectively in order to 
successfully prevent statelessness and 
protect stateless persons.
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experience of displaced people whose 
lived experiences often differ from 
institutionalised narratives on resource 
management. Considering their 
opinions may push policy-makers away 
from a management heavy response that 
preserves the current refugee regime 
and towards addressing the root cause 
of movement—climate change. 
The data is derived from around 60 
semi-structured interviews the author 
conducted with environmentally 
displaced families, local activists, and 
policy-makers in southern Iraq (refer 
to Map 1 and 2). The purpose of this 
is to provide an understanding of how 
those who are directly affected by 
water scarcity perceive the causes of 
the scarcity, and how officials who are 
working on policies related to water 
and the environment perceive water 
scarcity. These perceptions are analysed 
alongside data on various factors that 
impact water scarcity in order to identify 
knowledge gaps and policy-making 
consequences. This fieldwork examines 
how the gap between displaced 
communities’ understandings of climate 
change and that of local policy-makers 
differ, thus limiting the impact of the 
latter’s attempts to prevent further 
displacement. Generally, the difference 
in perceptions and understandings 
of water scarcity and displacement 
shows the complexity of water-induced 
Water Scarcity and Environmental 
Displacement in Southern Iraq: 
Perceptions and Realities
tiba fatli   
This paper argues that climate change interacts and plays along with other factors that worsen 
environmental crisis and induce forced movement in southern Iraq. It makes the point that to 
understand and address environmental-induced displacement, scholars and policy-makers need 
to listen and understand the perceptions of those most impacted by climate change as their 
experiences differ from institutionalised narratives. It concludes by urging scholars in the field to 
integrate displaced people not only in understanding displacement but also in finding practical 
solutions to climate change and displacement. 
Water scarcity and displacement 
While there has been a growing 
literature on environmental issues and 
displacement since the 1970s and 
1980s, there is considerable uncertainty 
of local perceptions of climate change, 
its impact on movement, and policy 
(Brown 2007; Dessai; O’Brien; Hulme 
2007). Particularly absent in the 
discussion of policy responses are 
the opinions of people displaced by 
environmental issues related to climate 
change. In effect, the loudest voices in 
this conversation, supposedly about a 
changing environment, are those farthest 
removed from shifting ecosystems. 
Current policy approaches to climate-
induced refugees are not practical and 
are ineffective. 
My research demonstrates that local 
government officials and international 
experts remain focused on water 
conservation measures while displaced 
persons—farmers and marsh dwellers—
advocate for action on climate change 
as a result of their displacement. To craft 
appropriate policy related to water-
induced displacement, particularly 
under the threat of climate change, we 
must understand this issue’s complexity 
and the different perceptions to 
contextualise the different factors that 
impact water resources, while paying 
special attention to the knowledge and 
46
OxMo Vol. 8, No. 2
water resources, land degradation, and 
drought are decreasing the size of arable 
land and herd size in southern Iraq, 
and slowly making parts of the region 
inhabitable and difficult for traditional 
livelihoods. These weather events, Jane 
McAdams argues, form ‘push’ factors for 
farmers and animal herders in southern 
Iraq to migrate, largely within the country, 
displacing people permanently. Climate 
change does not alone produce water 
scarcity; it interacts with political and 
internal factors that continue to exacerbate 
the water crisis in the south of Iraq and 
force people to move (Mayer 2018). 
displacement in which stakeholders – 
whether displaced populations, local 
government officials, federal policy-
makers, non-governmental organisations 
or international development organisations 
– focus on particular factors of water 
scarcity. 
As the world is expected to reach 
1.5 degrees Celsius hotter in as 
little as 11 years, slow and sudden-
onset environmental changes such 
as decreased rainfall and increased 
heatwaves are expected to occur with 
increasing severity (Hoegh-Guldberg 
et al. 2018). Desertification, dwindling 
POLICY MONITOR
Map 1. (left) Fieldwork sites - 
each of the pins represents a 
location of fieldwork site with 
community members
Map 2.  (bottom) Water crisis 
by location in southern Iraq 
(IOM 2018)
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product of the insecurity in the country, 
but also a result of not being able to 
access basic services, particularly access 
to water (FMR 2007).
In the past year alone, water-induced 
displacement in southern Iraq has 
increased by almost 50%; a total of 5,347 
families have been displaced so far (IOM 
2019). Thi-Qar governorate is the most 
affected by water-induced displacement, 
which as McAdam predicted, is largely 
internal displacement. Of those that 
IOM is tracking, around 79% of families 
were displaced to urban areas (2,790 
families) with only 21% to rural areas 
(757 families) (IOM 2019). 
My fieldwork reveals two types of 
water-induced displacement in Southern 
Iraq. First, farmers with longstanding 
tribal claims to land sell their farms 
and move to urban centres as their 
lands become not arable. Second, 
nomadic marsh dwellers are no longer 
able to rely on the wetlands to meet 
their livelihoods; their buffalos die, 
fish populations collapse, and water 
becomes scarce and polluted. And while 
internal movement within the wetlands 
has long characterised the lives of marsh 
dwellers, communities view their current 
movement as ‘forced’ and permanent. 
Beyond these generalisations there 
are many adaptation strategies as 
people seek to remain in their homes. 
Farmers bought buffalo and some marsh 
dwellers worked the land. However, 
I heard an overwhelming number of 
stories of families who had tried both 
and were packing up anyway.  The 
permanence and significance of these 
internal migrations is illustrated by two 
quotes my informants shared. One 
farmer said ‘we don’t sell our land.’ A 
marsh dweller said ‘when our buffalo 
die, we die.’ Unlike displacement in the 
1990s—neither group will return anytime 
soon. As Brown argues, migration is not 
the first response to climate change, 
other non-climatic factors interact with 
and worsen existing problems before 
people decide to move (Brown 2007).
 
A continuing history of environmental 
displacement in southern Iraq
Throughout contemporary history, 
water problems have played a role in the 
forced movements of Iraq – a country of 
40 million people (World Bank 2019). 
Eight years of war with Iran, the Gulf 
War, and decade-long sanctions in the 
1990s severely damaged Iraq’s water 
systems (Nagy 2001; GLEICK 1993). The 
Ba’athist government’s extensive and 
profound campaign draining 90% Iraq’s 
marshes further severely impacted Iraq’s 
water resources (Azzam et al. 2004). 
Environmental-induced displacement 
during the 1990s, however, was 
temporary compared to the current 
displacement. The main source of water 
was intentionally diverted in 1990, 
which resulted in the displacement of the 
majority of marsh dweller, who were later 
able to return to their land post 2003 
when the marshes were restored (Curtis 
et al. 2006; Wetland International 2016). 
Post 2003, severe weather conditions 
worsened Iraq’s water crisis. Failure 
of adequate water services was 
compounded by a severe drought in 
2007, significantly hindering Iraqis’ 
access to water (IOM 2012). Those who 
could not adapt to the increased scarcity, 
find alternative livelihoods sources, or 
afford to buy water were forced to move. 
In 2007, the International Organisation 
of Migration (IOM) reported that a 
decline in safe drinking water and 
sustainable water supplies coupled with 
the 2007 severe drought forced 20,000 
rural inhabitants in southern Iraq to leave 
their agricultural communities in search 
of water. This driver of displacement in 
Iraq happened in a setting where many 
Iraqis were being displaced following 
the 2003 US occupation (Sassoon 
2008). Meanwhile, 5,347 families fled 
southern Iraq citing water scarcity (IOM 
2019). The drivers of displacement were 
compounded by damaged infrastructure, 
loss of economic opportunities, and 
pressure of dwindling natural resources. 
Iraqi forced displacement was not only a 
POLICY MONITOR
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sizes (Evans 2008). Since 2012, of Iraq’s 
28% arable land, 1,000 sqm was lost each 
year to degradation. Meanwhile, 39% 
of Iraq’s surface was estimated to have 
been affected by desertification, with an 
additional 54% under threat (Webrelief 
2012). IOM found that in 2012, 40% 
of Iraq’s total cropland had suffered a 
significant reduction in productivity and 
livestock was devastated (IOM 2012).
Local perceptions of causes of water 
scarcity  
There are three main perceived causes 
of water scarcity and displacement 
within southern Iraq among local 
government official, farmers, and 
buffalo breeders that were stressed 
throughout the fieldwork. First, marsh 
dwellers and farmers heavily stressed 
environmental factors as a cause of 
water scarcity and displacement. Their 
main grievances and perception of 
the catastrophic state of water in their 
homeland is closely linked to the lack 
of rainfall and necessary evaporation, 
and extreme heat waves. There were 
four years of severe droughts between 
2005 and 2017 that were consistently 
cited throughout interviews: 2005, 
2008, 2015, and 2017. These drought 
dates were identified by marsh dwellers 
during fieldwork and corroborated 
by data gathered from the Ministry of 
Transportation (see Figures 2, 3, 4 and 
5). For displaced people and those 
on the verge of displacement, these 
environmental changes constituted a 
direct and obvious cause that was often 
characterised as being ‘unprecedented’ 
and ‘unsolvable’, and ‘irreversible’. 
Buffalo breeders and farmers who have 
resided within southern Iraq their entire 
lives understand the changing climatic 
conditions as a regional phenomenon 
occurring not just within the state 
boundaries of Iraq but beyond as well. 
Indeed, southern Iraq experienced its 
hottest summers and the worst droughts 
in the years 2007, 2008-2009, 2014-
2015, and 2017 (Barlow et la. 2016; 
Barlow et la 2015; Chulov 2009; Pearce 
2009). This impacted irrigation seasons, 
led to an abandonment of farmlands, and 
killed animals in the region. Beginning 
in 2008, Iraq experienced significant 
increases in the length of dry seasons, 
substantially decreasing the period 
of time during which the rangelands 
are grazable. Farmers have coped by 
increasing importation of water and 
feedstuffs and decreasing their herd 
POLICY MONITOR
Figures 1, 2, and 3. Average Annual Rainfall in 
Fieldwork Governorates as recorded by the 
Meteorology and Seismic Monitoring Centre 
Iraq’s Ministry of Transportation that the author 
collected during fieldwork.
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to climate change, albeit not being as 
vulnerable as Iraq. 
The annual discharge of the Euphrates 
and Tigris Rivers has been in steady 
decline and the discharge is predicted to 
be reduced by 9.5% by 2040 (Bozkur et la 
2013). Water flow has severely impacted 
southern Iraq. Upstream construction 
projects have increased since the 1960s, 
contributing to the reduction of the flow 
of the two rivers by approximately 80% 
(Wilson 2012). Iraq and its neighbouring 
countries have a long history of tensions 
over dam construction and failed water 
agreements (Aysegül, Tugba 2014). 
These tensions are once again coming 
to a head as the entire fertile crescent is 
threatened by warming climate (Behrooz 
2004; Financial Tribute 2017). 
Second, local government officials in 
all field sites stressed the impact of dam 
building outside of Iraq’s borders, which 
they perceived to be related to Turkey 
and Iran’s control of the upstream water 
flow of transboundary water resources. 
While officials downplayed or outright 
rejected the implication of climate 
change, they frequently highlighted 
international factors in light of 
aggressive, politically driven Turkish and 
Iranian development practices that are, 
thereby advocating for a regional water 
management agreement. Displaced 
farmers and marsh dwellers, however, 
conceptualised the construction of large 
infrastructure projects as a response to 
regional climate change and a form of 
adaption. They understood Turkey as 
preserving water resources to adapt 
POLICY MONITOR
Figure 4. Average Annual Rainfall in Fieldwork 
Governorates as recorded by the Meteorology 
and Seismic Monitoring Centre Iraq’s Ministry of 
Transportation.
Map 3. Dams on the Tigris 
and Euphrates River Basin 
(Homles 2010). 
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Figures 7 & 8). Thus, while communities 
acknowledge that internal management of 
water resources is an issue, they perceive it 
as an unintended consequence of climate 
change and its impacts on water scarcity. 
Policy-makers, on the other hand, perceive 
‘impingement’ or unlicensed water 
pumps as ‘water theft’. Water scarcity was 
understood as a political matter of internal 
governance failure, with water shortages 
experienced only during the dry season, 
rather than an issue of climate change. 
For them, the largest factor in seasonal 
water shortage is unequal distribution 
of water resources between and within 
governorates and the lack of innovative 
irrigation techniques in Iraq, deeming 
Iraqi farmers ‘lazy…uncivilized and [too] 
inept to learn new methods of irrigation’ 
(Interview with local official 2017).
Third, Iraqis cited internal governance 
and mismanagement of water services. 
The exact nature of their issue depended 
on their location, geographically—along 
the course of rivers—and socially. Marsh 
dwellers and farmers raised particular 
issues with not receiving their fair share 
of water. For them, this violates the 
annual water distribution plan that is 
issued on a yearly basis by the Ministry 
of Water Resources. This leaves the 
‘southern region in general and the 
marshes in particular with the last drop of 
the rivers’ (Interview with marsh dweller 
2017).  Nonetheless, displaced farmers 
and marsh dwellers acknowledged and 
sympathized with those who ‘impinge’ on 
others, who use water pumps to take more 
than the quota allotted to them by the 
federal government to meet their water 
needs given the scarcity of water (refer to 
POLICY MONITOR
TOP: Impingement: an unlicensed 
pump taking water from a canal in 
Al Qadyysiah. 
BOTTOM: Southern Iraq’s water 
management infrastructure has not 
yet fully recovered from the dual 
threats of war and climate change. 
Many canals have been destroyed 
and the canals that do exist are 
unmaintained and hold little water.
These photos were taken during 
fieldwork on climate change and 
displacement in southern Iraq. At 
the time, winter of 2017, the area 
was going through a growing and 
harvesting season. Farmers and 
marsh dwellers, however, were 
living through water scarcity; there 
was not enough water from Iraq’s 
two main rivers or rainfall to water 
the farms and the quality of the 
once fertile land was deteriorating. 
The images present a time where 
marsh dwellers and farmers had 
no choice but to move to adapt to 
climate change. These images show 
the scarcity of water and impact 
on agriculture in Iraq’s farmlands 
in some parts of its southern 
governorates, the lack of water in 
the once flourishing wetlands of 
Iraq, and the impact on fishing, 
buffalo breeding, and farming.
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making. Policy-making on both a 
national and international level needs a 
community-based policy approach. On 
a domestic level, displaced Iraqis are 
demanding inclusive development and 
participatory approach to national water 
governance (this can be in the form of 
public forums, representations in local 
councils, being included in the annual 
water management plan). The realm 
of policy-making on an international 
level is limited. Displaced people in 
southern Iraq highlight the finality of 
climate change, and that to address 
their displacement is to address the 
warming climate. As such, international 
organisations, policy-makers, and 
governments have to approach 
migration and environmental policy in 
light of anthropogenic climate change; 
they need to advocate and set in place 
equitable and fair environmental policies 
that place regulations on the extractive 
world economy that treat nature as a 
finite resource. 
Towards a just policy approach  
Current policy-making on climate 
change and displacement is exclusionary. 
It has not attempted to include those 
most impacted by climate change in 
the discussion, nor does it address the 
root causes of environmental-induced 
displacement (Dehm 2018). The two 
most often discussed solutions to 
environmental-induced displacement, 
a new legal regime for climate refugees 
or expanding already existing migration 
policy, do not address the issue at 
its roots: climate change. Both can 
potentially create another exclusionary 
international migration governance 
regime, akin to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, and do not have the 
capacity of addressing grievances of 
current and anticipated 150 to 300 
million climate-displaced people in 
five years (Chimni 1998; Gemenne 
2011). According to UNHCR figures, 
out of the current 70.8 million forcibly 
displaced people worldwide, only 25.9 
million are recognised refugees and 
have international protection under 
international refugee law. UNHCR, 
the UN agency mandated to provide 
international protection to refugees, 
carries out refugee status determination 
procedures largely in the global south. 
Adding environmentally displaced 
persons to this system is beyond the 
organisation’s legal mandate and 
capacity. On the other hand, a new 
global regime, as Jane McAdam argues, 
will not ‘solve’ the humanitarian issue 
due to conceptual and pragmatic 
difficulties (McAdam 2011). Perhaps, 
more importantly, drafting a treaty 
necessitates defining who falls within 
and outside of the scope of application 
of a movement that has not been fully 
conceptualised and understood. 
Based on my findings, those closest 
to their changing ecosystems have 
the most profound understanding of 
the complexity of the issue on both 
a local and regional level and should 
be included in a participatory policy-
POLICY MONITOR
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Remembering the Camps: Portuguese 
De-Colonization, Competing 
Colonialisms in Mozambique, 
and Deportation to India 
nafeesah allen 
Since the 15th century, Mozambique has had a sizeable population of residents from the Indian sub-
continent (herein referred to as Indo-Mozambicans). In reaction to Portuguese de-colonization in India, 
the African colony became a theater for forced migration and coerced citizenship articulation. The 1961 
end of the Portuguese empire in India triggered transformational shifts in Indo-Mozambican migration 
and identity patterns. This paper briefly summarizes that history and presents recently recorded 
narratives from those who were interned, deported, and left behind as children. Their recollections 
of the camps trace layered legacies of colonialism which affected different identity groups during the 
de-colonization process. Local differences emerged among Indo-Mozambican merchants of different 
nationalities and religions. Those sub-identities and intergroup rivalries persist today.
Introduction
From 2014 to 2017, I conducted doctoral 
research in Maputo to identify Indo-
Mozambican (Mozambican residents 
of Indian-subcontinent origin) layers of 
migration and identity that emerged 
in reaction to geopolitical shifts in 
the Indian Ocean and Lusophone 
worlds. Twentieth century migration, 
both voluntary and involuntary, was an 
ethnographic entry point to explore 
agency, citizenship, location, and 
belonging in Mozambique’s national 
context. In controlling the identity group 
(Mozambicans of Indian-subcontinent 
origin), geographic space (in Lourenço 
Marques before 1974, named Maputo 
after 1975), and temporal lens (1947-
1992), I found that four historical 
punctuations triggered migration and 
ethnic identity formations among Indo-
Mozambicans: first, the end of the British 
empire in India and the subsequent 
partition of India and Pakistan in 1947; 
second, the end of the Portuguese 
empire in India, with the annexation of 
Goa, Daman (also spelled Damão), and 
Diu (also spelled Dio), in December 1961; 
third, the independence of Mozambique 
from Portugal in 1975; and, finally, the 
civil war of Mozambique from 1977 to 
1992. Oral narratives from Maputo today 
illustrate these punctuations of forced 
migratory experiences that splintered 
the larger Indo-Mozambican community 
into smaller sub-identity groups and 
cultivated intergroup conflict.
When I began fieldwork, I did not know 
much about Portuguese colonial history. 
Thus, my initial research was biased 
towards Anglophone colonial history. I 
expected British colonial independence 
and self-rule movements to be causally 
linked to Indo-Mozambicans’ use of 
migration as a survival tool. Specifically, 
I anticipated that the creation of Pakistan 
in 1947, the independence of India in 
1947, the founding of Bangladesh in 
1971, and the expulsion of Asians from 
Uganda in 1972 would all prove deeply 
relevant to Indo-Mozambicans’ memories 
of the 20th century. During my fieldwork, 
however, I learned that British markers 
were far less relevant than Portuguese 
ones. The most important of these 
markers was the end of the Portuguese 
empire in India, with the de facto Indian 
annexation of Dadra and Nagar Haveli in 
1954 and the subsequent annexation of 
Portugal’s remaining Indian enclaves in 
December 1961. 
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Goa, Daman, and Diu (Da Silva 1976: 50-
52).  In 1954, India invaded Dadra and 
Nagar Haveli; India’s blocking Portugal’s 
access to these landlocked enclaves 
triggered de facto annexation to India. 
In December 1961, the Indian military 
launched ‘Operation Vijay,’ annexing 
the three remaining enclaves. Despite 
Indian reports that Operation Vijay had 
less than a handful of causalities, Diogo 
Simões Roque Moço (2012: 55) reported 
that Portugal’s military police calculated 
1,018 people as “dead, injured, or 
disappeared.” Countermeasures were 
implemented across the Portuguese 
empire, but none more than in 
Mozambique. The 1963 edition of Africa 
Today reported that 15,000 Indians 
were arrested or interned throughout 
Mozambique (Anon. 1963: 12-13). 
From N.M. Sacoor records, I found 
that between 1962-3, over 2,400 Indo-
Mozambicans boarded ships to depart 
the colonial capital of Lourenço Marques 
for Pakistan and India; most were Indian-
citizen deportees and their dependent 
children of various citizenships (N.M. 
Sacoor, Lda. Business Records).
This decade-long escalation is often 
minimized to the gross misnomer of 
‘Goan independence’. While there 
were certainly people who preferred 
annexation to India over colonization 
by Portugal, there is strong evidence 
that Portuguese colonial subjects in 
India wanted self-rule. Goan-origin 
interviewees told me the use of the 
terms ‘liberation’ or ‘independence’ 
was inaccurate and offensive; it was 
annexation after invasion. Popular 
sentiment among Goan Mozambicans 
was that India’s idea of liberation was 
an imposed and unwelcomed neo-
colonialism. They mourned their 
connection to Portugal, though some 
did not agree with Portugal’s retaliatory 
deportation of Indian passport holders 
from Mozambique. Collectively, 
these local histories of iterative self-
rule movements and imperfect 
independence counter celebratory post-
colonial metanarratives of African and 
This article offers oral narratives 
of current Maputo residents, who 
experienced this de-colonization 
movement as children through the lens 
of Portugal’s retaliatory internment of 
people of Indian and Pakistani-origin 
in Mozambique. Those children are 
now elders and I consider them as 
co-researchers. In my dissertation, 
memory contested colonial archives, 
a body of primary source knowledge 
typically biased to de-legitimize the 
lived experience of the colonized. Here, 
however, I focus exclusively on oral 
narratives as valid, primary source data; 
much in the same way that researchers 
prioritize (often flawed) written records. 
For example, I preserve respondents’ 
use of the term ‘concentration camps’ to 
describe their internment sites, because 
everyone who experienced internment 
referred to it this way. Methodologically, 
this work offers complexity to South-
South studies (by using colonial and 
colonized children, cum adults of various 
political positionalities) to re-examine 
post-colonial and heritage studies. The 
names in this article are all pseudonyms 
with one exception. Salim Sacoor, a 
vital collaborator, consented to use 
of his real name and to report on his 
family business, N.M. Sacoor, a shipping 
company deportees used to return to 
India and Pakistan.
A brief history of de-colonization, 
competing colonialisms in India and 
Mozambique
In response to Portuguese de-
colonization in India, Mozambique – 
then, a Portuguese colony—became a 
theater for forced migration and coerced 
citizenship articulation. Shortly after 
British India gained independence in 
1947, India’s independent government 
raised with Portugal and France the topic 
of integrating their colonial enclaves into 
liberated India. Hostility increased as 
Portugal repeatedly refused to discuss 
the integration of Dadra, Nagar Haveli, 
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Saadiq: But those who were 
Portuguese stayed. Because her 
father and step-mother opted to be 
Portuguese, they ended up staying 
[in Mozambique]… 1
Me: There wasn’t any violence?
Ibtihaj: No, I am not going to lie. I 
didn’t see violence… At that time, 
I did not see violence. We had 
food… We had military guards who 
protected us. Each of us who were 
interned had a military guard. So 
one group stayed one week and 
then left. Then came another group, 
like that, successively… When it 
came time for Muslims to fast, many 
Muslims here helped and sent 
food to those of us interned…We 
weren’t mistreated or anything. We 
also had visiting hours, so family 
members could come and converse 
openly. We were free in there, 
but we couldn’t leave whenever 
we wanted (Ibtihaj and Saadiq, 
personal interview, October 2015).
Deported: Portuguese-citizen child of 
Hindu parents
With her daughter’s English translation 
assistance, Rama, born in 1952 in Lourenço 
Marques to Hindu Gujarati merchant 
parents, responded to my detailed 
research questionnaire about Indo-
Mozambicans’ cultural and assimilation 
experiences in Mozambique. Rama 
explained that her father first immigrated 
to Mozambique in 1942 “because [he] 
had relatives in Mozambique. That’s 
one of the reasons and he saw good 
opportunity for business… He liked 
Mozambique, but had to leave because 
of the [1961] war. [He] was forced to 
leave by the Portuguese government 
1 Though it went unexplained at the time of interview, 
research shows that Muslims, like Ibtihaj’s parents, obtained 
Portuguese or Pakistani citizenship to avoid deportation. 
These citizenship choices were not available to Hindus, who 
had little recourse against deportation proceedings.
Asian solidarity; further, they raise the 
possibility that once-colonized countries 
can become hegemonic themselves. 
The generation that still remembers 
the camps and the ships are aging; 
the following sections capture their 
childhood stories of family, factionalism, 
and forced migration. These narratives 
offer a glimpse into the memories 
of detention, deportation, being left 
behind, and inter-group rivalries. The 
1961 invasion of Portugal’s colonies on 
the Indian sub-continent splintered the 
larger Indo-Mozambican community 
into sub-identity groups and cultivated 
intergroup conflict that previously did not 
exist, but persists into the present day. 
Detained: Portuguese-citizen child of 
Muslim parents 
Though she was just three or four when 
she went to live in a camp in Matadouro, 
in downtown Lourenço Marques, Ibtihaj 
remembers the camps. While her 
biological mother was Mozambican, 
Ibtihaj was raised by her stepmother 
from Pipodara and her father born in 
Ghandar—both Muslim Gujaratis and 
Indian passport holders. Ibtihaj and her 
husband, Saadiq, recalled the camp:
Ibtihaj: It was in the railway station… 
I stayed in the concentration 
camp for two or three months 
with my parents, but they stayed 
there longer. We [Ibtihaj and her 
brother] had to leave, because we 
had Portuguese nationality. We 
were born here in Mozambique… 
I think [my parents] stayed five or 
six months… Since they had Indian 
passports, they did not want to go 
to India because all of the Hindus 
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Deni is the Lourenço Marques-
born son of a Hindu tailor, who came 
to Mozambique in 1920. Deni was 
seventeen years old when he and his 
brother were left behind, after his parents 
and younger siblings were deported to 
India. He recalled:
 
Deni: [My parents] stayed almost 
three months in the concentration 
camps, until they regularized the 
situation… Here there were two 
factors: there were Indians who were 
Hindu and Muslims. The Muslims 
were lucky that time. The Embassy 
of Pakistan gave them passports.
Me: In 1961 and ‘62, they were 
changing their passports?
Deni: Yes, that’s why they stayed 
here. We [Hindus] were all kicked 
out. The Portuguese didn’t know 
who was Indian or Muslim. The 
Muslims put up signs with the 
Portugal flag in all of their homes 
and stores to symbolize that they 
were friends of Portugal. This was to 
distinguish between the Pakistanis 
and the Indians. We had to stay in 
the concentration camp until they 
sent us away. Each person had to 
buy their own ticket back to their 
country. Many people did not have 
money. The little that they had was 
pooled together and they helped 
each other to buy tickets… It was 
a cargo ship that had sleeping 
quarters. The trip took twenty-
eight days… The Muslims just 
laughed. They bought the majority 
of the Indian stores. They became 
more privileged. (Deni, personal 
interview, July 2017)
Who’s boarding the boats?
No one knows exactly when N.M. 
Sacoor, the shipping company deportees 
used to return to India or Pakistan, was 
founded, but Salim Sacoor, the current 
back in Lourenço Marques” (Rama, 
Questionnaire, 2015). She remembered 
her family’s stay in a camp in Matola, a 
suburb of Lourenço Marques, before 
being deported in 1961 to their 
ancestral village of Porbandar, Gandhi’s 
birthplace:
This year the colonist country 
Portugal had made an agreement 
with the Indian government that 
if Portuguese had to leave India-
Goa, so would the Indians living 
in Lourenço Marques leave their 
country. I was only nine years old 
and was dependent on my family. 
Both my parents were Indian and 
therefore I had to leave the country. 
We were force [sic] to live for six 
months, before going to India, 
in a secure place/building by the 
Portuguese government. Thereafter, 
we were directly deported to India in 
a ship. We reached India in twenty-
two days. Our house in Lourenço 
Marques, every property my father 
owned, was sealed and taken by 
them (Rama, Questionnaire, 2015).
Intergroup rivalry among those left-
behind
Throughout my research, Hindu Indo-
Mozambicans asserted that Muslim 
Indo-Mozambicans profited from the 
deportation of Indian citizens. Joana 
Pereira Leite and Nicole Khouri’s 2013 in-
depth study showed that Ismaili Muslims 
took loans to purchase confiscated 
businesses at auction, suggesting that the 
Goan crisis, and the subsequent expulsion 
of Hindustani merchants created new 
business opportunities for those who 
managed to stay behind in Mozambique. 
They write that in fact ‘(…) oral sources 
outside of the [Ismaili] community attest 
that it was at interesting prices that some 
Ismailis acquired establishments that 
had belonged to Indian citizens, who 
had been forced to abandon the colony’ 
(Leite and Khouri 2013). 
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paying their own fare on passenger 
ships to comply with the deportation 
order. Throughout my research, I found 
that N.M. Sacoor was the only passenger 
ship with a concession to travel from 
Lourenço Marques to the Indian-
subcontinent when deportation orders 
took effect. While I cannot be certain 
that all of the Karanja and Kampala’s 
1962-1963 passengers were deportees, 
I hypothesize that the vast majority of 
them were.
Conclusion
It is counter-intuitive to fathom that 
an Indo-Mozambican Muslim merchant, 
representing a British company, directly 
profited from Portugal’s deportation 
of Hindus back to their native India. 
Yet, ethnographic research about 
those directly affected by 1962-63 
internments and deportations revealed 
the normalcy of such stories; new fault 
lines of identity and nationality emerged 
in Mozambique, in reaction to the multi-
layered and protracted de-colonization 
processes on the Indian subcontinent. 
Across the Indian Ocean, competing 
British and Portuguese colonialisms 
(and their layered legacies of post-
colonialism) resulted in local rivalries 
among expatriates who had previously 
regarded one another as countrymen.
owner of the company, guesses it must 
have been in the 1920s. His Muslim 
grandfather (likely originally from 
Gujarat), Aboobakar Suleman, fled to 
Mozambique from South Africa and got 
a job with the company. For reasons 
that are still unclear, the owners left the 
business to Salim’s dad (young Sacoor) 
around 1947. N.M. Sacoor eventually 
became the local vendor for the British 
India Steam Navigation Company. 
When Portugal ordered all Indian 
citizens be detained and deported from 
Mozambique, Salim remembered that 
deportees came to his father to purchase 
ship tickets:
Panic spread throughout the city. 
Policemen broke into the houses 
and shops to look for those 
with an Indian passport, so they 
could be arrested and taken to 
a concentration camp, located 
near the C.F.M. [the train station 
in Lourenço Marques]. Then came 
the expulsion order from Portugal, 
so the race was tremendous for the 
purchase of tickets at N.M. Sacoor. 
And purchases were made standard, 
regardless of the friendship they 
had with Young Sacoor when the 
order was implemented (Sacoor, 
personal interview, 2018).
Salim did not remember how many 
deportees bought tickets, but my 
review of N.M. Sacoor records showed 
that approximately 2,469 people took 
the S.S. Karanja and S.S. Kampala from 
Lourenço Marques to India between 
January 1962 and July 1963. The largest 
of these journeys were the August 1962 
voyage of the S.S. Kampala with 628 
ticketed passengers and the January 
1963 voyage of the S.S. Karanja/ Sirdhan 
with 1550 ticketed passengers. The 
timing and scale of these departures are 
congruent with oral histories that confirm 
that deportees waited months before 
receiving official deportation orders and 
then they waited again in internment 
camps for three to six months, before 
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Figure 2.  N.M. Sacoor business records: Postcard of S.S. Kampala (Photo taken by the author, 2017)
Figure 1. N.M. Sacoor company records: Postcard of the S.S. Karanja (Photo taken by the author, 2017)
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Figure 4.  N.M. Sacoor Business records: Page 12 of 38 pages of 1550 passengers on the S.S. Karanja/
Sirdhan voyage of January 1963 (Photo taken by the author, 2017)
Figure 3.  N.M. Sacoor Business records: Page 15 of 15 listing passengers on S.S. Kampala’s Aug 1962 
voyage (Photo taken by the author, 2017)
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Reflective Practice and the Contribution 
of Refugee Researchers to Critical 




‘[W]hile calls for radical changes to 
“You are not the first person who 
comes to interview us. We share 
our experience with researchers, 
but nothing happens because we 
believe that they do not present our 
problems or make our problems 
visible. We have lost our faith in 
humanity because we lost our 
families, home and now ourselves. 
We feel isolated and ignored. We 
are constant refugees in exile since 
we escaped from Syria because of 
war but we are also looking for a 
way to escape from the challenges 
that we face in connection with 
the paperwork, bureaucracy, 
isolation, uprootedness and lack of 
understanding in this country!”
These words belong to members of 
Kurdish refugee groups that I interviewed 
in different cities. They express their 
frustration about researchers that fail to 
bring up refugee grievances rooted both 
in the homeland and in new societies. 
Following my engagement with Kurdish 
refugees, I realise that these statements 
also reflect my own previous experience 
of being a refugee; I was tortured and 
jailed in Turkey and lived permanently in 
fear. I was anxious about being captured 
and deported while seeking to escape 
to a safe country behind a border, where 
I was forcibly cut off from my homeland. 
This status has not changed as I am willing 
but unable to go back to my homeland in 
Turkey, but I fear that I would likely face 
persecution, torture, imprisonment and 
perhaps even death due to my critical 
stance towards the Turkish regime. Due 
to my refugee background, I have also 
often faced challenges and felt a lack of 
recognition, support and opportunities 
as a researcher, even though I have been 
awarded a PhD in Germany. This has 
occurred despite my legal status as a 
German citizen, my academic education, 
my multi-lingual social status, and my 
freedom of mobility. 
My experiences, which are rooted 
both in my homeland and in Germany, 
have now become the field. I place my 
experience in relation to those of the 
How does the positionality of refugee researchers and the research subject of refugees interact in the 
process of data collection? The reflective research practices of refugee researchers address the broad 
spectrum of questions that concern the researchers’ ethics, objectivity and the insider and outsider 
dichotomy in the process of data collection. This piece argues that the insider- approach, positionality 
and self-reflection of refugee researchers are crucial in the process of the data collection and analysis 
to produce critical knowledge on the integration process of refugees. Their research practices reveal 
that the refugees are not only the object and source of the data, but also producers of the critical 
knowledge. Based on six months of fieldwork, 230 in-depth interviews with newly-arrived Kurdish 
refugees and Kurdish diaspora leaders as well as participant observations in five urban and twelve rural 
cities in Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, France, and Italy, this paper sheds light on the reflective 
role and contribution of refugee researchers in the production of critical knowledge for decision makers 
and the general public on the role of diaspora associations in the process of escape, settlement, and 
integration of recently-arrived Kurdish refugees.
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diasporic associations in European 
cities. My research focused on processes 
of reception, incorporation, and 
settlement of recently arrived Kurdish 
refugees from Iraq, Syria, and Turkey 
since the ‘European refugee crisis’ of 
2015. It also examined the relationship 
between diasporic associations and 
recently arrived refugees, as well as 
the approaches of both the diasporic 
associations and the refugees toward 
local and national authorities. In the 
context of this fieldwork, 235 in-depth 
interviews with both newly arrived 
refugees and diaspora leaders were 
conducted alongside focus group 
discussions and participant observation 
across 17 European cities.1 The research 
revealed a wide range of challenging 
experiences rooted in both the homeland 
but also in the process of encountering 
bureaucratic obstacles as a refugee, 
such as paperwork and regulations. In 
addition, refugees encountered a lack 
of understanding and social isolation 
during the process of adapting to their 
new environments. The aim of my 
research was to understand and explore 
the role of Kurdish diasporic associations 
as part of a larger study of multi-scale 
forms of integration governance2 in 
Germany, Sweden, Austria, Denmark, 
France, and Italy.
The insider-outsider perspective 
Subjects of investigation in this 
research discussed ‘push-factors’ such 
as ongoing violent conflicts, political 
persecution, and homeland politics, as 
well as the personal impacts of various 
factors that emerge in the integration 
process in new countries. These 
factors included: their asylum status, 
1 Berlin, Munich, Landshut (Germany), Stockholm, Malmo, 
Lund (Sweden), Bornholm (Denmark), Salzburg, Vienna 
(Austria), Paris, Nice, Antibes, Cannes (France), Ventimiglia, 
Rome, Grosseto, Bari (Italy).
2 My field research took place from March to August 2019 as 
part of the European Union-funded Horizon 2020 project on 
‘Migration Governance and Asylum crisis’ (MAGYC).
Kurdish refugees I have interviewed, as 
an object of study. These memories of 
suffering transgress space and time in 
my life and constantly come up in my 
dreams, during conversations with other 
refugees, and in my social interactions. 
These experiences connect me with the 
refugees I have interviewed, with the 
homeland, and with friends who have 
been tortured, disappeared or had their 
lives taken in Turkey. The connection 
between my experience as a researcher 
with a refugee background and the 
experiences of recently arrived refugees 
with precarious status leads to two 
questions: What types of impact has my 
research on Kurdish refugees had on me 
personally as a researcher? How does my 
positionality as a Kurdish researcher with 
a refugee background have an impact 
on the data interpretation and analysis 
that aims to acquire and produce critical 
knowledge on refugees? In answering 
these questions, I must consider 
the decisive role I play as a refugee 
researcher in producing knowledge on 
refugees for decision makers in the field 
of migration and refugee integration. 
My approach to this research topic is 
therefore not neutral, but is shaped by 
my subjective experiences, biases, and 
normative believes. Yet, my positionality 
as a researcher with a blurred outsider-
insider view is crucial to my interpretation 
of the knowledge I have gained. While 
objectivity in research should typically 
be valued, I argue that through bringing 
in my own position as a refugee 
researcher, I can contribute to a deeper 
understanding of the importance of 
self-reflectivity in field research and also 
bring a critical perspective to established 
discourse on the integration of recently-
arrived refugees. 
Research on Kurdish refugees: The 
context of the study
In 2019, I embarked on ethnographic 
fieldwork on the function, role, and 
politics of pre-established Kurdish 
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institutions. 
In my experience, these exclusionary 
practices triggered a sense of frustration 
and ultimately, the inability to express 
suffering. Hence, I could strongly identify 
with the severe distress of both the 
established and newly arrived Kurdish 
refugees and their trauma. As in my case, 
those I interviewed, for example, felt not 
only forced to leave but also banned 
from their ancestral homeland. Like me, 
the Kurdish refugees in question—both 
those outside and within the diasporic 
associations— had been living in 
countries outside the Kurdish region 
for more than half of their lives but 
often without a clear legal status. The 
consequences of this is that, as I realised 
through my previous experience as a 
refugee, they have had to endure a long-
term condition of feeling vulnerable, 
insecure, and unprotected. They are 
affected by repressive politics in their 
countries of origin and are still obsessed 
by news about the tragic events in these 
countries, especially as it relates to what 
they feel to be their Kurdish brethren in 
the Middle East. Thus, they lead a ‘life in 
transit’ as I did when I left Germany for a 
restless life all over the place. I feel always 
‘on the move’ both in the physical sense 
but also in the mind. This experience 
has constructed and re-constructed my 
personality and positionality, and also 
affects how I conduct my research on 
Kurdish refugees. 
The impact of being a refugee 
researcher
The negative implications emerging 
from the experience of being a refugee 
and the development of a high level of 
self-consciousness have enabled me to 
deal with the predicament faced by the 
refugees I encountered in my research. 
I could understand the uncertainties 
surrounding their lives in the present and 
future in new countries from a refugee 
perspective. I ultimately decided 
not to distance myself from my own 
bureaucratic and language obstacles, 
social isolation, and a general lack of 
practical assistance in integration-related 
areas.3 One of the aims of the research 
project was to examine these factors from 
the viewpoint of refugees and provide 
decision makers, scholars, and the 
general public in receiving countries an 
insight into the refugees’ perspectives. 
I draw on my own experience of being 
a refugee and having suffered from 
a painful integration policy, which I 
experienced as being one-sided. In 
many cases, the political and institutional 
actors engaged in decision making 
and decision implementation around 
refugees’ integration policies fail to 
recognise the background, experiences, 
and vulnerable circumstances of 
refugees. This approach may impede 
refugees’ smooth incorporation into the 
social, political, cultural, and economic 
structures of receiving societies. 
Therefore, the refugees in question 
often struggle for recognition by the 
authorities and for their understanding 
of the cultural, political, and social factors 
related to conditions in their countries 
of origin and settlement. Through the 
struggle, refugees promote their own 
integration from below. My interpretation 
is based on the fact that I have also faced 
the difficulties of some of the existing 
‘integration’ policies, which often also 
include experiences of discrimination, 
exclusion, and marginalisation, and 
even interactions with authorities that 
produce feelings of worthlessness. 
Despite my ambitious efforts to engage 
in ‘integration from below’, I sometimes 
encountered situations in which I was 
discouraged from learning German or 
prevented from studying or exerting 
a policy impact on issues relevant to 
refugees and migrants in Germany. I also 
personally experienced discriminatory 
practices in some of my interactions with 
state authorities and public institutions, 
including universities and funding 
3 These areas include housing, the labour market, education, 
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and feelings of helplessness as I listened 
to stories relaying the tragedy of being 
uprooted, lost, discriminated against, 
and neglected in a new environment. 
They have experienced a calamity owing 
to the fact that the Kurdish people 
are stateless, and in consequences 
of this, being refugees seems to be 
an essential factor for their survival. 
Kurdish refugees have an uncertain 
status, collective narratives of suffering, 
traumatic experiences, and ongoing 
situations of precarity, all of which lead 
to a condition of extreme vulnerability. 
Kurdish refugees are often assigned a 
low status and are treated as minorities 
that belong to deprived communities or 
classes. They are often marginalised in 
both their new home and their homeland. 
To put it simply, my interviewees were 
often forced to live on the periphery 
of societies in which they are present 
everywhere but welcome nowhere. 
These circumstances have left a deep 
emotional impact on me and further 
shaped my positionality, sparking my own 
self-reflectivity during the data collection 
process. The stories I encountered often 
evoked my own past trauma as they fit 
within a collective narrative of common 
suffering and shared memory. This has a 
direct impact on my research and the way 
in which I approach Kurdish refugees. 
The position I try to represent in my 
research is not related to my common 
ethnic background as a member of the 
ethnic Kurdish community, but rather 
to the collective social and political 
consciousness that arises out of the 
experience and narrative of suffering. I 
hold this position along with others who 
have been forced to escape regardless of 
their ethnic, social, symbolic, or political 
identity. I have decided to emphasise 
my position of being a refugee in 
order to recognise refugees’ common 
struggles against injustice, coercion, 
and victimhood that are often caused by 
the actions of state institutions. 
In the process of undertaking field 
research, I have developed a sense of 
academic commitment and responsibility 
personal experiences and the narrative 
of suffering that I share with Kurdish 
refugees. Instead, I actively reflected on 
the experience of Kurdish refugees and 
coped with the personal repercussions. 
I did this in order to be better able to 
affect the perceptions and attitudes 
of authorities, decision makers, and 
individual citizens towards refugees. By 
doing so, I demonstrated that refugees 
have the agency to critically define the 
notion of ‘refugee’ based on their own 
experiences. My own case and those 
of many other refugee researchers 
should make clearer that refugees seek 
to influence political decision-making 
at various levels, including beyond 
borders and through critical knowledge 
production that aims to understand the 
challenges and conditions faced by 
refugees from more humane and ethical 
perspectives. 
As a refugee researcher, I point out 
that refugees should not just be assumed 
as victims who rely on the compassion 
and empathy of other human beings, 
but rather I try to challenge notions of 
helplessness to create a political space for 
their rights, protection, self-expression, 
and self-representation. Moreover, the 
autonomous efforts of refugees to create 
a political space of equal expression are 
meaningful.  The creation of this political 
space helps them to overcome their 
dire predicament and their collective 
narrative of suffering and allows them 
to express and share their critical self-
knowledge in order to be seen, heard, 
and felt. When Kurdish refugees critique 
researchers for not including them in 
the production of knowledge, they 
are pushing back against the idea that 
they are solely a source of data and not 
producers in their own right. 
The personal impacts of conducting 
field research and my positionality as 
a refugee researcher
During this fieldwork, I have 
experienced highly emotional moments 
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to communicate the obstacles and 
hardships of Kurdish refugees and to raise 
awareness amongst decision-makers, as 
well as the general public. This involves a 
critique of the unfavourable integration 
policies and perceptions of the general 
public towards Kurdish refugees, 
which in turn shape refugees’ social, 
political, and institutional adaptation 
to receiving societies. My sense of 
responsibility also extends to promoting 
an understanding of the implications of 
Kurdish statelessness, which is rooted 
in countries of origin, and places 
the Kurdish refugees and diasporic 
associations in a dire predicament. I 
aspire to shed light on the ways in which 
Kurdish refugees have been unable to 
express their collective experience of 
suffering due to their marginalisation. 
Finally, I seek to support their collective 
efforts to create a political space for their 
integration from below that will allow 
them to obtain both their recognition 
and visibility.   
Kurdish diaspora activists created a mountain, surrounded with images 
of the Kurdish martyrs, symbols of the homeland and wild landscape of 
Kurdistan. This image was taken at the Ahmet Kaya Kurdish Centre in 
Paris in May 2019.
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A Model of Protracted Suffering among 
Refugees on the Greek Islands: 
The Case of Chios
MohaMaD alhussein saouD anD Marta welanDer
This article proposes a model describing the situation for refugees and displaced people on the Greek 
island of Chios. This model was developed by the authors following extensive field research in Chios, 
consisting of 300 interviews with refugees and led by the human rights organisation Refugee Rights 
Europe in May 2017. It illustrates the situation on the island in a dynamic way, connecting refugees’ 
past, present and future, in order to make sense of the lived experiences of refugees on Chios. Based 
on the model, this article demonstrates that the distress refugees experience, including traumatic 
past experiences, a violent and desperate present situation, and an uncertain future–including fear of 
deportation and continued family separation–, appears to contribute to depression and mental health 
issues among thousands of people seeking protection in Europe. As such, the article calls for firm 
policy action in order to overcome a continued situation plagued by sustained and escalated violence, 
as well as more self-harming. 
Introduction
In several places in Europe, refugees 
and displaced people find themselves in 
situations where harsh living conditions, 
untreated health problems, and a heavy-
handed treatment by police officers are 
a daily reality (Refugee Rights Europe 
2018). The situation is particularly acute 
on the Greek islands, where thousands 
of prospective asylum seekers are forced 
to stay in overcrowded and unsanitary 
camps, awaiting their potential transfer 
to the mainland and eventual status 
determination. The grave situation 
on the islands is a result of increased 
number of arrivals and the signing of 
the EU-Turkey Statement in March 2016, 
which led to the introduction of what is 
known as the Greek ‘containment policy’, 
banning newly arrived individuals from 
travelling to mainland Greece until their 
asylum claims have been processed (Al 
Jazeera 2017). 
While the legality of the containment 
policy has been widely criticised 
(Amnesty International UK 2018), it is 
still in place at the time of writing, and 
the situation has deteriorated further 
with rising numbers of arrivals leading 
to a camp population increasing from 
approximately 4,500 people in May to 
nearly 14,000 by the end of October 2019 
(Reidy 2019). While accelerated transfers 
to the mainland are certainly urgently 
needed to address the overcrowding 
on the islands, the Greek government 
announced in November 2019 that 
individuals would be transferred to 
closed centres, which has been heavily 
criticised by rights groups as a form of 
de facto detention and deportation 
centres (Deutsche Welle 2019a).  
In this article, the authors introduce 
a previously unpublished ‘model’ 
illustrating the protracted and 
exacerbated suffering amongst 
refugees on the Greek islands, based on 
published research findings by Refugee 
Rights Europe as well as the authors’ 
own wider familiarity with, and analysis 
of, the situation amongst refugees in 
Europe. The main research findings 
informing the model are derived from 
Refugee Rights Europe’s field research 
study in Chios, Greece, from May 2017. 
During this period, one of the authors, 
alongside four other field researchers, 
conducted 300 semi-structured surveys 
with refugees and displaced people 
on the island, in Arabic, Dari, English, 
Kurdish, and Pashto. Based on the 
estimated population in Chios at the 
time of the study, the research sample 
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knowledge of, and insights into, the 
refugee context in Europe, with the 
aim of offering suggestions for more 
constructive policy proposals.
A model of protracted suffering 
among refugees 
Through a model that connects 
refugees’ past, present and future, 
one can better make sense of the lived 
experiences of refugees and displaced 
people trapped on the Greek islands. 
Starting with the past, the model 
illustrates refugees’ experiences of war, 
conflict or other forms of protracted 
crises. Such experiences have led many 
to have traumatic and painful memories, 
also contributing to an erosion of hopes 
and aspirations. Indeed, feelings of 
hopelessness result when an individual 
has fled his or her country, leaving 
their possessions, family members 
and social networks behind, which is 
bound to be a difficult, isolating, and 
potentially traumatising experience for 
most human beings. Moreover, many 
individuals fleeing war and conflict 
may have sustained potentially severe 
represented between 8-13% of the 
refugee population on the island, with 
88% of respondents being male and 
12% female. By way of comparison, in 
2018 men made up 48.2% of asylum 
seekers in Greece, and women 19.3% 
(with 36% being registered as children) 
(The Asylum Information Database 
2019). It is therefore important to note 
the gender imbalance of this sample, 
with an underrepresentation of women 
and girls. The researchers surveyed 
as many individuals as possible in and 
around the two camps on the island 
(Souda and Vial camps), mainly using a 
snowball sampling method to identify 
interviewees. The research team’s 
observations and complementary 
informal interviews with charities and 
NGO staff served to complement these 
interviews with refugees.  
Based on the insights collected 
throughout this field research, the 
two authors produced a model of 
refugees’ experiences of suffering on 
the islands, using the case of Chios as 
a basis but suggesting that the model 
is representative of the wider situation 
on the Greek islands. In developing 
the model, the authors drew on their 
Figure 1.  The model of the situation of refugees in Chios
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was mentioned frequently during the 
interviews, with 72% of the survey 
respondents with a health problem 
reporting that they had not received any 
medical support (Refugee Rights Europe 
2017: 25). 
Refugees on the islands live in this 
miserable situation for a prolonged 
period of time, which in turn contributes 
to further feelings of hopelessness 
and despair, especially when a critical 
‘uncertainty factor’ is added. One 
research participant, who had been in 
Chios for more than a year, highlighted 
this sense of despair with the following 
statement: “Sometimes I sit alone and 
cry. All my friends who came with me 
left” (Refugee Rights Europe 2017: 19). 
This uncertainly stems from the fact that 
people have no idea about what their 
future might hold, or what their next 
steps will be. They do not know when 
they will be transferred to the mainland 
and what the final decision of their 
asylum application would be; everything 
is uncertain and the process excessively 
lacking in transparency. The answer 
refugees often receive when asking 
officials about their potential transfer to 
the mainland is that they need to ‘just 
wait’, without any further information 
given–a common frustration shared by 
those displaced residing on the island. 
“I have been here since April 2016 and I 
am ready to wait for two or three years, 
but all I need to know is when I will be 
transferred from here. I have no idea, I 
am just waiting hopelessly”, a refugee 
told the research team (Refugee Rights 
Europe 2017: 35).
The long waiting time and the 
accompanying absence of certainty and 
information about next steps, combined 
with an exhausting living environment 
and the condition of being surrounded 
by individuals who are already consumed 
by war, conflict or other protracted 
crises, inevitably create a critically 
hopeless and desperate situation. In 
turn, this desperation provokes and 
exacerbates two main serious problems, 
namely self-harming and violence. The 
injuries, with some having been arrested 
and tortured. Such experiences are 
likely to precipitate or be accompanied 
by mental health issues and/or chronic 
ailments. Such harsh experiences make 
individuals particularly vulnerable, 
requiring extensive and targeted 
rehabilitation, care and support–which 
is too often inaccessible to refugees, 
including those stuck on the Greek 
islands at the moment. 
Despite these past experiences and 
resulting critical needs, refugees on the 
islands were placed in camps which do 
not fulfill basic living conditions. The 
food that they received was of very 
poor quality, with many interlocutors 
reporting that they could not eat the 
food due to episodes of food poisoning. 
For instance, one respondent told the 
research team: “I gave up eating the food 
that we received after I was poisoned few 
months ago” (Refugee Rights Europe 
2017: 22). The lack of essential services 
in the camps was clearly evident, with 
the people in the overcrowded Souda 
camp on Chios living in fragile tents. 
Some individuals did not even have 
access to a tent in the first place (Refugee 
Rights Europe 2017: 21). In Vial camp, 
there were caravans, but the camp was 
isolated with extremely limited access to 
public transport and long waiting times. 
Sanitation issues were widespread, with 
insects and rats everywhere due to a 
drainage pipe letting out dirty water 
in the vicinity of the camp, and toilets 
were very dirty. To illustrate the urgency 
of this, one respondent explained: “I 
created a high sleeping place inside the 
tent for my child in order to keep her 
away from rats” (Refugee Rights Europe 
2017: 21). In the Vial camp, informants 
said that there was no water in the toilets. 
Hot water was rarely available in Souda 
camp, only available for a few hours 
per day, while it was completely absent 
in the Vial camp (Ibid). Consequently, 
refugees residing there were barely able 
to wash themselves, which affected their 
hygiene and health, as well as their sense 
of dignity. The lack of medical services 
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absence of psychiatrists who might be 
able to support individuals in preventing 
self-harming behavior exacerbates 
this phenomenon. “The psychiatrist 
gave me only five minutes, he said he 
cannot give him more time as there are 
others waiting”, a refugee with a serious 
psychological issue explained (Refugee 
Rights Europe 2017: 25). 
The researchers interviewed many 
people who were on the brink of harming 
themselves, with some interlocuters 
already engaging in such self-harm. 
For instance, one person explained: “I 
tried several times to hurt myself by a 
blade but my friend prevented me” 
(Ibid; Refugee Rights Europe 2017: 39). 
When left untreated, such tendencies 
are of course incredibly concerning as 
they may lead to even more serious 
outcomes, including suicide attempts. 
For instance, Médecins Sans Frontières 
(MSF) reported in September 2018 that 
“an unprecedented health and mental 
health emergency [was unfolding] 
amongst the men, women and especially 
children kept in Moria refugee camp, 
on Lesbos, Greece” (Médecins Sans 
Frontières 2018). The MSF teams 
reported several cases per week where 
young people tried to commit suicide 
or engaged in self-harm (Ibid, see also 
France 24 2018). 
As regards interpersonal violence, 
the lack of hope and the exhausting 
environment appear to be contributing 
to increased levels of aggression 
amongst desperate individuals, which in 
turn risks leading to violence between 
refugees themselves. The researchers 
heard many accounts of fights breaking 
out between refugees, with 37% of 
interviewees reporting that they had 
experienced violence by other refugees 
on the island (Refugee Rights Europe 
2017: 14). This violence would often 
lead to police intervention. One recent 
example from September 2019 was the 
police response to the refugee riots 
which broke out in response to the 
death of a mother and child in a fire 
at a reception center on Lesvos. Riots 
started as a protest against the slow 
response to tame the fire and the overall 
terrible living conditions experienced, 
and the police force moved in and fired 
tear gas at the protestors in response 
(Deutsche Welle 2019b). When a major 
fight would break out, police would 
move in to end the fight and reportedly 
to punish the perpetrators. However, 
on many occasions, it was unclear who 
the ‘perpetrators’ actually were, which 
would lead to generalised punishment 
against anyone who happened to find 
themselves on the site of the brawl. This 
approach by the authorities might be 
rooted in a general antipathy towards 
refugees, or simply a misguided attempt 
to deal with a complex situation. The 
researchers heard stories of how the 
police arrived the day after a big fight 
and arrested a significant number of 
individuals at random. 24% of the 
interviewees mentioned that they had 
themselves experienced violence by 
police (Refugee Rights Europe 2017: 17). 
Such violent episodes would, in turn, 
exacerbate conflictual relationships 
between refugees themselves and 
between refugees and the police, 
potentially leading to increased violence 
in general and a heightened sense of 
insecurity on refugees in particular for 
women and children. Coupled with 
incidents of citizen violence by far-rightist 
groups reported by 22% of respondents 
(Refugee Rights Europe 2017: 12), the 
different layers of violence on the island 
would aggravate the overall mental 
condition of refugees and contribute to 
a further degradation of mental health 
and exacerbation feelings of misery and 
hopelessness. In turn, this may induce a 
cycle of further self-harm and violence. 
Conclusion 
The model of refugees’ experiences 
on the island of Chios illustrates critical 
concerns that are witnessed on many of 
the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea. 
The distress experienced by refugees, 
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including traumatic past experiences, a 
violent and desperate present situation, 
and an uncertain future, combined with 
fears of deportation and continued 
family separation, appears to contribute 
to depression and mental health issues 
among thousands of people seeking 
protection in Europe. Whilst complex, 
these concerns are arguable not 
irresolvable, but would require political 
will and resource allocation to address. 
Priorities for national and EU-level 
actors must include increased access to 
healthcare, proper and quicker status 
determination procedures through 
accelerated transfers to the mainland 
where due process with adequate legal 
safeguards, legal aid and interpretation 
FIELD MONITOR
services needs to take place, and 
improved access to the asylum procedure.
Meanwhile, it is likely that a long-
term solution can only be reached by 
abandoning the so-called containment 
policy and revising the EU-Turkey 
Statement which has contributed to 
the humanitarian crisis unfolding on the 
islands. The number of arrivals has again 
increased, with nearly 14,000 individuals 
in the camps at the end of October 2019 
(Reidy 2019), meaning that policy action 
is perhaps more urgently needed than 
ever before. Without meaningful action 
at the European and national levels, we 
are likely to witness a continuation of a 
situation of collective distress and self-
harming among asylum seekers.
A view from Chios
mohamad alhussein saoud
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The Picture from Above: Using Satellite 
Imagery to Overcome Methodological 
Challenges in Studying Environmental 
Displacement
alison heslin anD lisa thalheiMer 
Extreme and uncertain climate conditions adversely affect people around the world, including, 
in extreme circumstances, by displacing them from their homes. In today’s global climate crisis, it 
is critical to have a range of tools available to measure and address the scale and drivers of such 
forced migration. Inclusive development and the provision of time-effective humanitarian aid to those 
displaced requires real-time information on displacement, information that can be difficult to fully obtain 
through data collection on the ground. Satellite data offers an opportunity to supplement ground-level 
data collection for targeted intervention in areas most at-risk of displacement. The starting point of 
this paper is the discourse on environmental displacement, the challenges of studying this type of 
displacement and the opportunities information from remote sensing provide. We then showcase the 
applicability of such data in an embedded case study on Somalia, a country with a longstanding history 
of forced migration, drought and conflict.
Introduction
We find ourselves in the midst of 
a warming world with intensifying 
climate and conflict shocks. Studying 
forced migration in the context of 
environmental change and extreme 
weather events has gained prominence 
with the climate emergency being 
discussed in the media and among 
policymakers worldwide (McLeman and 
Gemenne 2018; Ponserre and Ginnetti 
2019). The effects of climate change 
on rainfall patterns and storm severity 
will continue to threaten populations 
in coastal, low-lying, agricultural and 
pastoral communities (IPCC 2012). 
Additionally, their economic livelihoods 
are at risk as weather events jeopardize 
natural resources on which many of these 
‘climate change hotspot’ communities 
depend. Intervention into areas at risk of 
environmental degradation and extreme 
weather as well as providing early 
response in the wake of displacement, 
possibly at a large scale, are critical in 
addressing forced migration. 
Interventions into areas at risk of 
displacement and areas receiving 
displaced persons require a thorough 
understanding of the mechanisms and 
processes driving the timing of people’s 
decisions to move and their selection 
of destination locations. In turn, 
understanding the displacement process 
requires data on a range of topics as 
the movement of populations is highly 
complex and motivated by interrelated 
sets of factors (see, for example, Heslin 
et al. 2019; Marsh 2015). Studies of 
displacement, in general, can face 
difficulty in obtaining data which predate 
the displacement event of interest. In 
particular, studies of environmental 
displacement may require data both 
preceding and following natural 
disasters, which alter the landscape, 
infrastructure and communities and can 
therefore disrupt any existing and ongoing 
data collection efforts.
In the context of environmental 
displacement, satellite imagery 
offers an opportunity to supplement 
information collected on the ground 
with environmental data that covers 
large geographic areas and time 
frames. To exemplify, using satellites, 
one can measure land use, vegetation, 
soil moisture, and other environmental 
variables at fine time scales and varying 
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informal settlements, adding to data 
on destination locations. In this paper, 
we discuss the scale of environmental 
displacement, the need for quality data 
to inform our understanding of this 
process and provide an example of the 
potential use of satellite imagery in the 
case of internal displacement in Somalia. 
spatial resolutions. Through platforms 
such as Google Earth Engine, these data 
sets are publicly available and frequently 
updated, providing near-real time 
information to monitor displacement 
events as they unfold. In addition to 
environment-specific data, satellite 
imagery can be applied to measure the 
growth of cities, refugee camps, and 
ACADEMIC SECTION
Environmental displacement 
Projections of displacement1 in general 
and environmental displacement, 
specifically, vary widely across studies 
using differing data and  methodologies 
(Gemenne 2011). Based on reliable 
sources, natural disasters resulted in 227 
million internal displacements from 2009 
to 2018; a number nearly three times 
greater than conflict-related internal 
displacement over the same time period 
(IDMC 2018a) (Figure 1). The first half 
1 In the migration literature, typically the terms displacement 
and forced migration can be used interchangeably. 
Throughout the remainder of the paper, we use the former.
of 2019 saw 10.8 million new internal 
displacements, with seven million of 
these triggered by natural disasters, a 
new record high mid-year displacement 
by natural disasters (IDMC 2019a). 
In addition to sudden onset natural 
disasters, environmental displacement 
can occur through longer term, gradual 
onset changes that affect livelihoods, 
fuel conflict, and drive internal migration 
to urban centres (Heslin et al. 2019). 
While the majority of displacements occur 
internally, disasters and conflict also drive 
populations across borders–most often 
into neighbouring countries, which host 
four in five refugees (UNHCR, 2019).
Figure 1.  New Internal Displacements 2009-2018.
Source: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Global Internal Displacement Database
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emerge. First, ground-collected data 
for determining underlying drivers of 
migration decisions may not exist or 
may be incomplete if collection begins 
only after an event has occurred or only 
in locations where formal programmes 
of assistance exist. Within the context of 
disasters reported in the IDMC database, 
Ponserre and Ginnetti (2019) report that 
only 130 of 7,000 events reported since 
2008 have time-series data displacement 
numbers and flows. Second, in the case 
of regularly collected data–the type 
that could be used to determine the 
initial characteristics or vulnerability of 
a region, community, or household–
sudden onset extreme weather events 
can disrupt their collection. Such gaps 
in data collection result in missing 
data during a critical time frame for 
fully understanding a displacement 
process. For monitoring unfolding 
humanitarian emergencies, delays in 
data access between its collection and 
public availability can impede research 
and hold up activities aimed at assisting 
relief efforts. Lastly, in addition to delays 
in the public availability of data, data 
collected by government agencies and 
aid organizations may not ever be made 
accessible due to either explicit intentions 
to keep information internal or simply 
from lack of capacity or resources to enter 
and host data in an accessible server. 
Opportunities in using satellite data 
The IDMC, among others, has 
highlighted the potential role of satellite 
data as a tool in addressing displacement 
(IDMC 2019b). While remote sensing, 
or collecting data about an area from 
a distance, cannot replace the breadth 
of information gained from on-the-
ground knowledge and experience—
for instance from in-depth interviews, 
household surveys, or ethnographies—
it can supplement such information 
in many ways. Addressing the above 
listed data limitations, one advantage of 
satellites is that they consistently record 
With climate change adversely 
affecting sea-level, storm severity, 
and weather patterns (IPCC 2018), 
environmental displacement is likely 
to continue as a major humanitarian 
issue into the future. During extreme 
weather events and humanitarian 
emergencies, health, safety and shelter 
are the most prevalent priority needs for 
displaced people. In addition, displaced 
persons face disruptions in education 
and livelihoods when leaving home, 
which can have lasting impacts (Bessler 
2019; Cazabat 2018). Differences in 
disaster-preparedness, geographic 
location, and societal context also 
create context-specific challenges for 
displaced people. Ayeb-Karlsson et al., 
for instance, investigate early warning 
system (EWS) effectiveness, finding 
social determinates of EWS failure in 
some cases (e.g. mistrust of authorities) 
and cultural determinants (e.g. religious 
understandings of disasters as God’s 
will) in others (2019). 
Environmental displacement is 
complex, and our understanding of 
associated mechanisms is limited. 
Examining the causes and mechanisms 
of environmental displacement can 
help in designing effective policies and 
processes influencing people’s exposure 
and vulnerability to extreme weather 
events (sudden) or climate change (slow 
onset). It is widely accepted that drivers 
are multi-causal, meaning they range 
from non-environmental issues such as 
the political economy, demographic 
change and conflict conditions to 
environmental changes and climatic 
shocks resulting in floods, storms or heat 
waves (Black et al. 2011). Thus, the study 
of environmental displacement requires 
a range of data sources to model these 
complex dynamics.
Data limitations 
When studying displacement in 
general, and environmental displacement 
specifically, several data challenges 
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Targeting interventions and building 
resilience
Researchers and practitioners have 
used remote sensing in post-natural 
disaster and large-scale displacement 
contexts to aid in addressing ongoing 
crises. In the event of a natural 
disaster, satellite imagery can provide 
information on the extent of damage 
and displacement. For instance, imagery 
of flood extent, destroyed structures, or 
burned areas can be compared with pre-
disaster imagery to provide governments 
and aid organizations estimations of the 
land area and number of people affected 
(Boccardo and Giulio Tonolo 2015). In 
addition, studies have used satellite 
imagery to estimate the size of displaced 
populations at points of destination. 
Such studies use imagery to count tents 
and buildings as well as to measure night 
time lights to estimate the number of 
people in a given location (Bharti et al. 
2015; Bjorgo 2000; Checchi et al. 2013; 
Lang et al. 2010; Wang et al. 2015). 
These remote sensing data can be 
combined with ground data and applied 
in collaboration with organizations 
working on the ground. In the Northwest 
Himalaya mountain region, Bharti et al. 
(2015), for instance, combine anonymized 
mobile phone data with satellite 
imagery of night time lights to estimate 
population movements to improve in 
the delivery of aid and rebuilding. With 
information on the approximate number 
of people in a location, governments 
and aid organizations can better allocate 
food and other supplies and estimate 
requirements for supporting these 
displaced populations. In the context 
of targeting interventions displacement 
need not be strictly environmentally 
motivated to benefit from satellite data, 
as determining the size and location of 
populations can direct aid and resources 
those displaced from any driver.
During humanitarian emergencies, 
knowledge of the most affected regions 
may come after displacement has begun 
when livelihoods and social structures are 
data at equal intervals around the world. 
A prominent example are Landsat 
satellites, which have been collecting 
imagery of the Earth’s surface since the 
1970s. The intervals of image collection 
for the numerous open source satellite 
data sources are uninterrupted by natural 
disasters (with the exception of cloud 
obstruction) or conflicts. This historical 
depth and contemporary consistency 
offer major advantages (Witmer 2015).
Satellite imagery can be used in 
many different ways in the study of 
environmental displacement, both in 
terms of gaining a better understanding 
of the drivers of migration and in 
measuring actual displacement 
numbers. Imagery can be used to track 
changes in land cover or land use type, 
surface water extent or infrastructure 
locations at high spatial and temporal 
resolutions, with open source satellite 
imagery from sources such as the 
Sentinel 2 satellite, which collects high-
resolution imagery in five day intervals 
at a 10-meter spatial resolution, 
meaning any location will have imagery 
data collected by the satellite every 
five days. In addition to such imagery, 
georeferenced climate data provides 
information on rainfall, temperature, 
drought indices and soil moisture at 
daily or near daily timescales as well as 
climate projections of temperature and 
rainfall under different climate change 
scenarios. Radar data, which measures 
physical properties of the earth’s surface, 
is available for a given location every 
three days and can be used to gauge 
expansions of settlements, measuring 
increases in built structures such as 
houses, tents, buildings, or roads. Such 
geographic data are particularly useful 
due to the near immediacy with which 
they are publicly accessible, providing 
near real-time information on the state 
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real-time or based on future climate 
projections to identify areas likely 
to face threats to their well-being. 
Increased temperature or decreased 
rainfall, for instance, will be acutely 
experienced by those dependent on 
rain-fed agriculture, specifically drought 
sensitive crops. For example, with 
remote sensing, one can first identify 
agricultural regions, then use historical 
data to locate areas, which regions have 
experienced decreases in vegetation 
during periods of below average rainfall. 
Knowing these areas are vulnerable 
to rainfall variability and knowing the 
values of precipitation at which the 
cropped area historically decreased 
allows for the use of either contemporary 
rainfall or rainfall projections to identify 
locations for intervention. By mapping 
future rainfall projections over the same 
regions, we can begin identifying areas 
likely vulnerable to droughts as climate 
change progresses.
Such measurements have most 
potential when applied in tandem with 
data collected on the ground or in-
depth familiarity with the region, as they 
identify potential environmental drivers 
of displacement, a process that is multi-
causal and context-specific. Satellite 
data offers the opportunity to fill gaps in 
knowledge of real-time conditions over 
large areas for practitioners working in 
the field. Already existing knowledge 
of the conditions which have driven 
displacement events in the past should 
guide data collection efforts to identify 
the current state of those factors in 
inaccessible regions or time intervals.
 
Potential for satellite data: the case 
of Somalia
For over two decades, Somalia has 
been a prominent humanitarian crisis 
in Africa, presenting a challenging 
landscape for aid agencies. The case 
of Somalia presents an example of the 
highly complex nature of protracted 
displacement crises in which conflict, 
already severely damaged. Anticipating 
who is affected and likely to be displaced 
can allow for intervention in situ,  reducing 
challenges of assisting already displaced 
populations and allows for work to build 
resilience in vulnerable populations. 
Creating resilience to environmental 
hazards requires building and 
strengthening the capacity of vulnerable 
populations to quickly and effectively 
recover from disasters and anticipate 
and reduce future risks (Hallegatte et 
al. 2017). Satellite imagery, along with 
georeferenced climate projections, 
can help identify areas at risk in order 
to build resilience and intervention 
strategies in advance of a crisis. The 
information available through remote 
sensing from satellites includes climate 
and land cover, such as vegetation and 
road surfaces, among many others. Such 
information can be used to assess the 
vulnerability of regions to environment 
displacement. In identifying factors that 
may cause displacement, such as unusual 
drops in vegetation or projections of 
crop failure based on rainfall anomalies, 
one is also less limited by the spatial 
resolution of data than in identifying the 
size the already displaced populations. 
In measuring already displaced 
populations, studies like those outlined 
above counting tents and buildings, 
require high-resolution imagery whereas 
in identifying potential environmental 
hazards for populations, high resolution 
imagery increases precision, but lower 
resolution imagery of land-use type or 
geographic data on climate variables 
can still offer insight into regions at-risk 
of displacement. 
Critical to using such a vast resource 
of information for locally applied 
interventions, however, is ensuring 
that the data is relevant to the specific 
context of interest. Knowledge on the 
region of interest is important for first 
identifying the primary livelihood source 
of the population and the livelihood-
specific vulnerabilities. Once these 
specific stressors are identified, it is 
possible to map vulnerabilities in near 
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from 2011 to 2012 (Gebremeskel Haile 
et al. 2019). Despite the number of new 
drought-related displacements abating, 
drought-related internal displacements 
continue and many people have been 
unable to achieve durable solutions 
in terms of their health, safety, shelter 
(Figure 2).
environmental disasters, and political 
and economic instability drive internal 
and international displacement while 
disrupting aid flows and data collection 
(Thalheimer and Webersik 2020). 
Somalis have faced seven drought 
events from 2000 to 2017, including the 
severe drought in East African drought 
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Figure 2.  Drought-Related Internal Displacement 2017, Somalia (excluding Somaliland).
Data Source: UNHCR PRMN Somalia Internal Displacement, 2017
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The need for pre-emptive action
While Somalia represents a particularly 
challenging case for intervention, it 
encapsulates many aspects leading 
to forced displacement more broadly, 
including ongoing conflict and limited 
state capacity. In such circumstances, 
the combination of an environmental 
event, moving populations and fragility 
presents substantial challenges for 
directing timely intervention. Indeed, 
once displacement begins, many 
intervention opportunities have already 
passed. In addition, ground-level data 
collection, if it existed prior to the crisis, 
will likely be disrupted, adding further 
obstacles to identifying intervention 
locations and solutions. In a real time 
evaluation report of the 2011 drought 
in the Horn of Africa commissioned 
by the UN Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs, the authors 
highlight uncertainty regarding the 
severity of the crisis as a factor, which 
limited early responses (Darcy et al. 2012). 
For example, the report notes scepticism 
and uncertainty surrounding anecdotal 
evidence reported from various agencies 
and villages to central officials. 
The presence of additional data to 
confirm or expand upon reports from 
more remote areas of Somalia could have 
expedited the identification of those at 
risk of hunger and displacement This 
could have allowed for aid interventions 
in place, thereby protecting populations 
from many additional dangers that 
accompany displacement. 
Following the 2011 East Africa drought, 
Save the Children and Oxfam issued 
a joint report outlining insufficiencies 
in the response that accounted for the 
prolonged and devastating food crisis 
and famine. Of particular note in their 
report is the call for a stronger focus 
on data to identify risks and investment 
in preventative interventions based 
on those assessments of risk (Save the 
Children and Oxfam, 2012). What both 
organizations highlight in the report 
regarding the famine applies more 
The 2011 East African drought
The 2011 drought in East Africa offers 
a sobering example of the role of the 
environment in displacement. Well 
below average rains in the fall of 2010 
and spring 2011 devastated livestock 
and crop production, causing an 
increase in food prices and worsening 
humanitarian situation in East Africa. The 
humanitarian emergency in Somalia was 
further exacerbated by a combination 
of generalized violence and conflict 
between the Federal Government of 
Somalia (FGS) and its allies fighting 
rebel groups. By summer 2011, the UN 
declared famine conditions in south 
and central Somalia as refugees fled 
into neighbouring Kenya and Ethiopia 
and internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
numbered over one million (Norwegian 
Refugee Council/Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Centre, 2012). As the 
drought destroyed crops, reduced 
livestock levels and exhausted people’s 
resources, much of the food assistance 
allowed into the country was diverted 
by different parties to the conflict 
(Seal and Bailey 2013). Although the 
Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) 
recognized the severity of the food 
crisis, it was unable to react ex-ante, as 
little had been invested in anticipating 
and preventing the vulnerabilities, 
thus addressing root causes of this 
kind of displacement. Somalia’s capital 
Mogadishu, for example, is an urban 
centre, which receives IDPs without 
the capacity to provide adequate 
safety, healthcare, housing, education 
and sanitation to arrivals, resulting in 
evictions, illness and gender-based 
violence (IDMC, 2018b). Due in part to 
limited state capacity as well as delayed 
humanitarian response, the 2011 drought 
resulted in widespread famine in Somalia, 
killing approximately 258,000 people 
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based financing (FbF) approaches 
to inform short-term humanitarian 
assistance based on disaster warnings 
from scientific forecasts (Coughlan de 
Perez et al. 2015). For example, FbF 
was applied during the 2015/16 El 
Niño event in Peru and helped reduce 
impacts from heavy rainfalls and floods 
by protecting houses, providing safe 
drinking water and first-aid training to 
affected populations (Red Cross EU 
Office 2019). To enable anticipatory 
humanitarian action, the use of satellite 
data helps to develop early warning 
systems, providing funding before an 
extreme weather event strikes. Ultimately, 
such ex-ante finance mechanisms support 
disaster-preparedness, reducing 
risks and strengthening resilience of 
vulnerable populations through an 
integrated framework.
The applicability of satellite data 
could have averted a humanitarian 
emergency during Somalia’s 2011 
drought. Satellite imagery could 
have offered an opportunity to locate 
vulnerable populations when regular 
data collection was obstructed by violent 
conflict or limited resources. One could, 
for example, combine data on rainfall, 
temperature and land use to identify areas 
facing most extreme weather anomalies, 
use satellite imagery to measure the 
size of displaced-persons camps and 
assess the environmental vulnerability 
of those in refugee or IDP camps. In 
the context of food security, the Famine 
Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS 
NET) incorporates data from partner 
organisations such as National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
and remote sensing climate products, 
like the Climate Hazards Group InfraRed 
Precipitation with Station data (CHIRPS) 
in analyses for food security outlooks 
in selected regions in Africa, Central 
Asia and Central America (FEWS NET 
2019a). Such a system could be applied 
to populations’ vulnerability to extreme 
weather and displacement. 
To identify at-risk areas to target aid 
intervention, one can use existing land 
broadly to addressing forced migration 
elsewhere–that the best strategy to deal 
with a crisis is by intervening before 
it can become one through building 
resilience and reducing vulnerability to 
droughts, floods, storms and other risks. 
To locate populations most vulnerable 
to climate extremes requires data on their 
location and surrounding environment, 
livelihoods, infrastructure and 
topography. For example, a qualitative 
assessment of existing road conditions 
through satellite-derived images are 
crucial for determining the feasibility 
and type of humanitarian aid delivery. 
Combining these data with that of local 
climate conditions and projections can 
target intervention before situations 
deteriorate into displacement-driving 
humanitarian emergencies. Such 
advanced action faces fewer obstacles 
on the ground as it could occur prior to 
disaster-induced conflict and instability 
and infrastructure and housing damage. 
During the 2017 Somalia drought, 
after almost half of the Somali population 
was already on the brink of yet another 
humanitarian crisis, the World Bank 
supported the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) and the FGS with 
a $50 million emergency funding 
package for drought relief, addressing 
deteriorating food security levels. While 
the response in 2017 helped to avert a 
repeat of the famine conditions of 2011, 
forecasts of soil moisture, temperature, 
and precipitation could be used to 
direct aid to areas at risk of future 
extreme events before populations are 
so severely affected. Whereas satellite 
imagery has been used in the context 
of mapping Somali road networks and 
population distribution in the absence 
of a humanitarian crisis (World Bank 
Group 2018), we argue that such data 
could have been used for a timelier 
intervention in 2017 (and 2011) to 
ensure disaster preparedness and build 
resilience in the face of a changing 
climate.  Practitioners like the Red Cross 
Climate Centre (RCCC), for instance, have 
been starting to apply tests of forecast-
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cover maps (Figure 3) or create more 
detailed supervised classifications of 
remote sensing data to locate land use 
types throughout the country and to 
identify regions vulnerable to climatic 
changes like decreases in rainfall, 
for instance agricultural or pastoral 
communities. Historical data can identify 
regions that experienced vegetation 
loss in previous drought events using 
numerical indicators, including the 
Normalized Difference Vegetation 
Index (NDVI) and the Standardized 
Precipitation Evapotranspiration Index 
(SPEI). NVDI provides a measurement 
of the amount of vegetation, which can 
be used to identify regions showing a 
marked decrease in vegetation during 
previous years. The possible influence 
of drought can then be assessed using 
SPEI, which combines measures of 
precipitation with evapotranspiration 
to identify drought conditions. This 
combination of NDVI, SPEI, and land 
cover data can allow for distinguishing 
the role of human and conflict-driven 
land degradation from drought-induced 
vegetation declines. Following the 
identification of regions with high 
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Figure 3.  Land use type Somalia
Data Source: MODIS Land Cover Type 2016
levels of vegetation and land-based 
livelihoods, which were historically 
drought-sensitive, remote sensing can 
further be used to plan aid shipment 
routes or identify infrastructure damage 
that may impede intervention. 
In the context of disasters such as 
severe droughts, having up-to-date 
information as well as historical data 
for comparison is critical to anticipate 
resource needs and high-risk locations 
before situations rapidly deteriorate into 
displacement and famine, as occurred 
in Somalia in 2011. Having access to 
additional types of data beyond that 
which can be collected on the ground 
is vital to pre-empt disasters and inform 
humanitarian responses in unstable and 
quickly changing environments.  
 
Way forward
Satellite data can provide important 
opportunities to strengthen estimates of 
populations at risk of forced migration, 
particularly in the context of disasters and 
degrading environments. Remote sensing 
data has been used in limited contexts 
to enhance the timeliness of knowledge 
on displaced persons’ destination 
localities. We suggest additional 
applications to address environmental 
displacement, including identifying 
vulnerable communities to support pre-
disaster resilience-building interventions. 
Regarding Somalia, these methods are 
applicable to inform life-saving early 
warnings, especially given existing conflict 
conditions and associated risks in on-the-
ground data collection and field visits. 
Satellite data of conditions of land areas 
must be guided by knowledge of the 
populations and their prior experiences 
under different environmental conditions. 
For this reason, the data from satellites 
would be best obtained and analysed in 
close collaboration between geographic 
and remote sensing experts and those 
by government and humanitarian actors 
working in early response and risk 
mitigation. 
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While these data sources are publicly 
available online, expertise is required 
to obtain, analyse and interpret data in 
a way that can inform decision makers 
and, ultimately, policy. For example, 
satellite information on the location, 
frequency and intensity of affected areas 
will be crucial to address priority needs 
and to design adaptation measures, but 
requires merging data from multiple 
satellites, resolutions, and time scales. 
The existence of the data does not 
guarantee its accessibility by those 
who could best interpret and apply the 
information available. In such cases, 
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capacity building needs to be a priority 
to equip actors with the tools needed 
to take advantage of this vast data 
resource satellite imagery offers. Maps of 
displacement outlooks could make this 
information quickly accessible through 
an easy to grasp visual method, similar 
to maps showing priority areas of future 
food insecurity (FEWS NET 2019b). 
In addition, collaborations between 
researchers and practitioners to create 
early warning systems for displacement 
and emergency aid needs is crucial to 
better address displacement in the 
context of environmental disasters. 
An image of Dadaab refugee camp in 
Kenya created from Sentinel-2 satellite 
data, provided by Alison Heslin. 
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Challenges to the Governance of 
the Return of Victims Abroad to 
Colombia
paul De rYCK anD stéphanie lópez villaMil
The return to Colombia of victims of the armed conflict living abroad has arisen as a major issue over 
the last few years. The emergence of numerous claims from victims to arrange their return in decent 
and safe conditions and the negotiations carried out by the Colombian government and the FARC-EP 
led country authorities to implement several policy measures related to Colombian return migration. 
However, a lack of participatory governance and civil society participation in the decision-making 
processes have characterised the shaping of these return policies. In spite of the unwillingness of 
the authorities to include them in the policy-making process, civil society organisations and other 
organisations supporting victims abroad issued claims and concrete proposals to influence those 
policy processes, with the objective of guaranteeing victims the right to come back to Colombia in 
voluntary, decent and safe conditions. 
Introduction
The question of the return of Colombians 
living abroad, particularly the return of 
victims of the civil conflict, arrived a few 
years ago onto the Colombian political 
stage, during the time of the signing of 
the Peace Agreement with the FARC1 
guerrilla in 2016. In fact, the progressive 
implementation of migration policies by 
the Government of Colombia at the end 
of the 2000s, combined with Colombian 
citizens living abroad claiming their 
rights, and the beginning of the peace 
process, have led to the commencement 
of several initiatives issued by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs related to 
Colombian returnees.2 Greater legal 
1 The FARC - Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias 
de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia) - also called FARC-EP - EP standing 
for Ejercito del Pueblo (People’s Army) - has long 
been the most important guerrilla in Colombia, 
until its dismantlement by the Peace Agreement 
in 2016 and its transformation into a political 
party - la Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del 
Común (the Common Alternative Revolutionary 
Force). In spite of the Peace Agreement, several 
dissident groups are still existing.
2 In general, return can be defined as the ‘return 
of an international immigrant to his home 
country, with the intention of re-establishing his 
residence in it, regardless of the length of his 
stay outside of his country and of the eventuality 
of a posterior reemigration’ (Mejía and Castro 
precedents have been established 
that expand the legal possibilities 
of supporting return migrants, while 
various institutional programs have 
been carried out in order to improve 
the return conditions of Colombians 
abroad, through reintegration assistance 
in Colombian society. 
The Colombian government estimates 
that around 4.7 million Colombians live 
abroad, that is to say more than 10% 
of its global population (Dinero 2019). 
Colombians abroad may be found 
predominantly in neighboring countries, 
but also in the United States and Spain. 
Moreover, economic and political turmoil 
in Venezuela has increased the need 
to achieve an efficient return policy for 
Colombians, as thousands of them had 
emigrated to Venezuela since the oil 
boom in the 1970s and are now looking 
to return (López 2019). According to 
Migración Colombia,3 more than 500.000 
Colombians have already returned from 
Venezuela (El Nacional 2019). 
2012: 17). The International Organization for 
Migration (IOM, 2006) distinguishes voluntary 
returns without obligation, from obligated 
voluntary returns (due to the ending of migrants’ 
temporal protection, rejected asylum, etc.) and 
compulsory returns (deportation, expulsion).
3 Migración Colombia is a governmental 
immigration agency.
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qualitative analysis of the legal framework 
and public policies the Colombian 
government has implemented. Second, 
the article will highlight several reflections 
from civil society organisations that call 
for further governance of voluntary return 
of victims abroad.
Return policies in Colombia: gaps and 
insufficiencies 
The legal framework of return in 
Colombia
According to Mármora (2002:297), 
migrant-repatriation policies are ‘aimed at 
retrieving emigrant population, whether 
it is through their physical return or their 
possible contribution to its origin country’. 
However, to grasp the issues raised by 
the return of victims abroad to Colombia, 
it is imperative to discuss the overall 
Colombian migration public policy, as, 
in this case, ‘emigration and return are 
two characteristics of the same migratory 
process’ (Díez Jiménez 2014: 23). The 
development of a migration policy began 
only in the 2000s, first through the Colombia 
Nos Une program created in 2003 that was 
incorporated into the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs’ functions and aimed to provide 
assistance to the Colombian diaspora. At 
the same time this program was created, 
the National Intersectoral Commission 
on Migration was created. However, 
the CONPES5 document 3603 of 2009, 
which enshrined the implementation of 
an ‘Comprehensive Migration Policy’, 
following the approaches developed by 
the National Development Plan 2006-
2010, was the first to comprehensively6 
address the migration issue in Colombia 
5 The National Council for Economic and Social 
Policy (CONPES) is the highest national planning 
authority and functions as an advisory body 
for the Government in all matters relating to 
Colombia’s economic and social development.
6 For the first time, the Colombian government 
stopped separating policies for immigrant and 
emigrant flows and began to articulate the 
implementation of migration strategies between its 
authorities (Ciurlo 2015).
Exile is a key issue in the Colombian 
political and social context, as it 
represents a ‘prorogation of the impacts 
of the armed conflict and of generalised 
violence beyond Colombia’s borders’ 
according to the National Centre 
for Historical Memory (NCMH 2016: 
20). However, this is an unknown 
phenomenon in Colombia which, 
despite the long history of the armed 
conflict, remains invisible today to many 
(NCMH 2018). Colombians who left 
the country due to the armed conflict 
have not been a priority in the national 
agenda compared to those internally 
displaced. If victims overall, regardless 
of place, have suffered certain invisibility, 
‘the invisibility of the victims abroad is 
even worse (…) they are faceless victims 
who had to leave everything behind 
them’ (Duarte and Aliaga 2018: 62). 
Nevertheless, institutional responses 
from the Colombian authorities as a 
welcoming country for its returning 
citizens have been so far inoperative, 
particularly regarding assistance to 
those called ‘victims abroad’ - victims 
of the armed conflict who fled to other 
countries.4 In particular, restricted 
involvement of civil society and of 
main interested parties, such as victims 
themselves, whether they have already 
returned or not, has characterised the 
decision-making and monitoring of 
a return legal framework for victims 
abroad. In fact, return policies have 
suffered from a deficit of ‘governance’.
This article aims to examine, from 
a critical perspective, the governance 
of return policies of victims abroad to 
Colombia and the integrated approach 
applied to assistance for return victims. 
It raises the following question: to what 
extent have inputs from civil society 
organizations been incorporated in the 
governance of return for Colombian 
victims abroad? Answering this question 
will be accomplished first through a 
4 There are victims living in foreign countries 
who have not acquired the refugee status, while 
others have; in this article, both are included in 
the same category: ‘victims abroad’.
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victims, as we will analyze later. 
People wanting to benefit from such 
assistance to return envisaged by the law, 
provided they meet all the requirements,10 
shall register in the Registro Único 
de Retornados (RUR), the registry of 
returnees. The Intersectoral Commission 
for Return, created by Decree 1000 of 
2013, is notably tasked with considering 
applications made by nationals living 
abroad who have solicited assistance 
to return. They are then included in the 
RUR and guided in their proceedings. 
In parallel to these mechanisms, the 
Colombian authorities developed 
various programs aimed at enhancing 
the voluntary return of nationals living 
abroad, both nationally11 and locally,12 
some focused on the host country or the 
qualifications of the returnee.13
10 The available information on the website: 
https://www.cancilleria.gov.co/footer/join-
us/work/plan emphasises the following 
requirements:
1. Be of legal age.
2. Prove their permanency abroad for at 
least three years.  
3. Must not have current convictions in 
Colombia or abroad and provided they 
have not been condemned for offences 
against the public administration
4. Must not have more than 12 months 
living in the national territory after having 
returned.
5. Provide relevant authorities with their 
interest in returning to Colombia invoking 
Law 1565 of 2012.
11 The ‘Retorno Positivo’ plan was created in 
2009, through which were established the 
Oficina de Atención al Migrante y los Centros 
de Referenciación y Oportunidades para el 
Retorno (CRORE), regional instances that bring 
assistance to the returnees. In addition, the 
former Presidential Agency for Social Action and 
International Cooperation now known as the 
Department for Social Prosperity, implemented 
two programs: the ‘Retornar es Vivir’ program in 
2010, which prioritised the assistance to returned 
families in 115 municipalities; and the ‘Familias 
en su Tierra’ program, born in the frame of the 
Victims and Land Restitution Law.
12 The ‘Bienvenido a Casa’ program was created 
in 2009 in Bogotá, and was replicated in the 
Risaralda Department as the ‘Siempre serás 
bienvenido a tu tierra’ program.
13 The ‘Retorno Productivo’ Plan (2012) focused 
on the return of Colombians who owned a 
professional or technical degree, while the ‘Es 
(Castro 2016). New legislation has 
since complemented this public policy, 
specifically Law 1465 of 2011 which put in 
place the National System on Migration. 
Regarding the return of Colombians 
abroad, Bedoya (2014: 86) points out the 
‘historical background of incentives’ of 
Decree No 1397/1972, directed towards 
Colombians possessing a university 
degree. As for the return of the victims, 
the Victims and Land Restitution Law,7 
provided them the right to return to their 
homeland as a reparation measure.8 
Nonetheless, the topical issue of return 
of Colombians abroad has mostly been 
addressed by the Return Law,9 with 
the purpose of facilitating their return 
through a tax reduction policy, as well 
as customs concessions to the entry of 
goods acquired abroad. This legislation 
divides return into four different types: 
occupational (laboral), productive 
(productivo), humanitarian or for specific 
causes (humanitario o por razones 
especiales), and supportive (solidario); 
this last one actually applies to victims of 
the armed conflict, and is coordinated 
with the Unit for the Victims Assistance 
and Reparation (UARIV), as established 
in the Victims and Land Restitution Law. 
These four types have been criticised for 
relegating some subjects to invisibility 
(Aliaga et al. 2019), in particular exiled 
Colombians who fled their country due 
to the conflict but are not considered 
7 Law 1448 of 2011. Ley de Víctimas y restitución 
de tierras: por la cual se dictan medidas de 
atención, asistencia y reparación integral a las 
víctimas del conflicto armado interno y se dictan 
otras disposiciones.
8 Article 28 stated the right to return to their 
place of origin or to resettle in voluntary, 
safe and decent conditions. Likewise, article 
66 established that ‘with the purpose of 
guaranteeing comprehensive attention to 
victims of forced displacement who voluntarily 
decide to return or resettle, under favourable 
and safe conditions, they will endeavour to stay 
in the place they chose so that the State can 
guarantee the effective enjoyment of the rights’.
9 Law 1565 of 2012. Por medio de la cual se 
dictan disposiciones y se fijan incentivos para 
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‘centralised hierarchic style’. Thus, 
governance aims at being developed 
in ‘different spheres of the society’ 
(López 2018a: 85) and at different 
levels (Faludi, 2012); on migration 
issues, some authors claim a social 
governance centered on cooperative 
actions (Barbero, 2012). Applied to the 
Colombian context, governance in this 
article refers to the inclusion of non-
state actors in the design, follow-up and 
monitoring of migration public policies 
and in particular of return policies. This 
concept is deeply relevant in public 
policymaking to address international 
migration issues, and especially on the 
issue of the return of victims abroad to 
Colombia. Aguilar’s definition will be 
used as a cornerstone of this analysis, 
with a focus on civil society participation 
in the development and tracking of 
return policies.  
Initially, the Colombian government 
created areas to foster the involvement 
of civil society stakeholders from the 
implementation of the Colombia Nos 
Une Program in 2003 onward (Ardila 
2009). Moreover, the creation of the 
National System on Migration led to the 
implementation of the Mesa Nacional de 
la Sociedad Civil para las Migraciones, 
a national civil society commission 
especially focused on migration, 
composed by a group of actors such as: 
Colombian population abroad, 
returned population, foreign 
community in Colombia, private 
companies, trade unions, NGOs, 
humanitarian actors, academies, 
populations with a differential 
approach (ethnic groups, gender, 
diversity and age-group, amongst 
others) who will work for the 
benefit of the migrant population 
and will look after their interest and 
ideas for the purpose of reaching 
common objectives (COLOMBIA 
NOS UNE 2019). 
 
On the other hand, the Victims 
and Land Restitution Law enshrined 
Finally, the return issue appears in 
the Final Agreement to End the Armed 
Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting 
Peace, signed in 2016. Indeed, the 
point 5.1.3.5 underlines the correlation 
between return in decent conditions and 
the adoption of measures that facilitate 
the socioeconomic reintegration of the 
returnees:
The assisted return will consist of 
promoting conditions to facilitate 
their return to the country and the 
construction of their life project. 
This includes providing decent 
reception conditions through the 
coordination of these plans with 
the specific institutional services 
offered, to progressively guarantee 
access to basic rights, decent 
employment, housing, health and 
education at all levels according 
to each person’s individual needs. 
(Office of the High Commissioner 
for Peace 2016: 194). 
Governance of return in Colombia: an 
illusory participation
In parallel to the legal framework of 
return implemented by the Colombian 
authorities, several tools were put in 
place in order to facilitate civil society 
and victims’ participation in decision-
making. However, in practice, the lack of 
willingness of the government to include 
victims in the policy-making process has 
restricted their participation; moreover, 
the fact that they have mostly been 
considered as economic subjects has 
been another obstacle to their effective 
participation. 
Aguilar (2006: 8) defines governance 
as an ‘associated and interdependent 
governing style between governmental 
organisms, private and social 
organisations’, distinguishing governance 
from governability, considered as a 
Tiempo de Volver’ program, implemented in 
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governance (Bedoya 2014). Return 
policies are not a top priority of the 
Colombian government, who has been 
more focused on its struggle against 
guerrillas, poverty, drug trafficking or 
internal displacement, which can also 
explain the failure in the implementation 
of these laws (Bedoya 2014). Then, 
though there are legislative measures to 
promote civil society participation, they 
have hardly been operative in reality, 
due to a lack of willingness from the 
Colombian government, which seem to 
be more willing to create the ‘illusion’ 
of participation, rather than foster the 
actual participation of civil society.
Aside from the fulfillment of cathartic 
functions and the retrieval of one’s 
citizenship for people who suffered 
severe violations of their basic rights, 
the participation of victims is crucial for 
understanding the return experience 
of these persons and addressing these 
experiences in the policy-making 
process. Nevertheless, several policies 
were designed without the institutional 
involvement of victims as foreshadowed 
by the Victims and Land Restitution 
Law; their influence in decision-making 
processes has been very limited, while 
the lack of coordination between the 
local and national levels created a 
profound sense of frustration among 
the victims (Berrío 2013). For instance, 
the Constitutional Court, repeatedly 
emphasized the weaknesses of the 
‘Nation-Territory Coordination Strategy’; 
in its Judgment Auto 383-2010, it showed 
the lack of political willingness from 
local authorities, who do not implement 
national action points; as well as the lack 
of human resources and the numerous 
administrative changes that prevent 
public officials from acquiring relevant 
skills with regard to the inclusion of civil 
society in policy-making. 
These instruments of participatory 
democracy, purportedly directed 
towards enhancing the civil population’s 
engagement in shaping return policies, 
are inoperative and do not foster 
participatory governance on return. 
in its Title VIII provisions in order to 
guarantee involvement of the victims in 
the design, implementation, execution 
and evaluation of public policies. In 
its Article 193 more particularly, it sets 
out the provisions for the creation of 
Victims Participation Roundtables, as a 
tool for encouraging the participation of 
the victims and ensuring their input on 
political decisions that affect them. They 
are institutional representative spaces 
compound by victims of the armed 
conflict, developed at a municipal, 
departmental, district and national scale.
Furthermore, since the Habana peace 
negotiations, a forum for participation of 
the victims abroad was launched, which 
included returnees who were previously 
exiled (López 2018a). They organized the 
International Forum for Victims (FIV),14 
which enabled them to exert pressure 
on the government to address in the 
final version of the Peace Agreement 
the topical issue of return as reparations, 
demonstrating civil society’s capacity to 
have an impact on decision-making. 
However, the lack of coordination 
between the different parts of the Mesa 
Nacional de la Sociedad Civil para las 
Migraciones prevented it from choosing 
a representative before the Intersectoral 
National Commission on Migration, 
as planned by the law (López 2018a). 
Likewise, at the field level, governance 
of return in Colombia is ‘non-existent’, 
mainly because of the centralization 
of the Colombian government (López 
2018a: 95). Indeed, Bedoya (2014) 
quotes several interviewed returnees 
who live in the Risaralda and Quindío 
departments, in the coffee region, 
saying the fact that the government 
has not decentralized enough financial 
and human resources, as well as 
scarce institutional coordination, has 
triggered this absence of operational 
14 The International Forum for Victims is a 
communication, coordination and participatory 
action mechanism, created by victims of the 
armed conflict who live outside of Colombia, 
with the purpose of collecting reflections and 
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of economic development, ignoring 
the most vulnerable ones. 
The marginalization of victims abroad in 
the return process
The exclusion of victims in the 
return policymaking process is evident 
by the marginalization of victims in 
relevant policies. First, the restrictive 
definition of a victim, apart from 
limiting the participation of many in the 
policymaking process, also excludes 
many de facto victims abroad from the 
possibility of benefiting from return 
programs (Fuentes-Becerra y Atehortúa-
Arredondo 2015). Duarte and Aliaga 
(2018), though they do not deny the 
significant impact of the Victims Law, 
point out its limitations regarding 
reparations for victims abroad. In regard 
to return, the information contained in 
the Unit for the Victims Assistance and 
Reparation (UARIV) specifies that only 
people included in the Registro Único de 
Víctimas (RUV), the registry for victims, 
can benefit from an assistance to return 
(UARIV 2019): 
Thus, when only referring to victims 
of internal forced displacement in 
its definition of forced displacement 
(Art. 60), this law excludes 
thousands of victims abroad who 
had to flee for multi-faceted and 
complex reasons that may not be 
acknowledged as sufficient by the 
definition of forced displacement 
(Duarte and Aliaga 2018).
As for supportive return, UARIV 
registered 1.058 returns from 21 
countries; in 2018, only 408 people 
returned. It should be noted that a total 
of 12.222 victims requested inclusion in 
the RUV from abroad (UARIV, personal 
communication, 29 March 2019), 
demonstrating how low the rate of return 
is. In comparison, in February 2017, the 
United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) reported 340.000 
In fact, this lack of governance reflects 
the absence of a comprehensive return 
policy. In spite of the ratification of a 
few sporadic laws, there is no holistic 
vision for return migration in Colombia. 
Although substantial advances have 
been made as a result of the Return 
Law and the tax incentives it offered 
to enhance the return of Colombian 
citizens,15 it is characterised by its 
restrictive conception of the migration 
issue (Bedoya 2014). Moreover, although 
it recognises the existence of four different 
types of returnees, its focus on the 
economic significance their return could 
represent leaves aside the protection of 
their rights (AESCO 2012). According to 
Muñoz, Mejía y Castro (2012: 11), ‘return 
public policies only offer a clear picture 
to those who return with good resources 
and financial capital’.
Certainly, the economic approach of 
return policies in Colombia, combined 
with the lack of involvement of civil 
society actors whose expertise is 
a vital element for its governance, 
have led to the development of a 
legal framework that does not fully 
guarantee the victims’ enjoyment of 
their right to return. As a matter of fact, 
the government’s strategy on return 
appears to be determined by a cost-
benefit analysis of the potentially lost 
remittances generated by the returns 
of Colombians abroad and the gain in 
human capital (Mármora 2002). Hence, 
this neoclassic focus on migration, 
particularly exposed by Massey et al. 
(1993) and that we can attribute to the 
Colombian approach to return, leads 
to the exclusion of the return of victims 
abroad within the global return policies 
and theorizing. For example, López 
(2018b) criticises this perspective, which 
only considers the migrant as a subject 
15 In particular, as mentioned earlier, a tax 
reduction policy, as well as customs concessions 
to the entry of goods acquired abroad, an 
affiliation to family compensation funds. In 
another context, tax incentives were notably 
used by the Malaysian government to target 
high-skilled Malaysians abroad and incite them 
to return (World Bank 2016). 
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return policies adapted to returnee 
needs, as there are limited data on the 
gender, age, education level and labor 
skills of Colombian returnees, as well as 
their host communities. 
Towards a governance of return in 
Colombia: ideas from the civil society
Given the lack of inclusion of non-
governmental stakeholders in the design 
and implementation of return policies, 
several civil society organisations have 
issued alternatives for the development 
of a comprehensive return policy in 
Colombia for the victims of the armed 
conflict who have left the national 
territory. This work has provided a 
valuable input, whether it is by means 
of the drafting of numerous grievances, 
or by concrete proposals aimed at 
improving return policies through an 
incremented governance. 
Pleas for the creation of adequate 
conditions for the return of victims 
abroad
Despite the restricted participation 
of civil society organisations in formal 
forums, several civil society organisations 
have advocated for different policies and 
rights for victims abroad. First, they have 
advocated for the acknowledgement 
of exile as a victimising fact by the 
Colombian government, in order 
to allow a greater access for victims 
abroad to return programs. Thus, 
Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos 
y el Desplazamiento (CODHES 2017a)17 
emphasises the need to extend victims’ 
recognition to an extraterritorial 
approach to foster the visibility of those 
Esperanza Foundation and the Alma Mater 
Network, a network of several public universities 
in Colombia, in 2009.
17 CODHES is a non-profit organisation working 
in the area of human rights and international 
humanitarian law, with a focus on peace building 
processes and displaced populations.
Colombians were refugees around the 
world, 95% of whom were located in 
Latin America, demonstrating the issue 
of under-registration. 
On the other hand, the absence of a 
policy that guarantees victims abroad 
a return in voluntary, decent and safe 
conditions has been highlighted. 
The absence of a guarantee of such 
conditions allows for the potential re-
victimisation of these people upon 
return. Hence, in spite of the signing of 
the Peace Agreement, in several areas of 
the country, armed groups and criminal 
bands are still perpetrating gross human 
rights violations. Indeed, for many 
victims abroad, it is meaningless to 
return if the unsafe conditions that led 
them to flee are still extant. According 
to Duarte and Aliaga (2018), 
In Colombia, we cannot talk of 
a postconflict yet, well, even if 
there has been a negotiated a 
peace agreement with the FARC-
EP, there are other actors that are 
an important part of the armed 
conflict in Colombia and who are 
still active (2018: 65).
Furthermore, the lack of comprehensive 
assistance from the State has been 
fundamental to the failure of these 
programs, as the lack of institutional 
support has impeded the socioeconomic 
reintegration of the returnees. Likewise, 
disregard for the heterogeneity of the 
returned population in Colombia and 
the scarcity of information in relation 
to the returnees’ socioeconomic 
characteristics, have made it difficult 
to address the reality of return and 
have caused inefficiencies in the return 
process (López 2018b). There is only 
one study in Colombia that exposed 
the socioeconomic characteristics of 
Colombian return migrants in recent 
years.16 Thus, it is difficult to design 
16 This study was realized by the District 
Observatory on Migration of the Secretary 
General of the Mayor of Bogotá office and the 
Colombian Observatory on Migration of the 
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Indeed, the safety issue is prominent 
in people’s minds when considering 
a potential return to Colombia, as 
highlighted by an elderly man living in 
Quito, Ecuador. He states that ‘the whole 
subject of durable solutions is bound to 
the possibility of returning to Colombia. 
If I want to come back to Colombia, I 
should be able to do it in complete 
safety’ (CNMH 2018: 216). However, the 
sluggish implementation of the Peace 
Agreement has not generated suitable 
conditions for their return so far, which 
can explain the fact that a significant 
part of the Colombian diaspora does 
not want to return to Colombia for 
now (REVICPAZ-LAC 2018). In addition, 
the Truth, Memory and Reconciliation 
Commission of Colombian women in 
the diaspora (TMRC 2018)21 found that 
a main issue for returned women to 
Colombia has been to find themselves 
in unsafe situations due to their status 
as women. 
The idea of decent return also refers 
to the need to provide returnees with 
assistance to foster their socioeconomic 
reintegration in Colombia. In many 
cases, most of the victims abroad could 
not rely on the help from relatives in 
their reintegration process, whether 
it is because they were also forced to 
flee their home or perished during the 
conflict, or because they do not have the 
financial means to do so. In light of this, 
the Government of Colombia’s support 
is essential beyond the repatriation 
process. Eighty percent of the families 
interviewed by REVICPAZ-LAC (2018) 
stress that access to healthcare is a 
vital component in the design of return 
policies. Second to this is access to 
decent employment (78.4%), followed 
by the relocation of all the members of 
the household (68%), and the recognition 
of studies completed abroad (58.4%). 
Many returnees mentioned the 
absence of information around the 
existence of migration and return 
21 TMRC is a Colombian-women-led organisation 
created in London in 2014 working with 
Colombian women on migration and return.
who live abroad. The Fifth International 
Forum for Victims held in Alicante, Spain 
in December 2018, also pushed for the 
acknowledgement of transboundary 
displacement as a victimising act. The 
Commission on Forced Migrations, Exile 
and Reconciliation (2018: 3)18 stresses the 
need to implement an ‘adequate structure 
to guarantee victims abroad access to 
attention, assistance and reparation 
measures’. Finally, the Red de Víctimas 
Colombianas por la Paz Latinoamérica 
y Caribe (REVICPAZ-LAC 2018)19 pleads 
for the automatic recognition as a victim 
for refugees who voluntarily request their 
inclusion in the RUV.
The signing of the Peace Agreement 
triggered the interest of many exiled 
Colombians who associate their desire to 
return with its implementation (REVICPAZ-
LAC 2018) which has so far been a major 
claim from civil society stakeholders. 
Indeed, due to the high-level of 
vulnerability and uncertainty of numerous 
victims abroad, guaranteeing decent and 
safe conditions is imperative to enhance 
their return. Through an investigation 
on the possible return of Colombian 
citizens who live in Spain, América, 
España, Solidaridad y Cooperación 
(AESCO 2016)20 showed that 80% of the 
interviewed people who expressed their 
willingness to return to Colombia in the 
post-conflict context would be motivated 
by safe return conditions. 
18 The Commission on Forced Migrations, Exile 
and Reconciliation is a coordination mechanism 
between civil society organisations and academic 
actors in Colombia and several countries of the 
region, compound amongst other by CODHES 
and the International Forum for Victims.
19 REVICPAZ-LAC is an organisation that 
gathers victims’ groups in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, and unites victims who do not 
necessarily form a part of organisations. It is 
a paramount civil society stakeholder, as it 
provides victims with an international forum of 
expression.
20 AESCO is a non-profit organisation whose 
purpose is to improve solidarity through 
development cooperation projects between 
Europe and Latin America. It works particularly 
with vulnerable people and has developed 
several projects with migrant networks in Spain.
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in point 1.1.7 of the Peace Agreement, 
land restitution is a sine qua non to allow 
socioeconomic stabilisation of forced 
displaced people and promote their 
return in decent conditions. 
Concrete proposals from civil society
These several claims led different civil 
society actors - victims organisations, 
human rights organisations in particular 
- to draft concrete proposals, aiming 
to create conditions conducive to the 
return of victims abroad. The explicit 
incorporation of victims abroad in the 
Peace Agreement is a significant step 
as it recognises forced displacement 
outside of the country and extends the 
focus to an extraterritorial approach on 
victims. However, there are still legal 
gaps regarding the question of their 
return, and regarding reparations and 
political participation (CODHES 2017a).
The limits of the Victims and Land 
Restitution Law in regard to victims 
abroad, formerly described, must be 
policies, which led to them returning 
without any institutional support. Those 
who did receive assistance from the 
Colombian authorities highlighted the 
scarcity of support during the return 
process. In particular, they lacked 
attention for their reintegration, above 
all regarding access to education for 
kids, healthcare, work and decent 
housing (REVICPAZ-LAC 2018). Women 
especially experienced great difficulties 
in finding a job adapted to their profile 
when they came back, even though 
many returned with entrepreneurial 
ideas (TMRC 2018). 
Also, civil society has strongly 
requested coordination between return 
programs and Development Programs 
with a Territorial-Based Approach 
(Planes de Desarrollo con Enfoque 
Territorial – PDET) contained in the Peace 
Agreement. This is crucial to boost the 
inclusion of locals and returnees in equal 
conditions and essential in fostering 
the reconstruction of the social fabric 
and territorial peace (CODHES 2017a; 
REVICPAZ-LAC 2018). As pointed out 
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This image was taken during a theater piece organised  
by Colombian exiled women and refugees that took 
place in Barcelona, Spain on 2 and 3 November 2018.
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the Victims and Land Restitution Law 
provides rules related to the reparation 
of victims abroad, CODHES (2017a: 17) 
describes them as a ‘precarious legal 
development’. Hence, along with the 
Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS 2018),22 
CODHES promotes the implementation 
of a transnational approach to reparation, 
first realised by the identification of 
individual and collective reparations, and 
by the implementation of public policies 
to foster the return and reintegration of 
victims abroad to Colombian society if 
they wish so (CODHES 2017a). On this 
subject, the International Network of 
Human Rights (INHR)23 recommends 
the creation of a specific commission 
for the Colombian diaspora within the 
Commission for the Clarification of Truth, 
Coexistence and Non-repetition, with a 
differential focus, aimed at building a 
‘historical memory on migration, refuge 
and victims abroad as a reparation 
mechanism’ (INHR 2017: 8). Although 
this last proposal seems particularly 
relevant in order to increase the visibility 
of victims abroad and to foster their 
contribution to the peacebuilding 
process, it may be difficult to implement 
such a Commission in the next years, as 
the peace processes has already been 
launched and are currently experiencing 
significant difficulties moving forward. 
The organisation REVICPAZ-LAC 
(2018) has been another important 
stakeholder in advocating for the 
need to improve the socioeconomic 
reincorporation of returnees. First, it 
points out the need to design a specific 
program for voluntary, decent, and safe 
return for refugees, asylum seekers, 
and victims abroad, characterised by 
an assistance to return that is not only 
economic but also psychosocial, the 
creation of institutional routes to ease 
the regularisation of relatives born 
outside of Colombia, as well as access to 
22 The Jesuit Refugee Service is an international 
Catholic NGO working in the field of refugee 
assistance.
23 INHR is a non-profit organisation whose mission 
is the promotion and protection of human rights.
overcome to enhance a global peace-
building process through reparations 
for these victims and guarantees of 
non-repetition. In particular, CODHES 
(2017a), as well as REVICPAZ-LAC (2018), 
have urged the Colombian government 
to recognise exile as a victimising act. 
In fact, CODHES (2017b) notably wrote 
a draft law proposal aimed to edit the 
Victims and Land Restitution Law to 
bring it in line with the Peace Agreement. 
The main proposal is the inclusion of 
a definition of the concept of victims 
abroad, absent this law, for the people 
who were forced to abandon their country 
in relation to, or because of, the armed 
conflict. Moreover, it would introduce an 
article that enshrines the right of these 
victims to a voluntary and assisted return 
in safe conditions and socioeconomic 
sustainability. Then, if all the civil society 
organizations urge the government to 
adopt a broader legal framework on 
the return of victims abroad, particularly 
regarding the acknowledgement of 
exile as a victimising act, CODHES has 
committed to rewrite the Victims and 
Land Restitution Law. 
Likewise, CODHES continues to 
attempt to strengthen the involvement 
of victims abroad, through the 
integration of delegates of Comités de 
Impulso de los Sujetos de Reparación 
Colectiva (Impulse Committees on 
Collective Reparation Subjects) within 
the Participatory Roundtables, who 
would represent victimised ethnic 
people, as well as victims abroad. 
Indeed, citizenships restitution to the 
victims abroad is an imperative condition 
for them to get their rights back. As a 
consequence, CODHES (2017a) pushes 
for several reforms of the political system, 
including voting rights and means for 
Colombians who have not returned, as 
well as other measures provided in point 
two of the Peace Agreement concerning 
political participation. 
The restitution of civil rights appears 
to be a form of collective reparation 
for those victims living outside of 
Colombia (CODHES 2017a). Though 
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it must coordinate return programs 
that also provide special assistance, 
attention and reparation mechanisms. 
Assistance, monitoring, and evaluation 
of local integration processes are 
equally essential, especially for the 
socioeconomic stabilisation, security 
assurances and non-repetition of 
the returnees’ forced displacement 
(REVICPAZ-LAC 2018). Local governance 
is also key to better prepare societies 
to receive returnees, considering 
many times returnees are judged or 
welcomed based on political and 
symbolic representations, something for 
which the work achieved by civil society 
organisations in combatting xenophobia 
is crucial (REVICPAZ-LAC 2018).
Last but not least, other key stakeholders, 
such as IOM, UNHCR and states hosting 
victims abroad also perform vital roles. 
The formation of multiparty working 
groups composed of these actors, as well 
as civil society organisations and victims 
abroad, are therefore necessary to enable 
the execution and evaluation of return 
programs and to promote voluntary 
return programs (REVICPAZ-LAC 2018). 
However, as some organisations have 
argued, the diaspora and host countries 
should agree upon these return plans, 
which should not make up a part of 
a repatriation policy shaped by the 
European Union or other external actors 
(INHR 2017). 
Conclusion
Policies aimed at fostering the return 
of victims abroad represent a major 
issue Colombian authorities have to 
deal with, despite it not being their 
main priority in the last few years. 
Nevertheless, the issue is also critical 
for a multitude of other actors, including 
civil society stakeholders and victims 
organisations, whose participation in 
the design and implementation of those 
policies is of great importance. Through 
a comprehensive review of the legal 
framework of return in Colombia and 
healthcare, education and occupational 
reintegration. REVICPAZ-LAC (2018) also 
emphasises the need to improve degree 
and skills accreditation, accompaniment 
and support for kids and teenagers 
on local integration, and transfers of 
pension contributions. As for women, 
their access to labour opportunities must 
be facilitated through the construction 
of professional networks to encourage 
their inclusion in the labour market 
(TMRC 2018). 
On the extensive participation 
of victims in decision-making, the 
International Forum for Victims has 
been particularly active. Indeed, the 
International Forum for Victims advocated 
for the acknowledgement and deeper 
inclusion of victims’’organisations in the 
elaboration of return policies. In fact, 
according to REVICPAZ-LAC (2018), 
UARIV has been averse to working with 
civil society stakeholders based in host 
countries of victims. Promoting operative 
participation of refugee’s associations 
and civil society organisations in host 
countries and in Colombia in all the 
steps of the policy-making process - 
design, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation - is paramount for considering 
the needs of victims (REVICPAZ-LAC 
2018). Indeed, the experiences of the 
victim population is indispensable for 
the coordination of relevant actors 
in return programs, as well as for the 
identification of good practices, notably 
for future returnees. This claim emerges 
from victims abroad themselves, who 
emphasise the need to create victim-
led organisations, who understand the 
conflict and the reality of exile: ‘what we 
need are organisations that arise from 
us, grassroots organisations made up 
by people who lived the conflict. We 
are the ones who really know about 
that (Afrocolombian woman, exiled in 
Ecuador)’ (CNMH 2018: 295).
Furthermore, the State must 
guarantee resources for travel from host 
countries back to the country of origin, 
with priority given to the most vulnerable 
people. In the case of victims abroad, 
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of civil society organizations’ proposals 
on this matter, this article has aimed 
to show that, although there are legal 
means that have been adopted to 
enable the governance of the return 
of victims abroad to Colombia, in its 
application, there has been a very 
limited participation of civil society in 
decision-making. 
To cope with the lack of participatory 
governance in this area, concrete 
proposals made by these organisations, 
mainly based on the experience of 
victims, have proven to be crucial in 
promoting the implementation of return 
policies for the victims abroad in safe and 
decent conditions. In particular, return 
programs should not provide return 
assistance that is only circumscribed to 
humanitarian aid for repatriation, but 
should rather be structured around two 
other issues, according to Mármora 
(2002): determining the reasons that 
led the migrant to flee his country and 
including mechanisms to foster his (her) 
reinsertion in his (her) home country.
It is legitimate to question the 
effectiveness of certain proposals in 
the current political context. Indeed, 
the acknowledgement of exile as a 
victimising act, through an amendment to 
Victims and Land Restitution Law, would 
constitute a significant step forward for 
thousands of victims abroad. However, 
the lack of commitment of the Colombian 
government towards this recognition 
makes it unlikely that the request will 
be adopted, taking into consideration 
that the validity of this legislation, the 
Victims and Land Restitution Law, extends 
only until 2021. Moreover, even if the 
Colombian authorities were to amend 
this law, the experience has proven so far 
that the laws implemented to foster the 
return of victims abroad had not trickled 
down onto the operational level; then, 
without a comprehensive adaptation of 
the policy on the ground, amending this 
law would not actually change the current 
situation. In addition, despite the signing 
of the Peace Agreement, its limited 
implementation, largely due to the lack 
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government, led to the continuation 
of the conflict in several regions of the 
country, in which dissident armed actors, 
paramilitary groups, and drug traffickers 
have impeded the establishment of 
decent and safe conditions for the return 
of victims.  
Nevertheless, the impact of civil 
society on policymaking in the area 
of return has been profound in some 
matters. The strengthening of the 
governance of return of victims abroad is 
intimately linked to the long-term efforts 
victims and human rights organisations 
have been realising. Pressure from 
the International Forum for Victims 
to include the issue of victims abroad 
in the Peace Agreement, mentioned 
earlier, illustrates the advocacy capacity 
of these stakeholders, despite the 
typical reticence of the government to 
implement their recommendations. 
sIn sum, the involvement of exiled 
citizens and civil society organisations 
in policymaking on return migration is 
necessary to consolidate peace and 
economic recovery in a post-conflict 
Colombia and is currently insufficient, 
if not altogether absent. In fact, ‘it 
is clear that the success of mass 
repatriation is inextricably connected 
to the complex processes underpinning 
post-conflict reconstruction and vice 
versa’ (Long 2010: 17). Thus, the return 
of victims abroad and the construction 
of sustainable peace in Colombia are 
interrelated issues, as the return of 
many victims depends on the existence 
of decent and safe conditions for their 
repatriation, while at the same time, 
their participation in peace processes is 
imperative to the reconstruction of the 
social fabric. Although the Colombian 
government seems to be applying a 
participatory governance approach to 
return policymaking, the implementation 
of the existing legal framework the civil 
society claims analysed in the article 
show that the participatory aspect of the 
governance of return remains, overall, 
an illusory approach.
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Regionalisation Versus Securitisation: 
The Pending Fate of the Refugee 
Protection Regime in Central America
brianna GóMez Castro
This article contributes to the growing literature on forced displacement in the Americas, specifically 
with respect to Central America’s 20th and 21st century migration crises. It investigates Central 
America’s formal entry into the international refugee protection regime, and its subsequent acceptance 
of regionalism as a preferred method for addressing issues of forced displacement. The article then 
scrutinises the effectiveness of regionalisation for securing human rights in light of a prevalent competing 
trend: securitisation of migration. To highlight these competing dynamics, it closely examines the 
case of Mexico—an important regional geopolitical actor to Central America— drawing from primary 
data collected through an expert interview to support the analysis. The juxtaposition of these two 
theoretical frameworks allows for a unique inquiry on the future of forced displacement in Central 
America; it aims to inspire future research and policy initiatives that are invested in bringing lasting 
peace and stability to the region.
Introduction
The following discussion engages with 
the particularities of forced displacement 
in the Americas, a regional bloc, which, in 
forced migration studies, is insufficiently 
researched, with the exception being 
in relation to migration to and from the 
United States. This is paradoxically so, 
considering its proud and extensive 
tradition with the institution of asylum 
from which many lessons can be drawn 
(Kron 2011; Harley 2014; Cantor et al. 
2015). Even still, taking the American 
continent as a unit of study for forced 
displacement understates the vast 
complexity of migration patterns, 
policies, and laws in the countries that 
comprise it. The difference in social 
demographics, institutional governance, 
and geographical attributes and/or 
burdens — to name a few variables— are 
intersectional factors that deeply define 
the dynamics of forced displacement in 
each sub-region, namely North, South, 
and Central America. 
Noting these sub-regions’ complex 
histories with forced displacement, 
this article specifically investigates 
Central America — comprised of Belize, 
Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama — and 
its distinct journey in becoming an area 
of the world with one of the highest 
concentrations of forcibly displaced 
persons (Cantor 2016: 89). There is 
laudable research that documents the 
causality between the rise of crime and 
weak governance in the region with the 
increase of forced displacement (Cantor 
2014; Jimenez 2016). However, there 
appears to be a considerable gap in the 
literature that analyses Central America’s 
unified response for addressing these 
migration trends. Accordingly, this 
article explores Central America’s 
implementation of a regional refugee 
protection regime as a cooperative 
approach and solution to forced 
displacement. 
Scholars, such as Mathew and Harley 
(2016) and Barichello (2015), have 
studied the effects of regionalising 
refugee protection to highlight the 
various challenges and successes to 
be expected. The former broadly 
analyse the theoretical underpinnings 
of regionalisation and briefly touch on a 
particular Central American initiative as 
a case study; given the expansive nature 
of their research, they are unable to 
investigate Central America’s continued 
experience with regionalism. The latter 
dutifully examines and delineates 
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of relevant primary and secondary 
sources published in both English and 
Spanish. Importantly, due to the hyper-
contemporary nature of the third section, 
many online newspaper publications and 
press releases from relevant agencies 
were used. The analysis in this section 
is also supported by data collected from 
an expert interview. Considering the au 
courant nature of this article, it should be 
noted that research is limited to events 
that have occurred by mid-August 2019. 
Forced displacement in Central America 
is an ever-changing landscape that is 
nearly impossible to keep up with, and 
so, noteworthy developments may not be 
covered. Bearing this in mind, this research 
is produced with a critical and open-ended 
approach so as to appropriately assess the 
future of the refugee protection regime in 
Central America. 
A history of forced displacement in 
Central America and the development 
of a regional refugee protection 
regime
The overarching theme in this article, 
regionalism, refers to the pursuit of 
common goals among a group of 
states that are close geographically, 
share identifiable patterns of behaviour, 
and co-exist in an imagined sense of 
community (Fawcett 2004). Utilising this 
broader definition will allow us to analyse 
the partnership and collaboration that 
has developed beyond the geopolitically 
established region of Central America, 
in particular with Mexico. 
Scholars have examined the 
consequences of regionalising refugee 
protection regimes to find that it is 
a positive, constructive approach for 
facilitating the application of universal 
International Refugee Law (IRL) and 
International Human Rights Law (IHRL) 
principles in a specific context, and 
prioritising responsibility-sharing 
among the states in question. Shuck 
(1997) argues that it can be a positive 
initiative because it encourages a 
regionalism’s development within the 
Latin American context, but neglects 
to pay significant attention to the 
increasingly pivotal role played by the 
isthmus countries. As such, this article 
draws on and contributes to the existing 
literature by analysing Central America’s 
experience with forced displacement 
and providing analysis to contemporary 
developments towards regionalisation of 
the refugee protection regime. Moreover, 
the research scrutinises the effectiveness 
of regionalisation for securing human 
rights in light of a prevalent competing 
trend: securitisation of migration. The 
juxtaposition of these two theoretical 
frameworks allows for a unique inquiry 
on the future of forced displacement in 
Central America; it aims to inspire future 
research and policy initiatives that are 
invested in bringing lasting peace and 
stability to the region. 
The first section of this article provides 
background on Central America’s 
history with forced displacement 
to demonstrate the conditions that 
prompted these countries to formally 
join the international refugee protection 
regime. It explores their development 
of a regionalist approach and analyses 
multiple declarations and agreements 
adopted over the course of thirty years. 
The second section focuses on the 
most recent regional document and 
its operational counterpart –the 2017 
San Pedro Sula Declaration and the 
Comprehensive Regional Protection 
and Solutions Framework (MIRPS in 
its Spanish acronym), respectively—to 
investigate Central America’s efforts 
to mitigate their current refugee crisis. 
The third section then delves into the 
securitisation of migration – drawing 
particularly from the case of Mexico – in 
order to elucidate the reasons for which 
it jeopardises an effective regional 
refugee protection regime in Central 
America, and consequently undermines 
the human rights of forcibly displaced 
persons. 
The research for this article 
primarily draws from a desk review 
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region gave way to rampant human 
rights violations from governments, 
paramilitary groups, and rebel groups; 
lack of proper governance and a 
suppressed society led to increased 
levels of poverty across the entirety of 
the region. As a result, an overwhelming 
number of Central Americans found the 
living conditions impossible, leading 
to staggering numbers of forced 
displacement. By the early 1990’s, more 
than three million Central Americans 
were displaced within their own country 
— referred to as Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDPs) — or forced across an 
international border, becoming refugees 
(Garcia 2006). There may have once 
been a strong migratory tradition in 
Central America, but the region proved 
fundamentally ‘ill prepared to deal 
with the refugee crisis of 1974 to 1996’ 
(Garcia 2006: 31). 
Noting the need for appropriate 
legislation and response mechanisms, 
Central American countries gradually 
acceded to the 1951 Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees (hereafter, 
Refugee Convention) from the 1980’s 
onwards, formally marking their entry 
into the international refugee protection 
regime. Unfortunately, however, the 
Refugee Convention definition1 did 
not extend protections to most Central 
Americans because they were fleeing 
generalised violence rather than explicit 
persecution. These individuals were 
often referred to as ‘non-convention 
refugees’ to note their ambiguous 
position within the international refugee 
protection regime. Starting in the early 
1980’s, UNHCR recognised that the 
Refugee Convention definition was too 
restrictive and consequently took the 
position that countries receiving Central 
1 Defined as persons who ‘owing to well-founded 
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing 
to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country; or who, not having a 
nationality and being outside the country of his 
former habitual residence as a result.
tradition of regional responsibility for 
displacement concerns and leads to 
more appropriate solutions that reflect 
the interests and values that regions tend 
to share. Commenting on the critical 
responsibility-sharing component, 
Hathaway and Neves (1997: 169) argue 
that it ‘not only makes practical sense 
as a means to combat the withdrawal of 
states from the duty to protect refugees, 
but is consistent with general norms of 
international law’. 
Recently, in their book Refugees, 
Regionalism and Responsibility, Mathew 
and Harley (2016) build on the existing 
literature and analyse five different 
regional mechanisms to assess the merits 
of regionalism. Whilst they acknowledge 
the potentially adverse effects cautioned 
by a few scholars (Gibney 2007) they 
find that ultimately such regional 
initiatives can enhance the refugee 
protection regime ‘if they address the 
specific needs of refugees in the region, 
foster greater attention to these needs 
from states, and are developed in 
accordance with international human 
rights standards’ (Mathew and Harley 
2016:16). Conversant with Mathew 
and Harley’s findings, the succeeding 
paragraphs will take the view that 
regionalism is a useful approach for 
addressing forced displacement, and 
will investigate Central America’s 
experience in developing its refugee 
protection regime.
Migration has long been an 
encouraged part of the socioeconomic 
identity of Central America due to 
the existence of shared cultures and 
traditions that were not easily confined 
by borders (Garcia 2006). However, 
these common and accepted migration 
patterns saw a major shift in the late 
20th century, primarily from the 1970’s 
onward. In her book Seeking Refuge, 
Garcia (2006) outlines how this is a 
direct result of interlinked civil conflicts 
occurring simultaneously in Nicaragua 
(1979-1990), Guatemala (1960-1996), 
and El Salvador (1980-1992). High 
levels of instability and insecurity in the 
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Cartagena Declaration represents ‘a part 
of a trend towards harmonisation and 
increasing protection and humanitarian 
assistance for victims of armed conflict 
and human rights abuses.
Acceding to the Refugee Convention 
and creating a supplemental regional 
document were important steps for 
creating a regional refugee protection 
regime. Moreover, a regional approach 
was finally viable in Central America 
because the conflicts in El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Nicaragua were coming 
to a close. In August 1987, heads of state 
from Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua, and Honduras gathered to 
sign the Esquipulas II Peace Accords; the 
accords addressed ten major issue areas, 
including protection and assistance to 
forcibly displaced persons (Article 8). 
Evidently, stakeholders in the peace 
process understood enhancement of 
the refugee protection regime to be a 
critical component of peace, security, 
and development in the region. It is 
within this context that in 1989, UNHCR 
and the Organization of American 
States (OAS) held the International 
Conference on Central American 
Refugees (Conferencia Internacional 
Sobre los Refugiados Centroamericanos, 
CIREFCA) to provide a platform for 
addressing forced displacement in the 
isthmus (Pacheco and Sarti 1991).
At CIREFCA, the five aforementioned 
countries, Mexico, and Belize, convened 
to discuss refugee rights, repatriation 
and integration, assistance for IDPs, and 
other issues of concern. Importantly, 
CIREFCA was much more than a one-time 
conference with pledged commitments; 
it was a Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(CPA) that supported a wider regional 
political process that would run until 
1995 as an integral part of the peace 
process and post conflict reconstruction 
(Betts 2009b). Furthermore, CIREFCA 
enhanced the international protection 
norms in the region by encouraging 
and assisting states to draft new 
and improved legal standards and 
promoting the adoption of measures to 
American refugees should be generous 
when assessing merits for protection. 
For example, in 1981 UNHCR 
recommended that all Salvadorans who 
had left their country since 1980 should 
be considered prima facie2 refugees 
because they fled due to political 
events and were likely to suffer if forced 
to return home (Garcia 2006). 
Central American countries, alongside 
other Latin American countries, heeded 
UNHCR’s plea for more expansive 
protection of refugees; on 22 November 
1984 they adopted the Cartagena 
Declaration on Refugees (Cartagena 
Declaration). The Cartagena Declaration 
retains the minimum standards of the 
Refugee Convention, but amends the 
definition to appropriately address 
forced displacement in Latin America. 
Accordingly, it defines refugees as 
‘persons who have fled their country 
because their lives, safety, or liberty 
have been threatened by generalised 
violence, foreign aggression, internal 
conflicts, massive violations of human 
rights, or other circumstances which 
have seriously disturbed public order’ 
(para 27). The Cartagena Declaration is 
not a legally binding document, however 
many Central American countries have 
incorporated it into their national laws 
relating to refugee protection.3
Importantly, the Cartagena 
Declaration not only allows for more 
expansive protection of ‘non-convention 
refugees’ in Central America, but it also 
fundamentally represents the beginnings 
of a regionalist approach for addressing 
the refugee crisis. By drawing on the 
shared experiences and tailoring the 
document to reflect the local realities 
of forced displacement, these countries 
endorsed that regional cooperation 
could be the best way forward. As 
Barichello (2015: 197) comments, the 
2 Prima facie group determinations are 
recommended (or issued) by UNHCR in 
emergencies where the high number of refugees 
makes individual determinations impossible.
3   Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua (see Harley 2014).
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protection regime; they demonstrate a 
strong regional commitment to assume 
state responsibility for protecting those 
forcibly displaced and afford them the 
full spectrum of fundamental human 
rights. Moreover, they overwhelmingly 
prioritise the contemporary refugee crisis 
that has already displaced thousands of 
Central Americans, specifically those 
living in the Northern Triangle (El 
Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala). 
Addressing contemporary forced 
displacement 
Throughout the last decade, 
increasingly high levels of chronic 
violence and insecurity have affected 
Central America. This is due to a 
confluence of factors that go beyond 
the scope of this article; however, it is 
sufficient to say that these factors include 
organised crime (drug cartels and urban 
gangs), high levels of poverty, and 
government corruption. As a result, high 
levels of violence and instability have 
unsurprisingly had a direct correlation 
with increased forced displacement in 
the region (Medrano 2017; Cantor and 
Plewa 2017).  
Figure 1 demonstrates the general 
upward trend of cross-border forced 
displacement since 2014. In particular, 
the Northern Triangle countries have 
seen the most impact, with their figures 
climbing substantially each year; the 
number of asylum seekers grew by 
over 20% in 2018 alone. According 
to UNHCR, an overwhelming amount 
of these asylum claims are filed in the 
US. Applicants from Central America 
and Mexico made up 54% of all asylum 
applications in the US in 2018, with El 
Salvador as the most common nationality 
of origin at 33,400 claims (UNHCR, 
2019e: 42).
UNHCR statistics also show that 
Central America has seen an increase 
of refugees and asylum seekers within 
the region. As of December 2018, there 
were approximately 73,500 refugees 
regularise the situation of refugees and 
returnees. Noting the positive impact 
of the regional initiative, Betts (2009a: 
92) argues that CIREFCA ‘represents 
the single most successful example 
of UNHCR-facilitated international 
cooperation in the recent history of the 
global refugee regime’. 
Before the CIREFCA process officially 
ended, Central American countries 
(alongside other Latin American 
countries) gathered on 7 December 
1994 to sign the San Jose Declaration 
on Refugees and Displaced Persons 
(San Jose Declaration). This was part of 
an initiative to re-evaluate and revise the 
scope of protection for forcibly displaced 
persons in Latin America, and to reiterate 
the importance of the Cartagena 
Declaration (Barichello 2015). The next 
significant step in regional cooperation 
occurred on 16 November 2004, when 
Latin American countries adopted the 
Mexico Declaration and Plan of Action to 
Strengthen the International Protection 
of Refugees in Latin America (Mexico 
Plan of Action, MPA). The MPA was more 
operational than the San Jose Declaration 
because it detailed concrete steps to 
address the main challenges of forced 
displacement. For example, it introduced 
three projects to be implemented across 
participating states: Cities of Solidarity, 
Borders of Solidarity, and Resettlement 
in Solidarity (Harley 2014). Furthermore, 
since its adoption, the MPA has facilitated 
the development of new legislation on 
refugee protection in Central America, 
specifically in Nicaragua (2008), Costa Rica 
(2010), and Mexico (2011) (Harley 2014). 
Noting the success of aforementioned 
agreements, in the last decade the 
isthmus countries have come together 
to formulate three new instruments that 
enhance and strengthen the protections 
afforded to forcibly displaced persons. 
They adopted the Brazil Declaration 
(2014), the San Jose Action Statement 
(2016), and most recently, the San Pedro 
Sula Declaration (2017). These documents 
build on each other and seek to identify 
important gaps in the regional refugee 
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2019d: 9). This number is expected to 
increase significantly in 2019 due to 
recent political turmoil in Nicaragua and 
the spiralling economic and political crisis 
in Venezuela; UNHCR estimates that there 
will be 20,000 to 25,000 new asylum 
seekers from Nicaragua and 10,000 from 
Venezuela (UNHCR 2019d: 8).
and asylum seekers (climbing from 57,000 
in 2017) (UNHCR 2019d: 7). Moreover, 
IDPs increased to 350,000, with Honduras 
contributing nearly half of that number. 
There are also 116,000 ‘other people of 
concern’ to UNHCR, bringing the grand 
total of individuals with protection needs 





2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Belize 45 51 57 59 63 841 98 160 207 217
Guatemala 7,483 10,284 12,554 16,278 19,113 15,807 26,954 46,227 72,711 86,864
Honduras 4,159 6,851 10,508 14,412 18,827 10,147 19,455 35,203 59,777 76,514
El Salvador 10,965 14,778 19,621 25,873 32,543 18,307 31,454 62,167 104,896 119,257
Nicaragua 1,587 1,476 1,419 1,467 1,661 727 1,248 2,126 2,719 32,256
Costa Rica 417 379 208 190 197 127 218 308 486 535
Panama 89 69 40 31 34 30 56 84 111 136
Table 1.  This table shows the number of refugees and asylum seekers originating from Central America who 
are displaced globally. These numbers were compiled from a UNHCR open source database on population 
statistics. The 2018 numbers are subject to minor changes, as they have not yet been published in formal 
reports (UNHCR 2019a).
* Per UNHCR data collection, this group includes persons whose application for asylum or refugee status is 
pending at any stage in the asylum process.
Evidently, the forced displacement 
context in Central America over the 
last decade has been nothing short of 
complex. Every country in the region is 
affected one way or another as either a 
place of origin, transit, asylum, and or 
return; more often than not, a country 
can be all of these things at once, 
further complicating the protection and 
assistance space for forcibly displaced 
persons. Considering this reality, Central 
American countries proactively decided 
to enhance their regionalised response 
for addressing forced displacement. 
Building on the above-mentioned 
regional cooperation and responsibility-
sharing mechanisms, six states –Belize, 
Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Mexico, and Panama—came together 
on 26 October 2017 to adopt the San 
Pedro Sula Declaration. In a historic 
moment for regionalised responses to 
forced displacement, the six countries 
agreed to work together to implement 
a regional Comprehensive Refugee 
Response Framework (CRRF) (UNHCR 
2019b). The CRRF is an initiative that 
comes directly from the 2016 New York 
Declaration for Refugees and Migrants 
(New York Declaration) and that is an 
integral part of the Global Compact on 
Refugees (2018). The regional CRRF 
adopted through the San Pedro Sula 
Declaration is called the Comprehensive 
Regional Protection and Solutions 
Framework (MIRPS in its Spanish 
acronym). It provides a platform for 
addressing national displacement issues 
while also facilitating a comprehensive 
regional response for displacement 
concerns that is based on responsibility-
sharing and solidarity. 
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protection regime in Central America. 
El Salvador’s decision in particular 
raises red flags considering that it is 
the highest refugee producing country 
in the region and has over 70,000 
IDPs (UNHCR 2019d: 9). Similarly, 
Nicaragua’s expected rise in asylum 
seekers foreshadows a pressing need 
for the country to prioritise cooperative 
measures for addressing displacement. 
It has been nearly two years since five 
Central American states and Mexico 
agreed to implement the MIRPS, and 
in this short time span there have been 
significant developments to improve 
refugee protection at a national level, 
while also participating in strategic 
partnerships at the regional level. A 
report completed by UNHCR (2018b), 
Two Year Progress Assessment of 
the CRRF Approach: September 
2016-September 2018 (hereafter Two 
Year Progress Assessment), provides 
valuable insight on progress made by 
the MIRPS countries, as part of broader 
CRRF initiatives. The report centres its 
analysis on the completion of the CRRF’s 
four key objectives: ease the pressure 
on host countries and communities; 
enhance refugee self-reliance; expand 
third-country solutions; and support 
conditions in countries of origin for return 
in safety and dignity (UNHCR 2019b).
Overall, the Two Year Assessment’s 
critique of MIRPS is optimistic, not 
just about the progress to date, but 
also about the potential of a regional 
approach to strengthen protection and 
assistance for refugees, asylum seekers, 
IDPs, and other displaced persons of 
concern. The MIRPS demonstrates the 
benefits of a multilateral approach to 
forced displacement and reaffirms the 
importance of supporting –through 
financial and technical resources, and 
responsibility-sharing mechanisms—
refugee-hosting countries (UNHCR 
2018b: 59). Moreover, the MIRPS (like 
CIREFCA) embodies the aims of a wider 
political agenda. It is nested within a 
regional peacebuilding initiative that 
sees solutions to forced displacement as 
It is important to briefly reflect on the 
countries participating and endorsing 
the MIRPS. Central America’s brand of 
regionalism is such that partnership 
and collaboration with neighbouring 
states is welcomed, and even necessary. 
Although Mexico is not a Central 
American country, its inclusion was 
imperative because of the high number 
of forcibly displaced persons that either 
transit through or claim asylum in the 
country. Moreover, noting Mexico’s 
extensive participations in previous 
regional efforts, it was a logical and 
pragmatic decision. Consequently, a 
regional response that did not include a 
strong commitment from Mexico would 
have been considerably less effective, 
seeing as involvement from all relevant 
geopolitical actors is crucial. 
It is also noteworthy that the United 
States was present for the signing 
of the San Pedro Sula Declaration; 
according to a representative of a 
US based human rights NGO, the US 
outlined on-going efforts to address 
root causes of displacement in 
Central America (by means of foreign 
assistance), asserted a commitment 
to resettlement, and reaffirmed its 
support for developing strong asylum 
systems in the region (Acer 2017). 
From a regionalist perspective, the US’ 
participation is welcomed because as 
explained above, an effective regional 
response is best ensured when the full 
range of geopolitical actors are involved. 
In this instance, the US exerts significant 
geopolitical influence over Central 
America because it is financially invested 
in security and development projects. It 
also receives a high number of Central 
American refugees and is controversially 
interested in stemming the flow of their 
arrival (Long 2019).
It is also relevant to highlight that 
there are two Central American 
countries that are not implementing the 
MIRPS: El Salvador and Nicaragua. Lack 
of participation from these countries 
is concerning as it jeopardises a truly 
regional response to the refugee 
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(e.g. Nicaragua and Venezuela), and 
drastic policy changes in neighbouring 
countries that have direct impacts on 
forcibly displaced Central Americans.  
The second issue area, ‘a volatile 
regional displacement context’, is 
arguably the most pressing concern when 
evaluating the MIRPS future successes. 
Perhaps stand alone, pressure from new 
crises and policy changes would not be 
damming enough to put to question 
the longevity of a regional refugee 
protection regime. However, these have 
unfortunately become compounding 
factors that led migration in the Americas 
to become securitised. The succeeding 
section will thus analyse how securitisation 
fundamentally jeopardises effective refugee 
protection and responsibility-sharing in 
Central America, both of which are at the 
core of a comprehensive regional approach. 
an integral part of security and stability 
in Central America. 
Along with the Two Year Progress 
Assessment, UNHCR (2018a) produced 
a case study, The MIRPS: A Regional 
Integrative Response to Forced 
Displacement. Ostensibly, the case 
study reflects a positive disposition for 
regional cooperation. However, it is also 
candid about considerable challenges to 
be expected—something that the Two 
Year Assessment fails to appropriately 
elaborate on. For example, the case study 
elucidates that there are two significant 
compounding issue areas: 1) ‘challenges 
to institutionalisation’, and 2) ‘a volatile 
regional displacement context’ (UNHCR 
2018a: 15). The former includes funding 
difficulties and retaining commitments 
during changing political cycles. The 
latter includes pressure on the refugee 
protection space due to new crises 
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has only continued to increase, most 
notably following the migrant caravan of 
November 2018 (Cuffe 2018). 
Sandoval Garcia (2017) explains 
that securitisation of migration, in the 
context of the Americas, has meant 
that illicit substances, terrorism, and 
migration are now represented as a 
single threat when governments are 
conducting or speaking about border 
control activities. As a result, individuals 
migrating because they were forcibly 
displaced are also seen as threats to 
security, rather than as recipients of 
international protection. Segura Mena 
(2016), provides an argument that is 
in discussion with Sandoval Garcia, 
however, she goes a step further to 
link the securitisation of migration to 
a US geopolitical strategy of political, 
economic, and military control over 
the Central American region. Segura 
Mena specifically analyses the Regional 
Conference on Migration, an ongoing 
inter-state cooperation mechanism 
since 1996, and posits that it represents 
a decisive moment in the institutional 
arrangement of a new regional migration 
regime, dominated by the migration-
security nexus, and characterised by 
its multilaterisation efforts and by the 
criminalisation of cross-border mobility 
under irregular conditions (2016: 108). 
She notes that one of the most significant 
consequences of this US geopolitical 
strategy is the active participation of 
Mexico in the fight against southern 
migratory flows.
A study done by Arriola Vega (2017) on 
Mexico’s southern border programmes 
corroborates Segura Mena’s thesis. He 
concludes that ‘Mexico has gradually 
played the role of a “migration manager” 
for the United States under a securitised 
lens. The southern border has become 
the main barrier to migration flows 
bound for the United States…’(Arriola 
Vega 2017: 6). In 2001 Mexico adopted 
the Plan Sur that heightened migratory 
controls at its southern border with 
the purpose of hindering Central 
American migration; since then, Mexico 
Securitisation as a challenge for 
regionalisation
Securitisation of migration in the 
Americas
Almost all relevant state actors either 
adopted the San Pedro Sula Declaration 
and the MIRPS, or endorsed it and 
offered support. However, despite these 
commitments to regional solutions, 
the competing trend of securitisation 
threatens these efforts. Securitisation is 
when an issue becomes a designated 
security concern because it is presented 
as ‘posing an existential threat to a 
designated referent object’ (Buzan et 
al.1998: 21). Traditionally, the referent 
object in question is the state, and the 
special nature of the threat legitimises 
extraordinary measures to safeguard 
national security. Security is a vague 
term void of legal meaning and is thus 
‘slippery and contested’, providing 
states with a wide margin of discretion 
when establishing their national security 
agenda (Zedner 2003: 153). As a result, 
a lack of agreed standards on national 
security, or security for that matter, 
creates a legal vacuum that states can 
use to their advantage.
Over the last few decades, migration 
has become a securitised issue, 
resulting in devastating consequences 
for the rights and protections of forcibly 
displaced persons. Unfortunately, 
securitisation of migration is at the 
forefront of current US foreign policy 
and is subsequently shrinking the 
protection space offered by the regional 
refugee protection regime in Central 
America. A contemporary example is 
the current US president’s tendency to 
criminalise, demonise, and effectively 
dehumanise migrants arriving to the US 
southern border. His comments about 
ridding the ‘bad hombres’ from the US 
may have seemed trivial at the time, 
but his continued securitised rhetoric 
has resulted in a series of direct assaults 
on US immigration law, IRL, and IHRL 
(Pierce and Selee 2017). This rhetoric 
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economic and political dependence on 
the US, has led to its immigration policy 
revolving around the needs and whims 
of its neighbouring country (Sandoval 
Garcia 2017). This is evidenced by the 
increased deportations mentioned 
above, and by more recent developments 
that will be further explored below. 
Notwithstanding, Mexico has 
continuously affirmed its commitment 
to a regional refugee protection regime, 
most recently exhibited by its direct 
involvement in the MIRPS. Mexico’s 
unique position in relation to both the 
US and Central America makes for an 
interesting investigation on the viability 
of an effective regional response 
to forced displacement in light of 
securitisation.  
A case study: Looking in depth at 
Mexico’s relationship with securitisation
Mexico is a particularly important 
MIRPS country because it holds the 
Pro Tempore Presidency as of February 
2019. In this role Mexico coordinates 
joint efforts between MIRPS countries 
and other stakeholders to promote the 
development of enhanced national 
and regional policy towards forced 
displacement (ACNUR 2019). In April 
2019, Mexico published a report that 
details the Pro Tempore Presidency’s 
priorities until December 2019. The 
priorities include ‘strengthening the 
regional and national dynamic in the 
promotion of shared responsibility 
among countries of origin, transit and 
destination (...) based on the principle 
that all people, in spite of their situation, 
are rights holders’ (SEGOB and COMAR 
2019: 1, emphasis added).
Quite contrastingly, around the 
same time that Mexico reinvigorated 
its commitment to the MIRPS, it also 
endorsed highly controversial asylum 
policies for newly arrived Central 
Americans. In a coordinated effort with 
the US, Mexico agreed to implement 
the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP) 
has continuously increased its border 
security, most recently through the 2014 
Plan Frontera Sur. By pressing Mexico 
to enhance its southern border controls, 
the US is effectively implementing a 
policy of ‘externalisation of migration 
controls’ that serves to expand and 
fuel the securitisation of migration. 
These externalisation strategies prevent 
migrants, including forcibly displaced 
persons, from reaching the territories 
or legal jurisdictions of destination 
states (Frelick et al. 2016). This is 
highly problematic because states are 
implicating themselves in violations 
of the principle of non-refoulement4 
(directly or indirectly). Regrettably, 
through such strategies, states are 
placing emphasis on national security to 
the detriment of the rights of migrants, 
although arguably, national security 
can be achieved by the advancement 
of human security (Jaskulowski 2017). 
Regardless of its morality or legality, 
the securitisation of migration has 
been fruitful for the US; between 2014 
and 2017, Mexico has deported more 
migrants from the Northern Triangle 
than the US (Flores et al. 2019). 
The discussion above conveys that 
the securitisation of migration in the 
Americas, driven and propelled by 
the US, is undoubtedly a significant 
challenge to the development of an 
effective protection framework for 
refugees, asylum seekers, and IDPs 
in Central America. A particularly 
problematic aspect of the regionalisation 
vs. securitisation dilemma is that Mexico 
is caught in the middle. The geopolitical 
position of Mexico, with serious 
4 Art. 33(1) of the Refugee Convention states 
that ‘No contracting state shall expel or return 
(‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever 
to the frontiers of territories where his life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of 
his race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion’. There 
is a more expansive definition in the Cartagena 
Declaration, which includes ‘prohibition of 
rejection at the frontier’, and acknowledges the 
principle as a jus cogens norm (art 3[5]).
ACADEMIC SECTION
113
OxMo Vol. 8, No. 2
system, it is reasonable to expect that 
this upward trend will continue; as of 
March 2019 nearly 13,000 people have 
applied for asylum. If Mexico is thus 
pushed to attain responsibility for an 
increasing amount of asylum seekers, it 
should only be expected to do so after 
receiving the appropriate financial and 
technical support to enhance relevant 
legal infrastructure and social services. 
The Mexican Commission for Refugee 
Assistance (Comision Mexicana de 
Ayuda a Refugiados, COMAR) and the 
National Migration Institute (Instituto 
Nacional de Migracion, INM) already 
experience capacity issues because they 
are understaffed and underfunded. In 
fact, the head of COMAR affirmed that 
the agency needed six times its current 
resources to effectively respond to 
the asylum requests (Meyer 2019). As 
Mathew and Harley (2016:199) elucidate 
when outlining potential challenges of 
responsibility-sharing in regionalisation 
efforts, adequate resources are 
‘necessary to guarantee that the 
international protection of refugees is 
enhanced and not diminished and to 
ensure that states share rather than shift 
the responsibility to protect refugees’ 
(emphasis added). 
To better understand the devastating 
consequences of the MPP, I travelled 
to Tijuana, B.C., Mexico in early June 
2019 to conduct an interview with Mr. 
Guerra, a staff member of Catholic Legal 
Immigration Network Inc. (CLINIC) and 
a consultant for Al Otro Lado (their 
partner organisation). Al Otro Lado is a 
bi-national, direct legal services NGO 
that has worked with migrants, asylum 
seekers, and refugees in the southern 
US border zone since 2012 (Al Otro 
Lado 2019). Mr. Guerra has coordinated 
Al Otro Lado’s local efforts in Tijuana 
since October 2018 and he offers a 
unique and critical perspective on the 
fast-paced developments. 
When asked about changes in US 
asylum policy and their effects on Central 
Americans waiting in Mexico, Mr. Guerra 
highlights the stark divergence between 
also referred to as the ‘Remain in 
Mexico Policy’. The MPP stipulates that 
migrants, including asylum seekers, 
who enter or seek admission to the US 
from Mexico illegally or without proper 
identification, are returned to Mexico 
while their immigration proceedings are 
underway (Department of Homeland 
Security 2019). 
The US is highly criticised for this policy 
because it is in violation of domestic 
immigration law, IRL, and IHRL. The 
MPP overrides the requirement to have 
Mexico officially designated as a ‘safe 
third country’5 before returning refugees 
and asylum seekers from US territory, and 
also arguably violates the principle of 
non-refoulement by returning individuals 
with protection claims to a country that 
cannot guarantee their safety (Borger 
2019; Gzeh 2019). Mexico’s acceptance 
of the MPP is disconcerting considering 
that the US has a history of attempting 
to make Mexico a ‘safe third country’, 
while Mexico has continuously resisted 
this designation (Solomon 2019). Civil 
society groups in the US challenged the 
legality of the MPP in the courts, but it 
appears that individuals are still returned 
to Mexico (ACLU 2019). As of 24 June 
2019, 15,079 people, mostly from the 
Northern Triangle, were returned to 
the border cities of Juárez, Tijuana, and 
Mexicali under the MPP (Human Rights 
Watch 2019). 
Consequently, the MPP is 
discouraging migrants from seeking 
asylum in the US and is shifting 
responsibility onto Mexico. Even before 
the MPP, Mexico reported an increase 
in asylum applications; the number of 
asylum claims rose from 14,596 in 2017 
to 29,625 in 2018, marking a 103% 
increase (UNHCR 2019g). Seeing as the 
MPP is only making it more difficult for 
migrants to access the US immigration 
5 US statutory standards state that in order to 
qualify as a ‘safe third country’, the country in 
question must be able to provide protection 
from persecution and a ‘full and fair procedure 
for determining a claim to asylum or equivalent 
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so, in order to alleviate the already 
overwhelmed migration system—would 
appear well founded (Frederick 2019). 
There is no way of knowing if the eight 
unaccompanied minors went into the 
care of social services or were deported, 
but in any case, their experience 
elucidates how both the US and Mexico 
are implicating themselves in violations 
of the principle of non-refoulement. 
Firstly, by not allowing these children 
to enter the US to claim asylum, and 
secondly, by likely deporting them back 
to a country they fled due to fear of 
persecution. 
This anecdote highlights the informal –
and illegal—ways that the US and Mexico 
are cooperating to stem the flow of 
migration. Importantly, this cooperation 
is not done on an ad-hoc basis. Rather, 
it is nested within the programmed and 
coordinated efforts that are ‘legitimised’ 
because of the aforementioned Migrant 
Protection Protocols (MPP). When 
speaking about the MPP, Mr. Guerra 
almost comically points out the irony in 
the name, commenting that ‘it’s more 
like Migrant Persecution Protocols’ 
(Guerra, interview, 6 June 2019). The 
claim that the MPP is about persecution 
rather than protection is a bold and 
unapologetically critical comment 
on the US and Mexico’s treatment of 
migrants and forcibly displaced persons. 
Moreover, with these comments Mr. 
Guerra is implicitly acknowledging the 
tension between regionalisation and 
securitisation. Mexico wants to be seen 
as a migrant friendly and human rights 
forward country, but due to pressure 
from the US, it is unable to follow 
through with its rhetoric. Mexico may 
be a MIRPS country, but it is sending 
messages of deterrence through its lack 
of social services, cooperation with the 
US on extreme immigration policies, and 
blatant disregard for the human rights 
of migrants. Throughout the entirety 
of the interview Mr. Guerra provided a 
plethora of information and anecdotes 
about on-going challenges facing 
migrants and forcibly displaced persons 
statements and actions, affirming the 
argument that Mexico’s policies on 
forced displacement are contradictory. 
He argues that when the crisis at the 
border escalated in late 2018 ‘it became 
really clear that the intent [of the Mexican 
government] was never actually to 
provide support’ but instead ‘the limited 
support that was provided [was] in such 
horrible conditions that it almost became 
a message of deterrence.’ (Guerra, 
interview, 6 June 2019). He then explains 
how Mexico has been influenced –even 
compelled—by the US to follow through 
with repressive migration policies. He 
laments to have seen ‘Mexico stumble 
and not really know what to do’ in the 
face of the migration crisis, and in doing 
so, he intrinsically suggests that Mexico 
is vulnerable and looking to the US for 
guidance (ibid).  
This allusion to geopolitical power 
dynamics becomes clearer when Mr. 
Guerra provides explicit examples on 
how the US and Mexico are cooperating 
in the border zones. For example, 
he points out that US Customs and 
Border Patrol (CBP) ‘have forced local 
Mexican authorities to prevent, for 
example, unaccompanied minors from 
seeking protection’ (Guerra, interview, 
6 June 2019). He then describes a 
harrowing scene where CBP ‘flat out 
created a human wall’ to prevent eight 
unaccompanied minors from getting 
onto US territory, and subsequently 
turned them over to officials from the INM 
(ibid). The INM is meant to adequately 
screen apprehended migrants for 
protection concerns, but a 2017 report 
from the Citizens Council of the National 
Migration Institute (Consejo Ciudano 
del Instituto Nacional de Migracion, 
CCINM) found that there were no clear 
and effective mechanisms for identifying 
individuals with protection concerns, and 
thus evidenced that the INM violated the 
principle of non-refoulement in many of 
their returns or deportations (2017:13). 
As such, speculation that the INM 
continues to prioritise deportations over 
protection concerns—and increasingly 
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nor promoting responsibility-sharing 
and solidarity. Moreover, Mexico is 
setting precedent for Central American 
countries to accept and implement the 
US’ securitized migration policies. Not 
long after the MPP, on 26 July 2019, the 
US government announced a ‘safe third 
country’ agreement with Guatemala 
(Restuccia, 2019). Refugees and asylum-
seekers who travel through Guatemala 
will need to seek legal protection in 
Guatemala before placing asylum claims 
in the US; this agreement is highly 
problematic because Guatemala does 
not meet the US legal requirements to be 
a ‘safe third country’ (Gzeh, 2019). While 
it is making significant strides as a MIRPS 
country to enhance and strengthen 
refugee protection and assistance, the 
increasingly high figures of forcibly 
displaced persons (86,864 Guatemalan 
asylum-seekers worldwide in 2018) 
indicate that Guatemala is not ready 
or capable of offering protection for all 
Central Americans crossing through its 
territory. Unfortunately, in light of this 
development, one can presume that 
similar agreements with other Central 
American countries are likely to follow. 
Conclusion
This article assessed the extent to which 
regionalism of the refugee protection 
regime in Central America has been 
effective. It lays out the continuous and 
extensive efforts on the part of Central 
American countries—and points to a 
definite trend in regionalisation of the 
refugee protection regime—beginning 
with the Cartagena Declaration in 1984 
and culminating with the San Pedro 
Sula Declaration in 2017. However 
positive these regional efforts have 
been in fostering responsibility-sharing 
and solidarity, and fruitful in developing 
a more comprehensive and harmonised 
system for addressing forced 
displacement, the unfortunate reality is 
that their effectiveness is jeopardised by 
the competing trend of securitisation. 
waiting in Mexico. His final comments 
were moving and thought-provoking:
‘…we need to remember that 
most individuals don’t want to 
leave their home country. They 
are leaving because they are so 
desperate and we need to create 
processes in place so that they can 
actually be protected, and figure 
out ways to extend a loving hand 
instead of trying to continue to 
figure out ways on how to deter 
people, to criminalise people. No 
one deserves to be criminalised for 
trying to survive’ (Guerra, interview, 
6 June 2019).
This plea from Mr. Guerra rightfully 
indicates that the securitisation of 
migration has to stop. It is fully within 
the rights of forcibly displaced persons 
to have their protection claims heard, 
but instead the US continues to 
criminalise them and argue that they are 
taking advantage of immigration laws. 
Enforcing immigration policies in order 
to pursue national security objectives 
may be a legitimate concern for the 
US, but their tendency to do so with 
complete disregard for IRL and IHRL is 
unjustifiable. Unfortunately, the MPP 
is just one of the many policy changes 
enacted by the current US administration 
to deter Central Americans from 
seeking asylum at the southern border, 
and by derivative, to jeopardise the 
regionalisation of the refugee protection 
regime in the isthmus. 
The consequences of these 
securitised policies are devastating for 
both migrants and displaced persons, 
and Mexico is undeniably complicit 
in sustaining systematic human rights 
violations. By allowing the US to return 
people with protection concerns to 
its territory, Mexico is jeopardising the 
legitimacy of the regionalisation efforts 
exemplified by the MIRPS. Undeniably, 
through its participation in the MPP, 
Mexico is neither strengthening the 
regional refugee protection framework, 
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ensuring the effectiveness of a regional 
refugee protection regime in Central 
America. As mentioned in the second 
section, in 2018 El Salvador was the 
highest refugee producing country in 
the region (with 32,543 refugees and 
119,257 asylum seekers worldwide) 
and has over 70,000 IDPs. At least in 
principle, El Salvador’s decision to join 
the MIRPS is a strong and symbolic 
‘never again’ message that shows a 
commitment to addressing the push 
factors of forced displacement, and the 
detrimental effects of the securitisation 
for migration that push individuals 
towards increasingly dangerous travel 
routes. It is too soon to tell if and how El 
Salvador’s inclusion will directly improve 
the protection space in Central America, 
but nonetheless, it is a laudable 
development for regionalism of the 
refugee protection regime. Seeing as 
the forced displacement crisis in Central 
America is dynamic and ever-changing, 
it is more important than ever to follow 
developments closely and critically.
This research does not presumptuously 
declare that the regionalisation of the 
refugee protection regime in Central 
America is condemned to fail because of 
securitisation. Rather, it has highlighted 
that securitisation carries many 
challenges that have a direct impact on 
the ultimate aim of fostering a refugee 
protection regime that can respect, 
protect, and fulfil the human rights of 
forcibly displaced persons. Moreover, the 
securitisation of migration has brought 
with it an ever-changing protection 
space that is nearly impossible to keep 
up with. Considering the almost weekly 
changes in US policy (during the Spring 
and Summer of 2019), it is unlikely 
that the securitisation of migration will 
decelerate anytime soon. The situation 
is fluid, and the unpredictability of short 
and long-term developments hampers 
effective and predictable structures from 
being established. 
In light of the many unfortunate 
circumstances directly infringing on 
forcibly displaced persons’ ability to 
enjoy their rights under IRL and IHRL, 
UNHCR recently placed a call to action 
in Central America. On 12 June 2019, 
the agency appealed for further regional 
talks to address forced displacement, 
noting that the strained capacity of 
the refugee protection regime placed 
‘growing numbers of individuals and 
families at grave risk and [created] 
situations that no country can address 
alone’ (2019f, para 1). A few days later, 
on 26 June 2019, a disturbing image 
went viral: a Salvadoran migrant and 
his two-year-old daughter lying face 
down, lifeless, in the waters of the Rio 
Grande (Linthicum 2019). This image 
renewed attention on the Central 
American refugee crisis and stressed the 
importance of heeding UNHCR’s call 
to action. Undoubtedly influenced by 
both the UNHCR and the viral photo, 
on 26 July 2019, El Salvador announced 
its decision to join the MIRPS (UNHCR 
2019c). 
Participation from El Salvador in 
the MIRPS is a crucial step forward for 
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Between Torture and Hiding: The North 
Korean Migration Case in China
phillip Kraeter
Different reasons underlie North Koreans’ decisions to cross the border into China irregularly, including 
state-driven persecution, economic hardship and hunger. While some fall under the refugee definition 
set out in 1951 Refugee Convention, others classify as refugees sur place given the inhumane treatment 
and serious harm they would face upon return to North Korea. Although those fleeing the North 
Korea would be classified as refugees according to several international instruments signed by China, 
Chinese authorities continue to refuse recognising their refugee status, classifying North Koreans 
instead as ‘economic migrants’ and repatriating them to North Korea by force. This article examines 
the challenges faced by North Korean refugees in regard to accessing international protection and the 
extent to which both North Korea and China fail to fulfil their obligations under international refugee 
and human rights laws. Despite bilateral agreements with North Korea, it argues that the automatic 
repatriation of North Koreans by China is an unlawful procedure and that both North Korea and China 
must conform to international agreements to protect North Korean citizens fleeing the country. Based 
on an analysis of the legal framework in place, as well as a consideration of the broader geopolitical 
context at play, this article suggests several recommendations for improving the situation of North 
Koreans in China. 
Introduction
Although the main destination of choice 
for those fleeing has been the Republic 
of Korea (South Korea), it is estimated 
that in total between 100,000 and 
300,000 people have arrived in China 
from North Korea (Margesson, Chanlett-
Avery, Bruno 2007: 4) by 2007–a 
number which is likely to have increased 
since, although up-to-date figures from 
reliable sources are difficult to obtain. 
Yet inconsistencies and disagreements 
persist over the classification of those 
who arrived from North Korea in China. 
Whilst North Korea refers to the migrants 
as ‘defectors’, the United States and 
other third parties utilise the term 
‘refugee’. China, however, makes use 
of the term ‘economic migrant’. While 
they could be classified as refugees and 
protected against repatriation to North 
Korea according to several international 
instruments signed by China, Chinese 
authorities have refused to recognise 
their refugee status and repatriating 
them to North Korea by force.  
This repatriation brings with it further 
problems, as North Korea is known to 
commit several human rights violations 
such as torture or dehumanising 
treatment on migrants after being 
returned to their country (Lee et al 
2001: 227). The political situation in the 
region complicates the matter further. 
Whilst China fears the consequences 
of a collapse of North Korea, it is also 
reliant upon it as buffer zone between 
China and South Korea, and more 
precisely the influence of the United 
States. Therefore, it is in China’s national 
interest to find a risk-free solution to 
this issue, while not provoking allies 
or being viewed by the international 
community in a negative light.
This article seeks to answer the 
following questions: What challenges 
have North Koreans fleeing North 
Korea since 1990 faced in accessing 
international protection? To what extent 
are North Korea and the China fulfilling 
their obligations under international 
refugee and human rights law? The 
scope of this article is set after 1990, as 
this marks the time of Sino-South Korean 
relaxation and further coincides with the 
natural disasters that took place starting 
1995. Further, the case of China was 
chosen due to the complex interplay 
between international treaties vis-à-
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1951 Refugee Convention (Refugee 
Convention) as any person who is 
outside their country of nationality and 
is unable or unwilling to return there or 
avail himself to the protection of that 
country, on account of a well-founded 
fear of persecution for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion 
(Refugee Convention Article 1A(2) 1951). 
While there is no universally accepted 
definition of the term ‘persecution’, it 
can be inferred from article 33 of the 
Refugee Convention that a threat to life or 
freedom of an individual on the account 
of race, religion, nationality, political 
opinion or even membership in social 
groups would constitute persecution 
(UNHCR 2011: 13). A fear of persecution 
may be established where the state is 
responsible for the persecution or where 
there is an absence of state protection 
against other actors. 
Applying these definitions to the 
present case, there seem to be two main 
umbrella categories of people fleeing 
North Korea into China. The first refers 
to individuals fleeing North Korea for 
fear of persecution at the hands of state 
forces, who would satisfy the definition of 
a refugee as laid out in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and its 1967 Protocol. The 
second category is comprised of those 
individuals leaving North Korea for 
other reasons, such as famine or better 
economic opportunities, making them 
economic migrants strictly speaking. 
The lines between these two umbrella 
categories are blurred, however. Famine 
and economic deprivation, for example, 
are sometimes part and parcel of 
persecutory measures against families 
or particular groups of individuals 
considered hostile to the regime. Due to 
a system of social classification in North 
Korea, for example, those who the regime 
considers to be in a hostile group could 
face restricted access to jobs or food. In 
addition, even those who may not be 
considered as hostile by the state but 
who leave North Korea nonetheless risk 
facing inhumane treatment as objectors 
vis national law, and the contradicting 
interpretations of actions by the 
government in question. 
It analyses the legal framework in place 
in China as well as North Korea, including 
relevant international treaties. It also 
offers reflections on the contemporary 
situation and broader geopolitical 
context in an attempt to understand 
China’s and North Korea’s position vis-
à-vis those fleeing into Chinese territory. 
Finally, the article concludes by exploring 
possible solutions to improve the matter 
in question and considers remaining 
research gaps.
In terms of methodology, it is important 
to note that neither North Korea nor 
China grant access to information on 
the issue. No interviews were therefore 
conducted directly by the author. Aside 
from drawing on articles pertaining to the 
legal and political situation, the majority 
of sources are based on testimonials of 
North Koreans, reports, or interviews 
from NGOs and academics who have 
gained access to migrants. Sources were 
selected based on relevance to the topic 
of North Korean migrants in China, on 
the root causes of the problem, and on 
potential solutions and treaties in place, 
which should protect them. 
North Korean ‘economic migrants’ in 
need of protection
To establish an understanding of 
the legal framework in place, several 
definitions need to be laid out. At the 
core of this lies the decision of the 
Chinese government to classify North 
Korean migrants as ‘illegal economic 
migrants’, rather than ‘refugees’ (Ra 
2015: 44). The United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures 
and Criteria for Determining Refugee 
Status understands an economic migrant 
as ‘a person who voluntarily leaves his 
country (…) exclusively for economic 
considerations.’ (UNHCR 2011: 15). 
Yet, a refugee is understood under the 
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(Amnesty International 2004, 2). The 
aforementioned articles of the North 
Korea Criminal Code stand in direct 
conflict with at least one international 
treaty signed by North Korea, the 
ICCPR. Amnesty International finds that 
North Korea’s article 117 of the Criminal 
Code violates article 12(2) of the ICCPR, 
which states that ‘everyone shall be 
free to leave any country, including 
its own’ (Amnesty International 2004, 
29). It further notes that officials of the 
frontier administration, who are found 
helping someone cross the border and 
flee, face a sentence of two to seven 
years in a labour camp, as per article 
118 of the North Korean Criminal Code 
(2004: 29). However, given the lack of 
available information, there is some 
debate among scholars regarding the 
level of punishment inflicted upon 
those found guilty of illegally crossing 
the border. While Kim cites a minimum 
punishment of five years if found guilty 
of treachery by defecting (2015: 127), 
Chan and Schloenhardt argue there is a 
standard sentence of seven years (2007: 
221). Some scholars also cite death 
by execution as the final punishment 
for severe offenses. Such a ‘severe 
offense’ could for example be contact 
with South Korean citizens or religious 
organisations like Christians in northeast 
China while fleeing North Korea (Kang 
2016: 71). It is seen by North Korea as 
unlawful political expression which is 
understood as an ideological crime and 
therefore warrants persecution in North 
Korea (Cho 2013: 226). 
Scholars such as Chan and 
Schloenhardt (2007) note that there 
are numerous factors which further 
complicate these matters and make it 
difficult to determine the realisation 
of the law. One reason cited is North 
Korea’s unwillingness to permit external 
human rights monitoring bodies into 
the country. As a result, much of the 
information in the literature is based 
on media reports, government sources, 
or anecdotal evidence. Due to these 
challenging conditions, many NGOs 
to the regime upon return. This classifies 
them as ‘refugee sur place’ (Chan and 
Schloenhardt 2007: 225), a term used 
to describe a person who was not a 
refugee when they left their country, 
but who becomes a refugee at a later 
date, due to a change of circumstances 
in their country of origin or as a result of 
their own actions (UNHCR 2011). 
Thus, it is important to note that 
even those who have left North Korea 
due to economic hardships or hunger 
may nevertheless become eligible for 
international protection after leaving 
the North Korea. North Korea officials 
are known to inflict harsh treatment on 
individuals who have left the country 
and are then repatriated by Chinese 
officials. Such treatment includes torture, 
imprisonment, or even execution (Chan 
and Schloenhardt 2007: 226; Lee et al 
2001: 227). In fact, articles 117 and 47 
of the North Korean Criminal Code 
make it a punishable offense to leave 
the country without possession of valid 
travel certificates and corresponding 
permission from the authorities 
(Chan and Schloenhardt 2007: 221). 
Furthermore, crossing a border illegally 
is a ‘crime of treachery against the 
Fatherland by defection’ according 
to article 62 of the Criminal Code 
(Kim 2015: 127; Margesson, Chanlett-
Avery and Bruno 2007: 9). This shows 
that North Korea aims to punish those 
being disloyal, further strengthening the 
position of refugees sur place.
Understanding existing laws and 
treaties in North Korea and China
North Korea has signed four 
international treaties relating to human 
rights, namely: The International 
Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the 
International Covenant on Civil and 
political Rights (ICCPR), the Covenant on 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) and finally the 
Convention of Rights of the Child (CRC) 
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Song (2014: 3-4) identifies China’s 
legal framework as the reason it is dealing 
with the situation in this way. She warns 
that the biggest challenge in dealing 
with cross-border human displacement 
into China is the absence of a refugee 
definition in Chinese domestic law. In 
particular, China’s Constitution is silent 
on the legal status of international 
treaties and their respective hierarchy in 
the domestic legal system. At the same 
time, China has not codified the definition 
of a refugee into domestic law, nor has it 
been directly applied by Chinese courts. 
Thus, although scholars such as Ra, Kim, 
Chan and Schloenhardt condemn China 
for violating its international obligations 
by disregarding treaties, Song argues 
that this is due to the disregard on the 
side of the Chinese government about 
the legal status of international treaties, 
including the definition and rights of 
refugees established in the Refugee 
Convention (Ra 2015: 45; Kim 2015: 
136; Chan and Schloenhardt 2007: 224; 
Song 2014: 6). 
With this in mind, the question remains 
whether the domestic legal framework 
or a signed international treaty holds 
greater importance. Song attempts 
to explain this difference using the 
example of article 46 of China’s Law on 
Exit and Entry Administration of 1986, 
which states that ‘foreigners seeking 
asylum for political reasons [who are] 
subject to the approval of governing 
authority in China, are allowed to stay 
and live in China’. In 2013, this was 
updated to provide that applicants for 
refugee status may stay temporarily in 
China during the application process 
and that those granted refugee status 
may stay in China. Yet, this law did not 
cover the issue of who qualifies for this 
refugee status, nor the procedures of 
this status determination (Song 2014: 
7). Song therefore argues that the main 
issue underlying China’s approach to 
North Korean migrants is that China is 
relatively new to refugee protection and 
has little to no knowledge about the 
international refugee regime. Particularly 
have left North Korea, citing the 
difficulty to obtain information without 
direct access to North Koreans. There 
is also general frustration when dealing 
with the government due to its apparent 
disregard of several articles of the North 
Korean Constitution of 1998, including 
the rights of freedom of speech, 
press, assembly, demonstration, and 
association (Chan and Schloenhardt 
2007: 217). Although this law grants the 
above rights in theory, Lee (2001: 227) 
explains that the situation in North Korea 
reveals several human rights violations, 
such as torture. Despite signing these 
four international human rights treaties, 
North Korea is not seen as cooperative 
in fulfilling its obligations of upholding 
the rights of refugees. 
An additional problem is the role 
China plays and the actions it has 
taken in this multi-faceted issue. China 
serves as one of the main temporary 
destinations for North Korean refugees. 
Although UNHCR estimates that there 
are between 30,000 and 50,000 North 
Koreans living as refugees in China since 
1990 (Margesson, Chanlett-Avery, Bruno 
2007: 4), some estimate there are as many 
as 300,000 (Ibid: 4). A reason for this 
large discrepancy is that UNHCR has no 
direct access to North Korean migrants, 
as many remain in ‘underground’ 
movements attempting to stay hidden. 
China’s role in this is interesting due to 
the aforementioned reluctance to view 
North Korean migrants as refugees. 
China, unlike North Korea, is a party to 
the 1951 Refugee Convention, signed 
by China in 1982 (Ra 2015: 43). In the 
1970s and 1980s, China also ratified 
several other international human rights 
instruments and treaties (Song 2014: 
5). The Chinese government, however, 
denies UNHCR direct access to refugees 
in China, making it challenging to 
uphold the Refugee Convention (Kim 
2015: 136). China has responded by 
proclaiming that the situation is an 
internal matter and therefore refuses to 
provide UNHCR with further access (Cho 
2013: 208; Ra 2015: 44). 
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‘wavering’ class, equal to roughly 50% of 
the population; and ‘hostile’ class, with 
the remaining 20% of the population (Cho 
2013: 187).1 As access to information is 
scarce in the North Korean context, these 
numbers could be slightly outdated, but 
still serve as the most recent credible 
classification. The core class forms the 
elite, with preferred access to food, 
medicine, education, and employment, 
while the wavering class consists mostly 
of the working class, with professions 
such as teacher, technician, soldier, and 
farmer (Chan and Schloenhardt 2007: 
218). Lastly, the hostile class represents 
those disloyal to North Korea (Cho 
2013: 187). This is not to say that 20% 
of the population has been directly 
involved in acts of treachery. Rather, 
it is based on North Korea’s system of 
‘collective responsibility’. Due to the 
strong ongoing family ties, collective 
responsibility prescribes that relatives 
of those breaching the law are equally 
punishable (Chan and Schloenhardt 2007: 
218; Chang, Haggard and Noland 2008: 
9). This punishment can even extend to 
multiple generations and is intended to 
cleanse the population of any and all 
opponents. Therefore, mere opinions 
of a relative can blacklist a person from 
receiving adequate quality of education 
or job offers over generations, even if this 
relative is long dead. 
This social classification system is 
propped up by North Korea’s prison 
system, which is further broken down 
into four different types of hard labour 
facilities, resembling modern-day 
gulags (Cho 2013: 189). Interrogation 
techniques such as water torture are 
applied to determine the degree of 
imprisonment. North Korean officials 
reject the existence of such institutes, 
however, despite estimates that 
between 150,000 to 200,000 prisoners 
are being detained there (Ibid: 190-192). 
1 Core class = haek-sim kyechung, wavering class 
= tong-yo kyechung and hostile class = jok-tae 
kyechung. The latter has no right to education, 
employment or medical services of any kind 
despite article 65 (Cho 2013, 188).
as prior to the mid 1990s, China had 
limited experience with asylum seekers 
and its legal framework makes little 
difference between refugees, tourists, 
and immigrants (Song 2014: 8). 
Reasons causing North Koreans to 
cross into China 
There are several different conditions 
which catalysed the movements of North 
Koreans into China. This section outlines 
how economic downturn and famine, in 
addition to state-driven persecution, 
forced the citizens of North Korea to 
consider other options and gave rise 
to the present case of North Koreans 
fleeing to China.
In 1995, North Korea was hit by 
excessive floods, destroying crops en 
masse, leading to a national famine that 
lasted until 1998 (Cho 2013: 196). These 
heavy floods which began in North Korea 
damaged agricultural activities, leading 
to a substantial food shortage that has 
not been adequately solved (Chan and 
Schloenhardt 2007: 220). The situation 
further exacerbated by droughts during 
the 2000s, fully collapsing the agricultural 
industry. To this day, this shortage has 
not been fully handled and has in fact 
worsened by an ongoing drought (Choe 
2019). It is estimated that 2 to 3.5 million 
people starved to death from 1995 until 
1998, yet the North Korean government 
claims that the death toll was around 
220,000 (Cho 2013: 197). Although 
natural disasters are not something in 
control of the government entirely, the 
response certainly is. In the case of North 
Korea, the country has yet to fully recover 
from this natural disaster of this scale.
However, for North Koreans, famine 
and natural disasters are not the only 
issue at stake. North Koreans live within 
an ongoing system of social classification, 
despite article 65 of the constitution 
calling for the right to equality (Lee 
et al 2001: 218). There are three main 
groupings in place: ‘core’ class, making 
up roughly 30% of the population; 
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be classified as a refugee in China. As 
previously mentioned, due to a lack of a 
refugee definition in Chinese domestic 
law, there have been no effective 
mechanisms to ensure implementation 
of the relevant treaties China has 
signed (Song 2014: 14). According to 
UNHCR Guidelines, an individualised 
assessment to determine refugee 
status should take place (UNHCR 2011: 
165). Instead, China simply denies the 
refugee status of North Korean migrants 
by claiming they have illegally entered 
China for economic reasons. Further, 
sheltering North Korean refugees can 
result in imprisonment in China, even for 
non-Chinese citizens (Ra 2015: 45). 
At the core of this reaction, according 
to Chinese officials, lies the 1961 Sino-
Korean treaty, which obliges China to 
return all North Korean nationals who 
entered China without a valid travel ID 
(Chan and Schloenhardt 2007: 224). 
The 1998 China-North Korea Bilateral 
Agreement on Mutual Cooperation for 
the Maintenance of State Safety and 
Social Order additionally creates an 
obligation on China to repatriate North 
Korean defectors (Ra 2015: 44). Despite 
scholars finding these agreements 
in violation of international treaties 
signed by China, such as the Refugee 
Convention or the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, China disregards 
these claims by classifying the border 
crossers as economic migrants, rather 
than refugees in need of protection (Ra 
2015: 44; Chan and Schloenhardt 2007: 
224). In their eyes, this means they 
would not be in breach of the principle 
of non-refoulement enshrined in article 
33(1) of the Refugee Convention, which 
prohibits the return of a refugee to where 
his life or freedom would be threatened 
on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion (Chan 
and Schloenhardt 2007: 234-235). 
It is worth noting, however, that China 
in fact would be under an obligation not 
to repatriate North Koreans migrants 
arriving in China, regardless of whether 
In order to strengthen the prison and 
social class systems, North Korea also 
adopted stricter border control in the 
early 2000s. This included instructions 
for border guards to shoot attempted 
border crossers on sight (Human Rights 
Watch 2013; Kim 2015: 127). However, 
the tightening of border control does 
not just pertain to North Korea. China 
has also pledged stricter controls and 
supports this by imposing repatriations. 
In addition, for decades, North 
Korea has also been an outlier within 
the international community, despite 
continued efforts to establish political 
ties to several countries. Under Kim Il-
Sung, North Korea’s supreme leader 
until 1994, an ideology termed ‘Juche’ 
was formed. This can be understood 
as an ideology of self-reliance and a 
person being master of its own destiny 
and that North Korea should be the 
centre of interest and be the driver of 
its own progress. This ideology is one 
of the reasons of the present political 
and economic isolation of North Korea 
(Amnesty International 2004: 2). The 
early 1990s also saw a decline in trade 
with China over the normalisation of 
Sino-South Korean relations. Whilst 
the North Korean government may 
have been able to cope with these 
two conditions on their own, the fall 
of the Soviet Union in 1991 made this 
impossible, as it meant losing 40% of 
its imports (Cho 2013: 196). The social 
classification, applications of torture 
techniques paired with isolation to the 
international community due to policies 
such as ‘Juche’ play a cumulative role 
in this debate. Although some factors 
certainly have a larger impact on this 
situation, they all contribute a part in the 
development of North Koreans crossing 
into China. 
China’s neglect to offer protection to 
North Koreans
The massive arrival of North Koreans in 
China sparked the question of who can 
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UNHCR proposed a special humanitarian 
status for North Korean refugees, 
allowing them to obtain temporary 
documentation for the protection from 
forced return (Ra 2015: 58). This led 
to a 17% increase in the granting of 
work visas to North Koreans in 2013, 
totalling 93,000 (Ibid: 59). To avoid 
criticism, China has granted North 
Korean refugees who successfully 
entered a diplomatic compound the 
right to leave to a third country. This 
is done to avoid repatriation and 
therefore creates the ability of a smooth 
transition into the final destination for 
the refugees in question (Chan and 
Schloenhardt 2007, 237).2 Despite this, 
China simultaneously tightened the 
security around these compounds and 
demanded embassies to hand over 
North Koreans to Chinese authorities. 
This seems to violate the principle of non-
refoulement, as diplomatic compounds 
have a responsibility not to return them 
(Ibid: 238). A possible way to address the 
concerns regarding the classification of 
refugees and who to protect, would be 
to fall back on the implementation of 
an individualised assessment system, as 
prescribed by UNHCR. Yet, to understand 
fully why China has been avoiding such 
a system to date in the case of North 
Koreans fleeing into China, its underlying 
motives should be considered.
The geopolitical context and China’s 
underlying motivations
North Korea acts as a geographical 
buffer zone between China and U.S. 
troops located in South Korea. This 
suggests that in any action China 
takes, it seeks to neither create a pull 
factor to encourage a greater influx of 
North Korean refugees, nor to provoke 
an ally or destabilise the North Korea 
2 The final destination for a vast majority of North 
Koreans is South Korea. Partially, this is because 
of article 3 of the South Korean Constitution, 
granting any North Korean national South 
Korean citizenship.
they qualify for refugee status, given 
widespread evidence that North Korea 
makes use of torture techniques to 
interrogate defectors, and that those 
repatriated face harsh conditions 
including execution. This is because 
unlike North Korea, China is a signatory 
to the Convention Against Torture (CAT), 
which it ratified in 1988. Article 3 of the 
CAT, prohibits parties from returning, 
extraditing, or refouling any person 
to a state ‘where there are substantial 
grounds for believing that he would 
be in danger of being subjected to 
torture’. China’s extradition law of 2000 
further prohibits extradition of persons 
who have or will probably be subjected 
to torture or other cruel, inhuman, or 
humiliating treatment or punishment 
(Cho 2013: 212). Nonetheless, China 
knowingly conducts a procedure of 
automatic repatriation, citing bilateral 
treaties and political relationships with 
North Korea. 
The Chinese viewpoint is supported 
by the ‘last in time’ law, which states 
that the treaty which was signed last 
should supersede others and can be 
seen as shielding China and the North 
Korean action in this instance (Cho 
2013: 219-220). Consequently, the 
law is often regarded as undermining 
the implementation of the Refugee 
Convention and other instruments, as 
governments could simply re-negotiate 
treaty commitments by enacting new 
legislation. The ‘last in time’ law requires 
that all existing parties need to be a part 
of both treaties in question for one to 
override the other. While Article 27 of 
the Vienna Convention on the law of 
treaties and institutions such as UNHCR 
view international agreements to outrank 
bilateral ones, the Chinese government 
seems to disagree (UN 1969: 339; 
Margesson, Chanlett-Avery, Bruno 2007: 
3). As a result, North Koreans are still 
automatically repatriated by Chinese 
authorities, despite being bound by the 
Refugee Convention and other relevant 
instruments. 
To assist in resolving this situation, 
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be resolved on its own. 
However, if China is assured that 
complying with international treaties 
and responsibilities does not threaten 
the existence of North Korea, a solution 
could possibly be negotiated on more 
realistic terms. Currently, an issue 
that prevents reaching a solution with 
positive outcome for North Koreans 
is the Chinese blanket statement that 
all North Korean refugees are in fact 
economic migrants. Not only does this 
seem to violate China’s obligations under 
international law, but it also fails to take 
into account the need for individualised 
assessments to be conducted when 
evaluating the asylum claims of North 
Koreans. Such assessments would need 
to be conducted in a way where they 
conform to international instruments, 
yet would not damage existing bilateral 
agreements, making them a realistic 
and worthwhile consideration. To 
then adequately make the separation 
between who is an economic migrant 
and a refugee, a case-by-case 
assessment needs to be implemented. 
This would allow China to comply with 
the 1951 Refugee Convention and other 
obligations under the CAT. 
Despite analysing the situation facing 
North Korean migrants and refugees 
from a multi-layered perspective, 
future research on this topic could aim 
to explore the role of the international 
community in greater detail, including 
its roles and responsibilities in terms of 
accessing information. This is especially 
important as NGOs themselves 
continue to find themselves with limited 
access to information in and about 
North Korea. Moreover, as it was not 
possible to conduct interviews for this 
study, this article does not capture how 
North Korean refugees feel about the 
procedures put in place. Further studies 
on the topic should therefore aim to 
integrate their voices into the analysis.
The economic situation in North 
Korea is not likely to improve soon, and 
equally starvation may continue to drive 
citizens abroad in search for food. It is 
(Margesson, Chanlett-Avery, Bruno 
2007: 12). Therefore, in order for China 
to reconsider its strategy of forced 
repatriation, it must be reassured first 
that actions such as granting UNHCR 
access will not lead to an exodus from 
North Korea into China, or a collapse of 
the North Korean regime entirely. As this 
is a big threat China faces, it must be 
addressed in order to reach an outcome 
for this case (Chan and Schloenhardt 
2007: 239-240). A suggestion towards 
such reassurance would be to allow 
China to draft such agreements with 
UNHCR, settling for a compromise until 
another solution is found. 
The survival of North Korea is seen as 
a core factor for China because a fall of 
the regime could potentially be a catalyst 
for a new Korean war, or cause an even 
larger, unwanted influx of North Korean 
refugees into China (Cho 2013: 202). 
Although this means that the Chinese-
North Korean alliance is relatively one 
sided, these sacrifices go hand in hand 
with China’s position in the East Asian 
region to become a superpower. A 
North Korean dismantling would be 
negative for such endeavours and is 
therefore not wanted by the Chinese 
government. This, although not justifying 
the breach of international law, does go 
far in explaining the Chinese stance and 
sheds lights on the motivation behind 
procedures such as forced repatriation 
of North Korean refugees. 
Conclusion
The case of North Korean migration 
in China explored in the present article 
presents layers of complexity relating 
to legal frameworks on a national and 
international level. Further complications 
are added by the actions taken based 
on international agreements signed. 
Both China and North Korea are to 
blame for this. The study indicates that a 
true solution is not in sight, and that the 
access to protection for North Koreans 
fleeing into China is not an issue that will 
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Beyond the ‘Women-and-Children’ Bias 
in Human Trafficking: A Study of Haitian 
Migrants in the Dominican Republic 
Jean-pierre MurraY 
The anti-trafficking agenda has faced at least two main criticisms – it privileges criminal justice over 
human rights and it focuses excessively on sexual exploitation and prostitution. Human trafficking 
has historically been linked with sexual exploitation of women and children, and despite attempts to 
broaden the scope, these associations have persisted. Scholars have called for new ways of framing 
trafficking which can effectively capture the complexities of this phenomenon and adequately represent 
the affected populations. This paper argues that an excessive focus on ‘women-and-children’ victims 
precludes an examination of a wider cross-section of vulnerable populations. Using the case of Haitians 
in the Dominican Republic, it proposes that a human security perspective that explores intersectional 
identities is best suited for studying human trafficking as it more closely examines the different factors 
which render people vulnerable to trafficking.
Introduction
A comprehensive study on human 
trafficking in the Dominican Republic, 
released in early 2019, detailed a 
dark reality of internal trafficking of 
women, children, and adolescents 
(OBMICA 2019). Similar assertions had 
been made in successive Trafficking 
in Persons (TIP) Reports which also 
flagged neighbouring Haiti as a human 
trafficking hotspot (United States 
Department of State 2016; 2017; 2018). 
These reports focus heavily on the 
vulnerabilities of women and children, 
primarily for sexual exploitation. Both 
Haiti and the Dominican Republic are 
source, transit, and destination countries 
(United States Department of State 
2016). Despite highlighting forms of 
forced labour among women, children, 
and adolescents, OBMICA’s (2019) study 
does not reflect more extensive forms of 
forced labour in the Dominican Republic. 
Similarly, the TIP Reports flagged other 
forms of forced labour practices but fell 
short of suggesting policies that could 
address them. What becomes apparent 
from these reports is that women and 
children are not the only victims, and that 
exploitation involved in human trafficking 
extends beyond sexual ends. All these 
have implications on how trafficking is 
conceptualised, who is considered a 
victim, what constitutes trafficking, and 
ultimately, how policymakers respond to 
the problem.  
Human trafficking research suffers from 
a scarcity of reliable data, compounded 
by the absence of a commonly accepted 
and widely applied definition of the 
phenomenon (Savona and Stefanizzi 
2007). Whereas the Palermo Protocol 
defines human trafficking,1 the 
interpretation and application of said 
definition varies widely. The problems of 
data and definition have implications for 
both scholarship and policy relating to 
human trafficking.  For example, in the 
Latin America and Caribbean region, 
sex trafficking is highlighted as the most 
prominent form of human trafficking, 
and women and children are identified 
as the most common victims (Langberg 
2005; Seelke 2011). However, this may 
be owing to an inherent bias in methods 
1 The Palermo Protocol defines trafficking from 
three main angles: the actions, the means and 
the purpose. Actions range from recruitment 
and transportation, to receiving or harbouring 
persons; means could be fraud, deception, 
coercion, abuse of power, among others; and 
the purpose as exploitation which may be for 
prostitution, sexual exploitation, forced labour 
and other similar forms.
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(Martinez 1999; Wooding and Moseley-
Williams 2004; Cloud 2009; Kristensen 
and Wooding 2013). Petrozziello and 
Wooding (2011) demonstrate how 
these intersectional identities of poor, 
black, Haitian women increase their 
vulnerability to human trafficking into 
and within the Dominican Republic. 
This perspective, however, falls short 
of addressing the ways in which Haitian 
migrants in general are vulnerable to 
trafficking because of the intersection 
of race and class, along with the 
excessive focus on women and children 
in human trafficking. Consequently, anti-
trafficking policies and scholarly work 
risk ignoring such migrants. This paper 
aims to inform anti-trafficking policies 
that protect the most vulnerable and 
marginalised populations, as well as 
contribute to a literature of human 
trafficking that captures the breadth of 
the phenomenon and its victims. 
  
Human trafficking: Between criminal 
justice and human rights 
Human trafficking has predominantly 
been considered as an issue that affects 
women since the early 20th century 
(Chuang 1998; Bruch 2004; Gallagher 
2010). The primary focus has been on 
forms of sexual exploitation, especially 
prostitution – which will be referred 
to as ‘sexualisation’ in this paper. The 
most widely accepted definition of 
human trafficking has been codified in 
the UN General Assembly Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking 
in Persons, especially Women and 
Children (emphasis added), hereafter 
the Palermo Protocol (2000). This 
enshrined trafficking as a criminal 
activity by placing it under the purview 
of the United Nations Convention on 
Transnational Organized Crime (Bruch 
2004; Gómez-Mera 2016). 
One strand in the antitrafficking 
literature calls for a human rights 
approach to human trafficking, over 
one of criminal justice (Chuang 1998; 
of identification, or in the perceptions 
which are held of possible forms and 
victims of trafficking (Meshkovska et al. 
2015). Furthermore, states such as the 
Dominican Republic with a pre-existing 
challenge of undocumented migration 
may place greater emphasis on 
smuggling, which is a criminal offense 
both for the smuggler and the smuggled 
than on trafficking, which is a criminal 
offense for the trafficker and not for the 
victim (Tejeda and Wooding 2012).     
This paper responds to the need for 
an analytical frame in human trafficking 
literature that can encompass the 
diversity of trafficking’s implications 
and victims. It draws on insights from 
gender and human security, and in 
particular intersectionality as a possible 
response to the call for an analytical 
frame that focuses on disempowered 
people – not just women and children 
– as being vulnerable to exploitative 
means, processes, and ends – therefore 
to trafficking. The study uses primary 
and secondary sources including 
global, regional, and national reports 
to assess the case of trafficking of 
Haitians in the Dominican Republic. 
It uses an analytical approach which 
centres the intersectionality of 
trafficking vulnerability to argue that the 
predominant focus on sex trafficking 
and the inherent bias towards women 
and children as victims overlooks other 
forms of exploitation, affecting a wider 
cross-section of Haitian migrants.
Whereas successive reports from both 
the United Nations Department of State 
(United States Department of State 
2016; 2017; 2018) and the UNODC 
(2009; 2012; 2014; 2016; 2018) have 
highlighted the significant problem 
of human trafficking in the Dominican 
Republic, this issue appears infrequently 
in scholarly literature, especially relating 
to Haitian migrants (Petrozziello and 
Wooding 2011; Wooding 2011). The 
vulnerabilities of Haitian migrants are, 
nonetheless, often discussed in ways 
that highlight how their intersectional 
identities predispose them to marginality 
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dichotomies of male perpetrator and 
female victims. The focus on women and 
children as innocent, powerless victims 
is problematic because it gives an 
erroneous delimitation of the ‘identity’ 
of victims, and by focusing on sexual 
exploitation it excludes several other 
forms of trafficking and other potential 
victims ((Ferree 2013; Meshkovska et 
al 2015). As governments apply policy 
responses, more restrictive immigration 
policies may unduly target women, and 
even voluntary migrant women may 
end up being conflated with victims of 
trafficking (Chew 1999). 
Parallel to the human rights approach 
is the commonly held view linking 
labour rights considerations to human 
trafficking. Human rights approaches 
need to focus more on forced labour 
practices and exploitative processes 
which impede the enjoyment of 
fundamental human rights (Hathaway 
2008; Obokata 2010; Brysk 2012). 
This perspective focuses both on the 
exploitative ends of trafficking and the 
processes which induce them. There 
is a demand for exploitable labour, 
sustained by structural flaws within 
exploitative labour markets that make 
workers vulnerable, for example through 
disproportionate dependence on their 
employers (Williams 2008; Pope 2010; 
Shamir 2012; OBrien 2016). Exploited 
migrant workers may find themselves 
with no options for seeking justice 
without themselves being prosecuted 
(Bravo 2009; Pope 2010; Chuang 2014). 
Clearly, there is a need for greater 
understanding of the vulnerabilities 
to which different populations are 
exposed, the causal mechanisms of 
these vulnerabilities, and the kinds of 
trafficking to which these populations 
become victim. While the Palermo 
Protocol has presented a broad 
definition of trafficking, the ways in 
which this definition is interpreted both 
in scholarship and in practice continue to 
exclude various forms of trafficking and 
to discredit some victims. Bruch’s (2004) 
call for new models for approaching 
Gallagher 2001; 2010; Bruch 2004). The 
current antitrafficking regime includes 
legally binding provisions enabling 
states to prosecute perpetrators, without 
providing clear protections for victims 
(Bruch 2004; Gallagher 2010; Martin 
and Callaway 2011; Gómez-Mera 2016). 
The Palermo Protocol does not provide 
a mechanism for identifying victims of 
trafficking, and therefore victims may 
either be conflated with other forms of 
irregular migration or may be criminalised 
for activities they are forced to undertake 
based on their trafficked status (Hoshi 
2013; Gómez-Mera 2016; Malloch 
2016; Schloenhardt and Markey-Towler 
2016). Victims could consequently be 
prosecuted rather than protected.  
The proposed human rights 
alternative, however, is far from univocal. 
Some scholars portray the victim as being 
predominantly women, and therefore 
consider that rather than adopt a broad 
human rights approach, the focus should 
be on improving rights for women 
who are exploited by traffickers and 
then criminalised in jurisdictions where 
they are trafficked (Chew 1999; Jordan 
2002; Miko 2007; Kapur 2008; Williams 
2008). They argue that mostly women 
and children are frequently trafficked 
for sexual exploitation and prostitution. 
This link with trafficking and prostitution 
is riddled with human rights violations, 
which justifies a human rights approach 
protecting primarily vulnerable women 
and children (Miko 2007). 
Others, however, are critical of this 
approach which is considered loaded 
with moral questions concerning the 
abolition of prostitution (Chuang 1998; 
Bruch 2004; Sharma 2005; Brysk 2012). 
Gendered discourse that seeks to 
rescue women and children, largely 
ignores more widespread structural 
causes of insecurity and vulnerability, 
and therefore does not adequately 
address preventative mechanisms 
(Raigrodski 2015; Russell 2016). Here, 
‘gendered’ refers to the ways in which 
trafficking is conceived in scholarship 
and policy as primarily based on 
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fragmentations involving difference or 
intersections that offer greater clarity in 
identifying sources of vulnerability and 
insecurity. This approach casts human 
trafficking as a threat to the trafficked 
persons rather than as an affront to 
state security (Yousaf 2018; Lobasz 
2009). Consequently, it shifts the focus 
to people in situations of vulnerability 
vis-à-vis more dominant groups. 
This perspective also examines how 
stereotypes of categories of practices, 
perpetrators and victims are reproduced. 
Postmodern feminist thought – in 
particular its contributions to gender and 
intersectionality – helps contextualise 
the operationalisation of human security 
by revealing the diversity in sources and 
systems of oppression and the unique 
challenges that different people face. 
Gender operates both as a category 
and as a process (Steans 1998; Beckwith 
2005). Gender as a category refers to a 
‘multidimensional mapping of socially 
constructed, fluid, politically relevant 
identities, values, conventions, and 
practices conceived as masculine and/or 
feminine’ (Beckwith 2005: 115).  It is not 
‘a stable identity or locus of agency from 
which various acts proceed; rather, it is 
an identity tenuously constituted in time 
– an identity instituted through a stylized 
repetition of acts’ (Butler 1988: 519). As a 
process, gender refers to the differential 
effects that structures and or policies 
can have on both women and men, 
and relates to ‘behaviours, conventions, 
practices and dynamics engaged in 
by people, individuals, institutions and 
nations’ (Beckwith 2005: 132).
A postmodern feminist lens provides 
an avenue for mobilising the concept of 
gender as not just a concept of binary 
identities, but of intersectional traits that 
collectively form part of an individual’s 
(or group’s) identity. Intersectionality 
focuses on how an individual is socially 
located in intersecting and mutually 
constitutive social identities which shape 
experiences in society (Shields 2008; 
Ferree 2013). Here, the focus is on how 
such social identities serve as categories 
the study of human trafficking may well 
find an answer in a focus on gender and 
human security using intersectionality as 
an analytical framework.
A gender and human security 
approach to human trafficking 
It is necessary to consider gendered 
vulnerabilities as a category in examining 
labour migration, exploitation, 
and oppression, since women are 
overrepresented in some forms of 
trafficking. Women can face particular 
vulnerabilities during the migratory 
process such as significant levels of 
gender-based violence including 
attacks, robbery, and rape by scouts who 
collect bribes to get them across the 
border (Petrozziello and Wooding 2011; 
Wooding and Petrozziello 2013). What is 
important to note, however, is that using 
gender as the only category of analysis 
reinforces the dominant trafficking 
discourse and ignores other factors which 
render people susceptible to trafficking, 
and consequently shrouds other forms 
of exploitation that are not reflected in 
human trafficking policy and research. 
Human security as a concept and policy 
direction emphasises safeguarding 
the individual from vulnerability and 
insecurity. The concept has been 
criticised for being too broad and policy-
oriented to have much analytical utility 
(Chandler 2008a; 2008b), or for having 
too much faith in established institutions 
such as the state (Newman 2010). 
These institutions, while charged with 
tackling insecurity may also be sources 
of oppression and disempowerment. 
Human security is also universalising 
(Ferree 2013). That is, while claiming 
to shift the focus to the individual, 
human security presents problems and 
solutions based on broad categories 
rather than focusing on specific realities 
of different populations. A gender 
and human security perspective could 
mitigate against this universalism since 
a gender analysis highlights important 
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of the citizen because of its race, class, 
and even gender (Russell 2016). 
 
Haitian migrants, exploitation, and 
human trafficking in the Dominican 
Republic
There has been a long history of 
migration from Haiti to the Dominican 
Republic across the porous shared 
border, and through more formal labour 
migration initiatives for sugar plantations 
(Vásquez Frías 2013; Martinez 1999). 
Consequently, there is a community of 
Dominico-Haitians who have remained 
on the fringes of the society because 
of their social status, their inability to 
advance due to discriminatory policies 
of nationality and naturalisation, and as 
descendants of Haitian migrants, they 
are considered inferior to the ‘Hispanic’ 
Dominican population (Wooding and 
Moseley-Williams 2004). There are 
between 340 000 (OBMICA 2018) and 
500 000 (ONE 2013) Haitian immigrants 
living in the Dominican Republic, 
representing over 80 percent of the 
total immigrant population. They work 
informally primarily in agriculture and 
construction. Most are undocumented 
migrants who crossed the border to take 
up jobs in these sectors where there is 
high demand. However, there is an 
enduring paradox which accompanies 
this clandestine but functional 
labour migration. These migrants are 
indispensable to the economy, yet they 
are considered a threat to cultural and 
national identities (Ferguson 2003; 
Wooding and Moseley-Williams 2004). 
 
Although there have been reports of 
human trafficking among these migrants, 
the Dominican Republic does not 
systematically collect and classify such 
data (IOM and INM RD 2017). One of 
the earliest studies highlighted a critical 
absence of reliable data on trafficking, 
while noting that the Dominican Republic 
was already considered a leading 
source country in Latin America and 
of discredit, disempowerment, and 
vulnerability and result in a compounded 
marginalisation which is much greater 
than the sum of its parts (Crenshaw 
1989). That is, some populations may be 
multiply marginalised especially where 
categories such as race and class intersect 
with gender. The intersectional identity of 
a poor, black woman, for example, places 
her closer to the margins of society and 
renders her more vulnerable to various 
forms of discrimination, domination, 
and exploitation (Crenshaw 1991; 
Lobasz 2012). Ultimately, the sources of 
injustice that a gender analysis allows 
us to examine are disempowering and 
oppressive systems which could affect 
both men and women and which may be 
perpetuated by men and women alike 
(Peoples and Vaughan 2014; Nash 2008).
A key concept in this body of literature 
is that of embodiment – the idea that 
constructed identities such as gender are 
internalised, performed, and corporally 
materialised. Social values are ascribed 
to genetic and phenotypical differences 
playing out in a social hierarchy 
regulated by power and dominance. In 
this context, some bodies carry greater 
value than others. These bodies may 
differ along gender lines, racial lines, 
class lines or an intersection of these 
categories, and are valued based on 
how well they conform to or transgress 
ideal types in a given social context 
(Butler 1993; Grosz 1994; Gatens 
1996; Alcoff 2006). Assumptions about 
different bodies serve as demarcations 
between full and lesser citizens and thus 
determine whether the state will treat 
them with all the attendant protections 
and benefits or regulate them in less 
desirable ways if they are non-citizens 
(Bacchi and Beasley 2002). This concept 
clarifies the ways in which intersectional, 
corporeal identities qualify and 
disqualify members of a social space 
and how multiple marginalities render 
some populations more vulnerable to 
trafficking than others. The migrant body 
or the trafficked body is more vulnerable 
to the extent that it does not fit the norm 
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The Dominican government has, 
however, pursued an antitrafficking 
agenda. In 2003 the government 
passed the Law on Illicit Smuggling of 
Migrants and Trafficking of Persons. This 
law provides no gender delimitations 
in defining trafficking and in theory 
covers a broad cross-section of forms 
the Caribbean, and among the top ten 
countries globally (IOM 2006). Haitians, 
Dominicans, Colombians, Venezuelans, 
Peruvians, and Chinese were among the 
most common victims of trafficking who 
were primarily women and children (girls 
and boys). Table 1 below summarises 
the different categories of labour in 
which victims of trafficking were found.
Categories of Labour
Dominican Republic as a country of:
Origin Transit Destination
Agriculture (M) * *
Construction (M) * *
Vendors (M, W) * *
Forced Prostitution (W) * * *
Commercial Sexual 
Exploitation (M, W) * *
Sex Tourism (M, W) * *
Domestic Servitude (W) * *
Bride Trafficking (W) *
Illegal Adoption (M, W) *
Table 1.  Human Trafficking in the Dominican Republic 2001 - 2005. (Adapted from 
IOM 2006) 
Key: M – Men; W – Women  
of trafficking and victims.2 Furthermore, 
the government has outfitted an 
institutional infrastructure to tackle this 
issue: the Interinstitutional Commission 
Against Trafficking in Persons and Illicit 
Migrant Smuggling (CITIM) created in 
2007, the Interinstitutional Committee 
on the Protection of Migrant Women 
(CIPROM), the National Migration 
Institute (INM RD), and the Office of 
2 Definition of trafficking in the 2003 law: ‘the 
capture, transportation, transfer or reception of 
people, using threat, force coercion, abduction, 
fraud, deception, abuse of power or situation of 
vulnerability or granting or receiving payments 
to obtain the consent of a person who has 
authority over another, for the purposes of sexual 
exploitation, pornography, debt bondage, forced 
labour or service, irregular adoption, slavery and/or 
analogous practices, or the extraction of organs.’
the Special Prosecutor for Trafficking in 
Persons and Illicit Migrant Smuggling. 
There is also a fund for the assistance 
and protection of victims of trafficking 
which assists with travel costs, food, 
medication, and other related expenses 
(Tejeda and Wooding 2012). 
In addition, the government launched 
an overarching, multi-year National 
Plan Against Human Smuggling and 
Illicit Trafficking of Migrants which was 
initially scheduled to run from 2009 to 
2014 and was relaunched in 2017 to run 
until 2020. This plan outlined three key 
focuses. Firstly, there was a human rights 
approach which established preservation 
and protection of the human rights of 
victims as the main objective of anti-
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Class and vulnerability 
Social inequalities including distribution 
of income, assets, employment, 
education, and health care, are key 
determinants of vulnerability, and 
therefore major contributing factors 
to human trafficking (Perry and 
McEwing, 2013; Barner, Okech and 
Camp, 2014). Most victims of human 
trafficking in the Dominican Republic 
are from marginalised socio-economic 
backgrounds, with very little education 
and other resources (IOM and INM RD 
2017). This position of socio-economic 
disempowerment makes them 
vulnerable to the different recruitment 
tactics employed by traffickers.  Whereas 
intra-Caribbean migration is generally 
female dominated and usually comprises 
more highly educated people than the 
recipient population, Haitian migrants 
tend to be lesser educated males 
(IOM 2017). Poverty, unemployment, 
and illiteracy are push factors for 
these frequently irregular migrants 
(Wooding and Moseley-Williams 2004; 
Seelke 2011). Generally, people from 
impoverished regions on the periphery 
of development move to areas of 
marginally improved living standards 
(Martinez 1996). Irregular migrants end 
up in especially vulnerable positions 
and are consequently susceptible to 
protracted human rights violations, and 
this is especially true for Haitians in the 
Dominican Republic (Ferguson 2003; 
IOM 2017). Social class, then, is one 
aspect of intersectional, marginalising 
identities which contributes to structural 
causes of trafficking.     
Migration is not just a pursuit of a 
better life; it is often an escape from 
the challenges faced at home. People 
of lower social classes are exposed 
to various kinds of vulnerabilities 
within their own societies. Economic, 
trafficking efforts. Secondly, there was 
a focus on gender which acknowledged 
that the causes and consequences of 
trafficking were different for men and 
women, and that women were more 
vulnerable because of social, cultural, 
and economic exclusion. Thus, the 
National Plan included gender indicators 
and affirmative action measures in favour 
of women. Finally, there was a focus on 
age which recognised that children and 
adolescents had specific vulnerabilities, 
special rights, and needs. The National 
Plan would be implemented according to 
the three P’s – prevention, prosecution, 
and protection (CITIM 2010). 
Analysts have criticized this policy for 
targeting migrant smuggling more so 
than human trafficking, however. Where 
it did address human trafficking, efforts 
were more geared towards stemming 
the trafficking of women – particularly 
Dominican women – outside the country. 
Thus, other vulnerable populations such 
as Haitian women or Haitian migrants 
more generally were not paid any specific 
attention during the implementation of 
this antitrafficking initiative (Petrozziello 
and Wooding 2011; Tejeda and Wooding 
2012). While the government framed it as 
a human rights issue and considered the 
differential ways in which gender influenced 
vulnerability to human trafficking, the 
absence of an intersectional perspective 
resulted in a binary interpretation of 
gender and human trafficking. This 
interpretation fed into predetermined 
assumptions that victims were more than 
likely women and perpetrators were more 
than likely men. Even with this ‘women-
and-children’ bias, policy makers may still 
have ignored vulnerable Haitian migrant 
women. An intersectionality framework of 
analysis may therefore be more helpful in 
revealing the vulnerabilities of this group 
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2013; 2018). In addition to social 
marginalisation, these migrants have 
limited access to vital services. They 
are often met with political and social 
hostility, and several barriers to accessing 
health care, education, and the justice 
system. Over 43 percent of Haitian 
migrants have only a primary education, 
while 35 percent have less than primary 
level education. This is in stark contrast 
to other migrants in the Dominican 
Republic, most of whom (82 percent) 
have tertiary level education (OECD 
and ILO 2018). These socio-economic 
conditions predispose Haitian migrants, 
more so than others, to working in the 
informal sector doing so-called 3D jobs 
– dirty, dangerous and demeaning/
difficult. They work primarily in 
agriculture, construction, and domestic 
services – areas in which they have been 
particularly prone to exploitation with 
very little opportunities for recourse 
if abused (ONE 2013; Wooding and 
Petrozziello 2013; OECD and ILO 2018). 
This coupled with considerations of 
the intersection of race, nationality and 
citizenship (which will be discussed 
below), renders these migrants multiply 
marginalised, and therefore places them 
in situations of extreme insecurity and 
vulnerability.  
Race, citizenship, and the vulnerable 
migrant
The racialised relationship between 
Haitian migrants and their Dominican 
hosts reflect patterns of ‘otherness’ 
based on social construction of in-
groups and out-groups underpinned by 
assumed homogenous racial or ethnic 
social identities. Migrants are presented 
by the media, political actors, and 
other powerful stakeholders as ‘suspect 
communities’ who do not belong to 
political, and environmental crises have 
differential impacts on the society and 
often force the most socially vulnerable, 
the poor with little opportunities to cope, 
to migrate. Underdevelopment plagues 
Haiti which suffers from chronic food 
insecurity in a context of considerable 
rural poverty and extreme polarisation 
between the rich minority and the 
poor majority. This economic situation 
is compounded by persistent political 
instability. Furthermore, the successive, 
catastrophic natural disasters sealed the 
fate of many Haitians, forcing them to 
seek temporary or permanent solutions 
across the shared border (Felima 2009; 
Lundahl 2013). In addition to these 
push factors, there is also a demand for 
cheap, migrant labour in the Dominican 
Republic, which has been experiencing 
sustained economic growth and 
development (OBMICA 2016; 2017; 
2018; OECD and ILO; 2018).
Impoverished Haitians, however, lack 
the necessary resources to cover the 
costs of migration and are therefore more 
readily exploitable by unscrupulous 
go-betweens. Lacking resources often 
means taking unofficial or illegal 
channels for migration and relying on 
these middlemen to secure passage and 
employment (Cloud 2009; Petrozziello 
and Wooding 2011; Wooding and 
Petrozziello 2013). Their social status 
predisposes them to working in the 
informal sector, providing unskilled 
labour for low wages. They are often 
indebted to employers or smugglers 
who then hold this as a kind of Damocles 
sword above them. This exploitable 
informal labour, therefore, reinforces 
their social status by locking them into 
a system with very little opportunity for 
upward mobility. 
Haitian migrants, therefore, live in 
precarious conditions characterised 
by poverty and deprivation (ONE, 
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indio4 although phenotypically they may 
be considered negro5 (Gates 2011; Lamb 
and Dundes 2017; Torres-Saillant 1998). 
The resulting racialised, anti-Haitian 
sentiment contributes to marginality 
and vulnerability.  
In turn, the state has perpetuated 
this racialized divide with policies 
such as those undertaken by former 
dictator, Trujillo, who sought to whiten 
or “hispanify” the Dominican Republic 
(Howard 2001; Ferguson 2003; Ricourt 
2016). Such discrimination continues 
to be a major challenge for Haitian 
immigrants, with institutionalised 
forms of othering through policies on 
nationality and citizenship. Dominicans 
of Haitian descent have struggled 
to prove their citizenship not only 
because of discriminatory practices of 
state officials but also because their 
ambiguous status in the country, as 
well as their social circumstances act 
as barriers to accessing the proper 
documentation (Ferguson 2003; 
OBMICA 2016; 2017; 2018). People 
in these conditions are vulnerable to 
abuse and exploitation because they 
do not have access to formal systems 
such as education, justice, health and 
the formal job market. They are more 
likely to be arrested and deported, 
or to end up working in exploitative 
conditions (Cloud 2009; Kristensen and 
Wooding 2013). 
Gendered conceptualisations of 
human trafficking do not effectively 
capture how the interplay of race 
and citizenship create vulnerabilities 
for migrants. Migrant bodies are 
exploitable because they fall outside 
of the ideal of the ‘embodied citizen’. 
If class, race, and access to citizenship are 
structural contributors to human trafficking, 
4 Indian (indigenous)
5 Black
the host society (Breen-Smyth 2014; 
Anderson 2006). Discernible markers 
of difference such as race or religious 
practices function as symbolic barriers 
between the immigrants and the host 
societies and contribute to migrant 
marginalisation (Zolberg and Woon 1999; 
Lucassen 2005; Anderson 2013; Erel et al. 
2016; Ibrahim and Howarth 2016).  When 
race and ethnicity are superimposed on 
citizenship such that the racial category 
influences the legal category, the result 
is a racialized demarcation between 
citizen and non-citizen (Calavita 2005; 
Guild 2009; Chavez 2013; Erel et al. 
2016). These symbolic boundaries then 
contribute to essentialist stereotypes 
about the non-citizen ‘others’ who are 
denied the legal right to belong (Bail 
2008; Bridget Anderson 2013; Guild 
2009; Pugh 2017; Hainmueller and 
Hopkins 2015; Calavita 2005).
Dominican identity has historically 
been constructed around an Indo-
Hispanic identity which is in opposition 
to a black Afro-descendant identity 
ascribed to Haitian neighbours (Martinez 
1999; Craemer and Martínez 2016; 
Candalario 2007; Simmons 2009). The 
resultant antihaitianismo3 is a kind of 
othering whereby Haitians embody 
Dominicans’ cultural contrast and 
ultimately pose a threat to their colonial 
heritage and culture (Martinez 1999; 
Guilamo 2013). Racial tensions affect 
not only Dominicans with Haitian 
ancestry but also Dominicans with 
darker skin who do not fit the ‘Hispanic’ 
ideal (Martinez 1999; Ferguson 2003; 
Wooding and Moseley-Williams 2004; 
Cloud 2009; Nolan 2015). Despite 
miscegenation in the Dominican 
Republic with more African than Indian 
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trafficked relationship. Therefore, rather 
than focusing on a broader set of extreme 
forms of exploitation, policymakers place 
emphasis on women and children who are 
trafficked for commercial sex or adoption 
(Wooding and Moseley-Williams 2004; 
Seelke 2011). Herein lies the cognitive 
bias which Meshkova et al. (2015) suggest 
exists in antitrafficking policies. 
The persistent focus on women and 
children victims in Western countries 
is consistent with the interpretation of 
human trafficking as largely being for the 
purposes of sexual exploitation or more 
specifically, prostitution. It is, therefore, 
informed by moralizing, anti-prostitution 
sentiments in western Judeo-Christian 
cultures, as well as among lobby groups 
which frame prostitution as inherently 
exploitative (Sharma 2005; Gallagher 
2010). Add to this the fact that the 
intersection of race, gender, and class 
cause some female bodies – women 
of colour – to be more likely victims of 
trafficking (Butler 2015). These ‘outsiders’ 
or multiply marginalised groups do not 
‘embody’ the ideal citizen but rather by 
their very identity and the activity which 
they pursue – prostitution in this case 
– they contravene certain sociocultural 
norms (Russell 2016). This legitimises 
the exploitation of these populations, 
for example Haitian women, who find 
themselves in a social hierarchy of 
inferiority and vulnerability ‘as women 
(not men), Haitian (not Dominican), 
dark-skinned Afro-descendants (instead 
of “Indian” mulattos), poor (not rich 
or middle-class), and undocumented’ 
(Petrozziello and Wooding 2011:43). 
This creates a binary that opposes 
the ‘women-and-children’ victim to the 
male perpetrator. Russell (2016:319) 
talks about an ‘essentialized version of 
identity – victim of trafficking’, which has 
a dual role of enabling and disabling. This 
identity creates boundaries, opening 
and if these factors are indeed causing 
the marginality of Haitian migrants then 
one would expect Haitians – not just 
Haitian women – to figure prominently in 
any trafficking data from the Dominican 
Republic. Similarly, one could expect 
that specific anti-trafficking measures 
would target this population. In the 
following section we will examine how 
an intersectional perspective highlights 
fissures in traditional ‘women-and-children’ 
assumptions about human trafficking.  
Intersectionality and the gendered 
trafficker-trafficked dichotomy  
‘Discourse about trafficking continues to 
rest on moral indignation about violations 
of womanhood, and support migration-
management policies and tighter border 
controls – greater policing of migrant and 
third world populations’ (Kempadoo 2007: 
82). Persistent machismo – the strong 
patriarchal social system in Latin American 
societies – is a major driver for trafficking 
because it perpetuates discrimination 
against women and children (Wooding 
and Moseley-Williams 2004; Seelke 
2011; OBMICA 2016). These strong 
gender prejudices are indeed factors of 
vulnerabilities for women and children as 
they result in entrenched forms of social, 
cultural, economic, and political exclusions 
(IOM 2006; Belliard 2008; Petrozziello 
and Wooding 2011; UNFPA 2012; 
IOM and INM RD 2017). Subjugation, 
exclusion, and the structural as well 
as somatic violence of this patriarchal 
system tacitly legitimate the idea that 
power imbalances between men and 
women in such a system make the latter 
exploitable. These gendered assumptions 
in turn shape the discourse around human 
trafficking in general, as it is assumed 
that the male-female power dynamics 
map onto a corresponding trafficker-
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movement from places of economic blight 
to more prosperous countries (UNODC 
2014; 2016).
As demonstrated in Table 2 below, 
published results of anti-trafficking 
efforts over the last three years in the 
Dominican Republic reveal that only 
women and children were identified 
as victims of trafficking and were given 
assistance by the state. If forced labour is 
recognized as a form of human trafficking 
and exists in male-dominated industries 
such as agriculture and construction; and 
if there has been a steady increase in the 
cases of trafficked men globally and in 
the Latin America and Caribbean region, 
then one could ask: ‘where are the men 
in this data?’ Unless the Dominican 
Republic is singular in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, the regional trend 
suggests that at least some adult male 
victims of trafficking should be captured 
in this data. 
The male-dominated construction 
industry in the Dominican Republic, 
where over 80 percent of the labourers 
are Haitians, is prone to extreme forms 
of exploitation. A 2012 study highlighted 
four broad types of exploitative practices 
(OBMICA 2012). Firstly, there was unfree 
recruitment whereby employers used 
deceptive recruitment practices and 
confiscate the documents of the workers. 
Secondly, without documents, laborers 
were tied to their employers, not being 
able to seek work elsewhere or prove 
their immigration status to authorities. 
Furthermore, they were forced to stay 
longer than had been agreed without 
getting the wages that were due. Thirdly, 
they were assigned the most hazardous 
jobs without any form of protection. 
Labourers were often threatened with 
dismissal, deportation, or even death. 
Finally, migrant construction workers 
were in conditions of life and work under 
duress: forced overtime beyond legal 
possibilities for protection on the one 
hand and on the other hand closing 
doors to agency. Victimhood comes with 
an image of helplessness and a need to 
be rescued (Russell 2016). The state is 
expected to provide protection for this 
victim based on obligations outlined in 
the Palermo Protocol as well as national 
legislation. Being categorised as a victim 
is, therefore, essential to accessing the 
protection mechanisms of the state. 
In this context, gendered stereotypes 
around trafficking become disqualifiers 
for some groups of trafficked persons. 
It is less likely that a man would be 
considered as a trafficked person, for 
example, because he doesn’t fit the 
ideal identity of the victim. 
Here, the UNODC’s Global Report 
on Trafficking published since 2009 is a 
useful complement to data presented 
in more recent government reports. 
Between 2003 (when the Dominican anti-
trafficking law was passed) and 2008, 
some 265 cases of adult female victims 
versus seven adult male victims were 
referred to the Center of Orientation 
and Integral Investigation. Furthermore, 
254 of these cases were for sexual 
exploitation while only 16 were related 
to labour exploitation, and two related 
to forced marriage (UNODC 2009). 
Both the 2014 and the 2016 reports 
highlighted a decrease in the instances 
of women being trafficked globally and 
an increase in the trafficking of children 
and men. Globally, men were averaging 
around 30 percent of victims while forced 
labour accounted for about 40 percent 
of all cases of trafficking. In fact, in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, forced labour 
accounted for more than half of detected 
cases. For the Dominican Republic, the 
reports suggested that there was still a 
heavy flow of victims of trafficking from 
Haiti especially since a characteristic of the 
flow of trafficking in the region involved 
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effect that gendered perspectives on 
trafficking have of excluding women 
from consideration as perpetrators 
themselves. As an illustration, the widely 
practiced phenomenon restaveks, which 
originated in Haiti, involves using Haitian 
children to work as indentured, unpaid 
laborers in domestic servitude under 
extreme conditions of physical, verbal, 
and sexual abuse. The children are often 
forced to work as mendicants or perform 
paid sexual favours in order to contribute 
to their indebtedness to the household 
that offers them shelter (Cloud 2009; 
Seelke 2011). However, the gendered 
trafficking discourse tends to mask the 
role that women play either as initiators, 
facilitators, or perpetrators of this 
exploitative process. To the credit of the 
Dominican Republic, their prosecution 
record, as shown in Table 3 below, 
demonstrates an acknowledgement 
that men and women alike may be 
perpetrators of trafficking. Yet this 
acknowledgement is still closely related 
to gendered and sexualised conceptions 
of human trafficking. Policymakers 
assume that women traffickers are 
often involved in trafficking of other 
women and young children for sexual 
exploitation (Ministerio de Relaciones 
Exteriores 2017; 2018; 2019; OBMICA, 
2018; Vargas, 2019). Therefore, they 
still are not considered as possible 
perpetrators of other forms of trafficking 
such as forced labour. 
Further, the three official reports from 
the Dominican government from 2016 
to 2018 neither mention Haitians broadly 
nor Haitian women more specifically 
as victims of trafficking (Ministerio de 
Relaciones Exteriores 2017; 2018; 2019). 
This is, however, in stark contrast to the 
evidence presented in other sources. The 
IOM has highlighted trafficking of Haitians 
across the shared border as an enduring 
feature of population flows between 
limits; limited freedom of movement; 
threat of physical violence; exclusion 
from future employment; threat of 
imprisonment (OBMICA 2012).
Subsequent migration reports have 
highlighted that similar conditions 
persist (OBMICA 2016; 2017; 2018). 
Intersectional identities make Haitians 
vulnerable to trafficking as an exploitable 
labour force in the construction industry. 
Yet, this predominantly male labour force 
does not appear on the antitrafficking 
radar, because men are not ‘victims of 
trafficking.’ One can consequently infer 
that the fundamental flaw lies at the 
point of problem definition – gendered 
conceptualisations of trafficking seem 
to have precluded men from being 
considered as victims of trafficking by 
the Dominican authorities. Assumptions 
about female victimhood have effectively 
excluded the possibility for there to be 
male victims. Instead there are narrow 
perceptions of forms of trafficking and 
kinds of victims, which carry through to 
anti-trafficking policy and the collection of 
trafficking data (Meshkovska et al. 2015).  
Victims Identified 
and Assisted 2016 2017 2018
Males (minors) 20 13 71
Females (minors) 63 44 0
Females (adults) 74 45 25
Males (adults) 0 0 0
Total 157 102 96
Table 2.  Human Trafficking Statistics for the 
Dominican Republic
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dominican 
Republic – Informe del Gobierno de la Republica 
Dominicana Sobre Acciones en Materia de la Trata 
de Personas y el Tráfico Ilícito de Migrantes  
The disparities presented here 
also lead us to consider the dual 
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were 52,348 cases of smuggled Haitians 
in 2017 and 134,605 in 2018 (Ministerio 
de Relaciones Exteriores 2018; 2019). The 
possibility for conflating smuggling and 
trafficking has been raised by critics who 
suggest that without a clear mechanism 
for identification, antitrafficking efforts 
have an intrinsic loophole for the 
confusion of trafficking victims with other 
forms of irregular migration or smuggling 
(Bruch 2004; Gallagher 2010; Gómez-
Mera 2016), and this has certainly been 
the case for Haitian migrants in the 
Dominican Republic (Petrozziello and 
Wooding 2011).      
This then illustrates that anti-trafficking 
policies that conceptualise trafficking 
in gendered dichotomies of male 
perpetrator and female victims are 
fundamentally flawed because they 
may still exclude multiply marginalised 
women. In this case, the state disqualifies 
poor, dark-skinned Haitian women from 
being considered as victims of trafficking, 
and therefore from accessing protection. 
The intersectional identity then plays a 
dual role of rendering the Haitian woman 
vulnerable to trafficking on the one hand 
and invisible to anti-trafficking efforts on 
the other. She is, therefore, marginalised 
by disempowering structural forces and 
subject to continued exploitation because 
she does not embody the ideal victim. 
As poor, foreign, black, Haitian, and a 
woman, she is not the embodied citizen. 
The Dominican woman, however, and 
the phenotypically and culturally similar 
Venezuelan are worthy of victimhood 
and therefore worthy of the state’s anti-
trafficking efforts. 
Ironically, it is this same heightened 
discrimination against multiply 
marginalised groups such as Haitians, 
which puts them on the radar of anti-
smuggling efforts (Petrozziello and 
Wooding 2011; Tejeda and Wooding 
2012). Since smuggling is a criminal 
the two countries because of economic, 
political, and environmental factors which 
render them particularly vulnerable (IOM 
2006; IOM and INM RD 2017). In fact, 
Petrozziello and Wooding (2011), having 
conducted extensive qualitative studies 
with Haitian women along the border, 
concluded that migrant Haitian women 
are especially vulnerable to various forms 
of exploitation including those linked to 
trafficking. This vulnerability is related 
to, among other factors, the fact that 
they work in precarious conditions in the 
informal sectors with little or no regulation 
and hardly any vigilance over working 
conditions, whether it be sex work or 
domestic labour. Yet, Haitian women do 
not appear in official trafficking data.  
The antitrafficking regime has 
historically functioned along racial lines 
focusing initially on the trafficking of 
white women (Bruch 2004). This suggests 
that some bodies were more worthy of 
victimhood.  In the Dominican Republic, 
Haitian women are entirely absent from 
official data on human trafficking. The 
trafficked victims identified in official 
reports are primarily Dominicans and 
Venezuelans, consistent with previous 
critiques of the implementation of the 
government’s antitrafficking policy – that 
is, the focus was largely on Dominicans 
while ignoring the trafficking of Haitians 
(Petrozziello and Wooding 2011).  There 
were no reported cases of trafficking of 
Haitians recorded since 2016 yet there 
Convicted 
Perpetrators 2016 2017 2018
Male 6 9 4
Female 7 6 3
Table 3.  Convictions for Human Trafficking
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dominican 
Republic – Informe del Gobierno de la Republica 
Dominicana Sobre Acciones en Materia de la Trata 
de Personas y el Tráfico Ilícito de Migrantes 
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Conclusion
This paper has argued that gendered 
framings of human trafficking offer a 
distorted view and result in ill-adapted 
antitrafficking policies, which neither 
target a representative set of forms 
of trafficking nor attend to the broad 
spectrum of potential victims. Historical 
biases in the anti-trafficking regime 
towards trafficking for sexual exploitation 
are partly to be blamed for this, and it 
certainly has not helped that the Palermo 
Protocol explicitly elevates ‘especially 
women and children’ as victims. 
Furthermore, the heavy emphasis on 
criminal justice has caused prosecuting 
the perpetrator to take precedence 
over protecting the victims. Yet, the 
flaw is not entirely on the framing of 
the human trafficking outlined in the 
Palermo Protocol. Rather, it is a question 
of narrow interpretation. Here, a gender 
and human security analysis provides 
a useful framework for considering the 
vulnerability of marginalised groups and 
the broader forms of trafficking to which 
they may be subjected.  
We have examined how intersectional 
identities and the resultant multiple 
marginalities fuel the vulnerability of 
Haitian migrants and result in multiple 
exclusions vis-à-vis the antitrafficking 
regime – exclusions that make them 
potential victims of trafficking and prevent 
them from being recognised as such. 
Haitians who do not embody the ideal 
educated, Hispanic, male Dominican 
citizen in a context where Hispanidad and 
machismo are revered, are in positions 
of insecurity and exploitability (Martinez 
1999; Seelke 2011). Yet, assumptions 
about trafficking and victimhood 
become problematic for both male and 
female victims.  Antitrafficking initiatives 
focused on women and children 
overlook men as possible victims even 
activity for both the smuggler and the 
smuggled, this label appears more fitting 
for the body of ‘the other’, the contrast 
of the ideal citizen. These bodies are not 
only exploitable but also excludable. 
The state has no obligation to provide 
protection for a smuggled migrant 
because he or she is a criminal (Gallagher 
2010), and therefore the state can use 
this as a pretext to exclude the Haitian. 
Here, the multiply marginalised person is 
not worthy of victimhood, yet the state 
imputes agency to this disempowered 
person by establishing that she chose to 
be smuggled across the border.  
It is not the intention of this paper 
to argue whether men or women are 
more frequently perpetrators or victims 
respectively. Rather it argues that 
gendered perspectives determine who is 
victim or perpetrator and that these binary 
identities shroud broader processes of 
exploitation affecting Haitian migrants 
– children and adult, women and men. 
Here, scholars of intersectionality remind 
us that marginalised populations do 
not have homogenous experiences 
(Crenshaw 1989; 1991; Butler 2015). Class 
and race, intersecting with gender, result 
in significant power differences within 
the category of women such that a poor 
Haitian woman, for example could be 
multiply marginalised vis-à-vis a middle-
class – or even poor – Dominican woman. 
Furthermore, even as the gendered 
dichotomy is flawed, the victim/trafficker 
dichotomy is also not as rigid as policy 
prescriptions suggest (Warren 2012). In 
fact, the labels of powerless victims and 
cruel traffickers are often imbued with 
moralising judgements of the sex trade 
in general (Sharma 2005; Lobasz 2012). 
These judgements and the policies they 
inform obscure more fluid dynamics 
between trafficker and trafficked and 
ignore the agency of supposed victims 
(Warren 2012; Russell 2014). 
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Journey Signs of Asylum Seeking
ernest zhanaev
This project tells a six-month 
photographic story which I started 
when I applied for asylum in the United 
Kingdom, wandering across the country 
while living in hostels or accommodation 
provided by Home Office. I took these 
photographs on a smartphone to 
capture the signs of the surrounding 
environment I saw. I spotted the signs 
in the streets of London, Birmingham, 
Leicester and some of them in the 
housing rented by Home Office in 2015. 
Discovering England by travelling 
and residing in different places brought 
me an understanding how people live 
outside London. Born in the Soviet 
Union, I see things that are very much 
familiar but I am also challenged by 
HOSTEL WARNINGS.
After we made an appointment with Home Office 
to apply for asylum we needed to stay somewhere 
for two weeks. This hostel in Bayswater was the 
only solution. There was a kitchen where hostel 
guests could cook their lunch or dinner. The sign 
above the sink amused us. 
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previously unknown things, unsure of 
the truth and beliefs within the language 
and instructions reflected in these signs. 
‘Journey Signs’ should tell the viewer 
that an asylum seekers’ world during 
the application process is a very narrow 
one. The signs I chose to capture are 
not necessarily positive and can lead to 
anxiety that overwhelms asylum seekers 
like myself. It is these extremities in the 
language within such signs that attract 
the depressed mind squeezed in the 
everyday circumstances of uncertainty, 
bureaucracy, and poverty. To me, the 
tendency to notice only slogans full of 
negativity reflects the mental state of 
those who spot them. It made me feel 
as if I am still an outsider, detached from 
the real positivity of the environment I 
have come to live in and narrowing my 
world into a corridor of signs and words.
ARTISTIC AND CREATIVE EXPRESSIONS
POLICE ARE AWARE. 
The smell of smoke lingered in 
the corridors, as well as anti-
social behaviour among the 
residents of the house. Yet the 
other asylum seekers I met who 
live here almost never complain 
or violate any rule.
153
OxMo Vol. 8, No. 2
WHO PROTECTS WHAT? The sign fencing a demolished area said there were trees behind it to protect. I did not know what trees 
exactly, perhaps they were far in the distance or this was an outdated sign of another place. What struck me was the dissonance of 
offering protection to something which had become a place of ruins and neglect rather than people seeking asylum. 
ARTISTIC AND CREATIVE EXPRESSIONS
154
OxMo Vol. 8, No. 2ARTISTIC AND CREATIVE EXPRESSIONS
EMERGENCY ACCOMMODATION.
Spelling mistakes in signs are a reminder of 
bureaucratic mistakes in asylum procedures, 
putting obstacles in the path towards 
refugees’ freedom and independence.
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WINDOW WARNINGS. Stained bedding and smeared walls are nothing if even windows are covered by 
something unpleasant, with warnings obscuring the view and tarnishing the perspective of the outside world.
The photographer 
Ernest Zhanaev is a human rights writer and consultant 
based in the UK since 2014. He was instrumental 
in making the Kyrgyzstan parliament adopt the UN 
Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture 
and latter to pass legislation for greater financial 
transparency in electoral law. He also edited English 
news for the independent Ferghana News covering 
developments in Central Asia. Now a consultant 
for international organisations and think tanks, 
Ernest researches human rights issues in post-Soviet 
countries specialising on freedom of speech, social 
and political development.
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